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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC AND BUSINESS CASE 







The Department of Defense (DoD) lags behind commercial entities in terms of adopting 
mobile computing technologies. Commercial smartphones offer scalable solutions to 
meet requirements ranging from business functions to tactical operations; however, these 
solutions require considerations beyond those applicable to the commercial sector. This 
research identifies whether potential solutions may contribute to three objectives: 1) 
reduce the DoD’s currently high device and service costs; 2) increase the DoD’s 
smartphone functionality; 3) maintain or increase the level of security functionality 
available in commercial devices for DoD.  
 A strategic analysis of the commercial mobile communications industry 
highlights the business drivers and motivations of industry participants. This information 
is used to identify the DoD’s strategic options, which, in turn, serve as the basis of 
business cases for adopting future smartphone capabilities. Business case analyses 
compare proposed cost models with the cost models for current smartphone 
implementations. 
 Results indicate growing strategic opportunities for the DoD to acquire more 
economical commercial handsets and more flexible network services. The business cases 
may potentially save billions of dollars over seven years—i.e., the estimated life cycle of 
cellular network equipment. Risk assessments demonstrate the strong potential for the 
proposed solutions to maintain handset functionality, security features, and network 
coverage. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has a clearly stated need for interoperable, affordable, 
innovative, and small form factor mobile communication devices. To date, however, the 
DoD has been unable to acquire a suitable device, or set of devices, that meets all of its 
needs. The DoD’s unique requirements for supporting secure communications further 
increase the complexity of efficiently procuring the devices.  
Currently, the defense services procure unclassified commercial handsets and 
network services in a fractured manner via various contracting vehicles. The 
inefficiencies found in these vehicles ultimately limit the DoD’s mobile communications 
potential for both unclassified and classified communications. Although the existing 
vehicles for procuring secure communications are more centralized, the current 
government-only solutions also result in inefficiencies. The shortfalls in the current 
situation ultimately translate to imprudent cost allocations, either directly in actual dollars 
or indirectly through various means (e.g., decreased productivity or suboptimal technical 
capability). 
The authors of this paper conducted strategic and business case analyses to 
identify a path toward achieving mobile communications solutions that meet the 
following criteria: 
1) Reduce the DoD’s high device and service costs, 
2) Increase overall smartphone functionality for the DoD, and 
3) Maintain or increase the level of security functionality available in 
commercial devices for the DoD. 
The strategic analysis points out trends in market conditions that may allow the 
DoD greater leverage in acquiring suitable commercial handsets. Most notable among 
these trends are the apparent decreasing bargaining power of handset manufacturers and 
increasing opportunities for more flexible acquisition of mobile voice and data service 
(i.e., Mobile Virtual Network Operator [MVNO] opportunities).  
  2 
Following the strategic analysis, business case analyses address the potential 
costs, benefits, and a limited set of security considerations for undertaking the following 
two efforts: (1) acquiring a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cross-domain solution 
(CDS) smartphone, and (2) implementing one of various MVNO business models to 
obtain network services. As illustrated in Figure 1, these analyses yielded the following 
conclusions: 
 The current level of DoD spending for reoccurring wireless 
services is $235M for FY2010 with a $40M increasing trend. The 
current SME PED average annual total cost of ownership 
(including service) is $4,100 per user (amortized over 2 years).  
 Over seven years, DoD can potentially save $1B (in current 




















Figure 1.   DoD Wireless Services (Cost) 
In Figure 1, the blue bars represent the net present value (NPV) of costs for 
current DoD wireless services on the unclassified (e.g., BlackBerry) and classified (e.g., 
SME PEDs) domains. The proposed (red) bars represent the NPV of costs for the least 
costly MVNO approach.  
  3 
Figure 2 presents only the costs in order to clearly illustrate the difference in each 
of the seven years. The numbers under the years indicate the total estimated demand for 
wireless services based on current DoD trends. 
 
Figure 2.   DoD Wireless Services (Current Versus Proposed). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM 
On 20 Oct 2009, the Director of Army Capabilities Integration Center, Lieutenant 
General Michael Vane, signed a memorandum for the Army Acquisition Corps, 
clarifying his intent for the capabilities set 13-14 (FY13-14 solution). The document 
states,  
We strongly urge the development of an alternative that leverages the use 
of commercial technology at Company and below (Personal Digital 
Assistants [PDA], Blackberry, iPhone, etc.) for both Battle Command 
applications and communications and secure data only that needs to be 
classified as part of the transport system.  
The document continued by outlining objectives for the proposed capability at each level 
of command: (i) across echelons—provide command and control capabilities to enhance 
situational awareness and reduce current communication short falls, (ii) battalion and 
above—reduce communications hardware footprint, (iii) company and below—increase 
response time by reducing end-to-end latency. The remaining paragraphs provide a more 
detailed outline of the Army’s specific goals for adopting the technology (Vane, 2009).  
Later that year, 28 Dec 2009, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Peter 
Chiarelli, signed a memorandum stopping all acquisitions of communication devices 
without G-3/5/7 LWN/BC Directorate approval. The purpose of the order was to prevent 
purchase of ongoing noninteroperable communication devices. Over the past 8 years of 
the war, thousands of orders were submitted without any effort to maintain 
interoperability. He specifically stated, ―We must encourage innovation, not stifle it, 
while ensuring it can be integrated within a consistent and affordable network strategy‖ 
(Chiarelli, 2009).  
For the purpose of this paper, the point of referencing these documents is to 
highlight and validate the existence of a requirement for interoperable, affordable, 
innovative, and small form factor communication devices. Currently, multiple program 
offices within the Marine Corps and Army (MCSC PG-12 and PEO C3T) are actively 
  6 
refining a capabilities development document in conjunction with their respective 
requirements offices (MCCDC and TRADOC) in an effort to acquire devices in line with 
these high-level directives. In addition to the acquisition efforts, multiple Broad Agency 
Announcements (BAAs) and Requests for Information (RFIs) (i.e., BAA W15P7T-08-R-
P001, RFI CDID JTWCC, etc.) are posted in response to these continuing capability 
requirements. The ground elements of the military are poised to adopt cellular handset 
capabilities. 
In the past, DoD acquisition processes failed to provide a solution because of 
unsupportable business cases for suppliers, or because of the length of the acquisition 
process. Because of the nature of DoD procurements, technologies tend to change during 
the acquisition process, resulting in sometimes deprecated and incompatible equipment 
by the time it is fielded. These are well-known problems that commonly occur during 
acquisitions of rapidly changing technologies.1  
The overall goal of this work is to identify potential solutions to facilitate the 
following outcomes for the DoD: 
 Reduce the traditionally high cost of secure mobile devices, and 
reduce costs for network services 
 Increase functionality in the form of handset capabilities and 
increased mobile network coverage. 
 Maintain, and in some cases increase, the level of security of 
mobile communications in the DoD. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research is inspired by the lack of military communication capabilities in 
comparison with the commercial industry. In the interest of leveraging COTS 
smartphones for military applications, the research described here analyzes the COTS 
smartphone industry and develops a business case for adopting future smartphone 
                                                 
1 Refer to the September 2006 GAO report on Best Practices for a discussion of some issues. Report 
number GAO-06-883. Available from http://www.gao.gov/. 
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capabilities. The authors focus on identifying the current cost models and comparing 
them with various proposed models. Findings indicate that the DoD can acquire COTS 
solutions at lower costs than current Government Off-the-Shelf (GOTS) solutions without 
significantly increasing security vulnerabilities.  
This research aims to answer the following questions: 
 What are the potential costs and benefits of integrating secure COTS 
smartphone capabilities with existing military networks? 
 Who are the participants in the mobile communications ecosystem and 
what drives their businesses?  
 To what extent does the DoD require a separate infrastructure to support 
secure communications?  
 What cost drivers are shaping the commercial smartphone market and will 
continue to drive them in the future? What are the cost drivers and models 
for the current Department of Defense (DoD) smartphones? 
 What are potential costs to modify a COTS smartphone to meet the 
specifications required by DoD communication policies? 
 What are the potential security benefits and risks of the various options for 
the DoD to obtain mobile computing capabilities? 
 What benefits might be captured by making COTS smartphones available 
to a wider base of DoD users? 
 What blend of cost, security, and performance will provide the most 
security functionality for the least cost?  
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The following methods were used to gather and analyze data in support of 
answering the research questions: 
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 A network value analysis to identify and discern the relationships between 
industry participants. 
 A five forces analysis to analyze the network services market and the 
handset market within the United States. 
 Cost analyses to identify the costs of the current DoD solution, the base 
case, as well as those of other potential solutions.  
 A high-level risk analysis of each potential solution to determine its 
security benefits.  
 A comparison and sensitivity analysis of the costs and benefits of potential 
solutions to those of the base case will complete the cost-benefit analysis.  
The following list describes the contents of the ensuing chapters: 
Chapter II.  A strategic analysis of the commercial mobile 
communications ecosystem aimed at identifying the 
participants and the factors that drive their business 
decisions. This chapter includes an assessment of the 
DoD’s strategic options for leveraging the industry to 
obtain mobile computing capabilities. 
Chapter III.  A business case analysis of the acquisition of secure COTS 
handsets for DoD personnel. 
Chapter IV.  A business case analysis of the potential reorganization of 
the DoD’s strategy for the use of a Mobile Virtual Network 
Operator model to obtain mobile network services. 
Chapter V. A summary of the DoD’s strategic options, a summary and 
list of the potential benefits of COTS smartphone and 
network service business cases, and a discussion of 
potential future work. 
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Additionally, appendices as listed in the table of contents are included to elaborate 
on background and supporting information or provide data used in the analyses. Finally, 
government-only addenda containing sensitive but unclassified information are internally 
maintained and are available upon request. 
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II. THE COMMERCIAL MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 
ECOSYSTEM 
The commercial mobile communications ecosystem consists of a global industry 
encompassing multiple subindustries and markets that work together to deliver mobile 
voice and data services to consumers. Analysts often refer to these subindustries as 
regional industries, and they are generally separated by geographic boundaries. One can 
further segment these subindustries into their contributing parts. For instance, network 
operators and handset manufacturers make up the two major subcomponents of any 
regional mobile communications industry. However, the dynamics within industries in 
different regions can vary significantly due to a multitude of factors such as government 
regulations and consumer tastes. Therefore, when necessary for simplicity and accuracy, 
this chapter focuses its description and analysis on the mobile communications industry 
in the United States. 
A. INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION 
The mobile communications industry exists to connect the mobile consumer with 
the existing telecommunications infrastructure (both the publicly switched telephone 
network [PSTN] and the Internet). This merging of technologies serves as a source of 
complexity in the market structure, and it influences the growth of the industry. Due to 
this dynamic, ranking providers of the various services is very difficult. In these cases, 
examples of current firms are provided. 
A fragmented, but highly interconnected industry has materialized to deliver the 
voice and data capabilities that mobile users demand. The major entities consist of those 
who perform the following activities: 
 Develop and manage the infrastructure.  
 Develop and provide mobile handsets to users. 
 Provide content (data) for mobile users to access.  
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Figure 3 depicts the industry structure as a hierarchy meant to illustrate the 
general positioning of major market participants. It begins with the single global industry 
at the top, regional network operator subindustries in the next layer, and then the various 
market participants in the lower layers. This depiction identifies the participants and their 
general alignment, but it only hints at the intricacies of the markets. For instance, 
government regulation and technical standards and protocols are shown in the margins to 
acknowledge the fact that those forces affect operations and evolution of the industry. 
The value network, presented following the description of industry participants, focuses 
on displaying interactions between firms. 
 
Figure 3.   Mobile Communications Industry–Hierarchical Depiction 
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1. Summary Description of Industry Participants 
The following paragraphs offer descriptions of the industry participants illustrated 
in Figure 3. In addition to a basic description, the paragraphs provide examples of 
specific firms performing those functions. 
a. Mobile Network Operators 
Mobile Network Operators (MNO) essentially act as the gateway for users 
to access the capabilities, products, and services located within the PSTN and Internet. 
They invest in providing, leasing, and managing mobile networks. MNOs earn revenue 
by selling service to consumers (including operators who resell services). AT&T, 
Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile represent the top MNOs in the United States (Smith, 
2010).2 A more detailed description of MNOs follows this summary of participants.  
b. Radio and Core Network Device Providers 
The radio access and core network device providers specialize in 
designing, fabricating, and selling the actual hardware components that make up the 
mobile network. They provide this hardware to MNOs who connect and operate the 
equipment along with machine-to-machine capabilities that are essential to an MNO’s 
ability to offer quality services to customers. Network device providers may specialize in 
either radio or core network equipment, or they may be diversified between the two. They 
may also operate in other industries that require similar technology. Some examples of 
radio and core network providers include Ericsson, Nokia Siemens Networks (joint 
venture between Siemens AG and Nokia), and Motorola Solutions, Inc.3 
c. Content Providers 
Content providers develop and make content (e.g., ringtones, wallpaper, 
and location-based information) available to users via either a network operator’s portal 
(e.g., T-Mobile’s T-zones) or the Internet. They provide this service to the users, but their 
                                                 
2 Based on company descriptions available from Hoover's Company Records database (2011, March 
1). 
3 Ibid. 
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revenue may come either from the network operator or directly from the user. 
Additionally, this category of industry participants includes what McNally et al. (2007) 
described as content aggregators. These aggregators interface between content providers 
and network operators (providing a many-to-one or many-to-many relationship) to 
facilitate content formatting for presentation to users via operators’ portals (McNally et 
al., 2007). A content aggregator may maintain a network operator’s portal or a portal of 
its own, which users access via a handset. Increasingly, one can describe any company 
with an online presence as a content provider. Specific content providers include the 
following companies: Hands-On Mobile, Inc.; Digital Chocolate, Inc.; and Glu Mobile, 
Inc.4 The companies, Zed Worldwide, Digital Bridges, and Motricity, represent content 
aggregators.5 
d. Handset Manufacturers and Retailers 
Handset manufacturers provide users with the means for accessing 
content, or connecting with one another, via the mobile network. These firms earn 
revenue by selling handsets to MNOs and retail businesses who, in turn, sell those 
handsets to consumers. Examples of retail businesses include Radio Shack, Walmart, and 
Target. Handset manufacturers invest in research and development, and they perform the 
integration and engineering necessary to build handsets from hardware and software 
obtained from various suppliers. The industry separates handsets into multiple categories 
based on their capabilities. The terms smartphone and feature phone appear most 
commonly used to describe the majority of mobile devices currently available. CTIA-The 
Wireless Association® (CTIA, 2010a), defined smartphones as ―wireless phones with 
advanced data features and often keyboards … [and the] ability to better manage data and 
Internet access‖ (para. 6). Synthesizing this definition with that of others, this project 
defines smartphones as mobile cellular handsets that support high-level operating systems 
and are capable of running advanced third-party applications (Pyramid Research, 2009; 
Llamas & Stofega, 2010; Smith, 2010). Given no authoritative definition for feature 
                                                 
4 Based on company descriptions available from Hoover's Company Records database (2011, March 
1). 
5 Ibid. 
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phone, one can regard a feature phone as a handset that provides voice and data 
capabilities via a simplified user interface with limited potential for third-party 
applications. The leading mobile phone manufacturers in the United States are Nokia, 
LG, Motorola, and Samsung (Datamonitor, 2010c). The leading smartphone 
manufactures, according to Global Industry Analysts (2010), include Research in Motion 
(RIM) and Apple, who commanded a combined 75% of the market in 2008. Other 
competitors include Palm (acquired by HP in 2010), HTC, Samsung, and Nokia (Global 
Industry Analysts, 2010). 
e. Handset Component Manufacturers 
Handset component manufacturers build the electronic hardware that 
resides within the handsets. This category of firms consists of a wide variety of 
businesses that produce items ranging from handset casings to antennae to 
microprocessors. These components must meet communication specifications for the 
network they access, and they must integrate into the overall design of the handset. 
Therefore, producers of these components must interface with both handset 
manufacturers and applicable wireless standards-developing bodies. Among leading 
component manufacturers, Qualcomm is one of the most well-known semiconductor 
companies. Its competitors consist of Broadcom, Texas Instruments, and Freescale 
Semiconductor.6 
f. Operating System Providers 
Although the operating system (OS) can be considered a handset 
component, it plays a unique role. Software firms—synonymous with platform 
providers—develop the OS to interface with all of the other components (e.g., screen, 
keyboard, memory, etc.). They market their products directly to end-users as well as 
handset manufacturers. Because the OS exists partly to optimize management of system 
resources, platform providers must work with handset manufacturers to ensure 
interoperability with the hardware. These firms invest in software development and 
                                                 
6 Based on company descriptions available from Hoover's Company Records database (2011, March 
1). 
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interoperability with handset hardware. They earn software-licensing revenue from 
handset manufacturers. The following list contains OSs that led the global smartphone 
market in terms of units shipped in 2009: Symbian, BlackBerry, Windows, and iPhone 
OS (MarketsandMarkets, Inc., 2010).  
g. Application Providers 
Logically, applications run at a higher and less-privileged layer than the 
OS (i.e., the applications reside above the kernel and middleware). Applications on 
mobile phones perform specific usability-enhancing functions for users beyond those that 
the OS provides organically. Providers of applications must work with OS vendors, or at 
least have access to OS application programming interfaces, to ensure compatibility with 
the OS. Applications may be prepackaged with operating systems (e.g., games), 
suggesting a perceived advantage of combining the two complementary products. 
Alternatively, an end user may add (i.e., install) third-party applications to the device. 
Smartphones such as iPhone and BlackBerry, and increasingly others, leverage the latter 
case. In this model, an application provider can range from a major corporation to an end 
user. For example, Time magazine maintains a list of the top 50 iPhone applications for 
2011 by category: Games (Angry Birds, Scrabble, Plants v. Zombies, etc.), On the Go 
(Kayak, Yelp, Word Lens, etc.), Lifestyle (e.g., Amazon, Epicurious, Mixology), Music 
and Photography (e.g., Mog, Pandora, Sound Hound), Entertainment (e.g., Netflix, 
IMDb, ESPN Scorecenter, etc.), and Social (Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc.).7 
2. Mobile Network Operators in Depth 
Jaspers, Hulsink, and Theeuwes (2007) described the MNO function as both 
network management and service provision. Traditionally, the MNO provides all of these 
capabilities as a vertically integrated firm, but fairly recent developments have created 
space for others to participate in the process. MNOs remain the central participants; 
however, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) and Mobile Virtual Network 
Enablers (MVNE) can augment the MNO. In the United States, an MNO obtains a 
                                                 
7 List found on Time Magazine website: www.time.com. 
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license from the government to utilize a given frequency band in a given area. The MNO 
then acquires network infrastructure and institutes operational (managing the network), 
business (customer interaction), and marketing (supporting marketing campaigns and 
sales activities) support systems (McNally et al., 2007). These three systems are 
sometimes referred to as simply the operational support system (OSS), and their 
existence sheds light on the wide range of activities the MNO function encompasses. The 
notion that a firm builds its businesses around a single core competency (e.g., managing 
radio networks or customer support) supports the case for existence of other specialist 
firms like the MVNO and MVNE. 
a. Mobile Virtual Network Operators 
To an end user, MVNOs provide the same services that MNOs provide; 
however, the term virtual indicates that, in reality, some MNO functions are normally 
abstracted away. CTIA-The Wireless Association (2010b) defined an MVNO as ―a 
company that buys network capacity from a network operator in order to offer its own 
branded mobile subscriptions and value-added services to customers‖ (para. 11). In 
essence, the industry generally views an MVNO as a network operator that does not own 
spectrum. Note, however, that exceptions may exist due to continual innovation of the 
business case.  
(1) The Economic Business Case for MVNO. McNally et al. (2007) 
asserted that the MVNO business model has been driven by the following three 
strategies:  
 Segmentation-driven strategies: MVNOs may help MNOs reach different 
market segments by providing more targeted marketing. 
 Network utilization-driven strategies: Through targeted marketing, an 
MVNO may help an MNO utilize excess capacity. 
 Product-driven strategies involving marketing to customers who have 
specialized service requirements. For example, provision of service 
centered on handsets that contain simple interfaces and large buttons. 
Economic theory helps illustrate one scenario in which an MVNO 
adds value to the industry. Consider a market where the incumbent MNO operates a 
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mobile network serving a large majority of the consumer base but has no intention to 
offer service (advertise) to the remaining underserved consumers who are not willing to 
pay as much. As illustrated in Figure 4, the MNO charges a service price (P1 on the y-
axis) that it determines will maximize its marginal benefit. It will not lower the price 
because the marginal cost of doing so outweighs the marginal benefit. Q1, on the x-axis, 
indicates the quantity of service that consumers demand based on the price. The shaded 
area indicates an inefficiency called deadweight loss (DWL) resulting from this 
arrangement. In this case, the DWL represents remaining network capacity, or 
bandwidth, that goes unused. The MNO has already incurred the cost of leasing the 
spectrum, but it reaps no benefit from the unsold capacity. Similarly, some consumers 
demand service, but they are unwilling to pay the price at P1. Thus, the DWL represents 
the value of the MNO’s unsold capacity combined with the consumers’ unmet demand.  
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Given the aforementioned conditions, an MVNO can enter this 
market, offer a price that the underserved consumers are willing to pay, and tailor the 
service to those consumers’ values. In this ideal scenario, all parties gain in the following 
ways:  
 The MNO earns revenue on the previously unused capacity that it 
sells to the MVNO.  
 Previously underserved consumers obtain service.  
 The MVNO earns a profit by providing mobile services to a select 
group more efficiently than the MNO.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the resultant market at equilibrium with a 
higher quantity of service (Qe) provided at an overall lower price (Pe). This example 
represents one of many cases, presented here to help explain the continuing presence of 
MVNOs in the industry. 
 
Figure 5.   Economic Depiction of a Market With Both an MNO and MVNOs at 
Economic Equilibrium 
In this example, the value of the MVNO to its host MNO lies in 
the fact that it targets a specific user base (i.e., possibly, but not necessarily, a niche 
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market) that differs from the host MNO’s user base, thereby allowing the MNO to gain 
revenue from otherwise unused capacity. The model protects the MVNO from competing 
with its host MNO; however, this model can result in competition between the MVNO 
and other MNO competitors. In this case, the MVNO essentially acts as a fighting brand 
where its low price competition combines with the host MNO’s differentiation to take 
market share from competing MNOs or MVNOs.8  Such a strategy is part of a broader 
pattern of industry specialization and change.9 
(2) The MVNO Continuum. As previously stated, any operator that 
provides services to consumers, but does not own spectrum, may be referred to as an 
MVNO. This definition is quite broad, given the breadth of requirements to provide basic 
mobile service. Jaspers et al. (2007) have distinguished between types of MVNOs based 
on the extent to which they control their own resources. The term service provider (SP) 
refers to resellers, enhanced service provider (ESP) describes those who also offer 
services such as voice-mail, and full MVNO indicates firms who perform more network 
management services (managing core network functions, etc.) (Jaspers et al., 2007; H. 
White, 2010).  
Table 1 illustrates the range of services available to an MVNO by 
listing a subset of operator-provided services and indicating which type of operator will 
provide that service. The MNO column is included in the table to serve as a point of 
reference.  
 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of fighting brands, see: ―Multiproduct quality competition: fighting brands and 
product line pruning,‖ by Johnson & Myatt (2003) in American Economic Review 93, no. 3, 748–774. 
9 For further discussion, see Geroski & Vlassopoulos (1991) and Jacobides (2005). 
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 MVNO MNO 
Service Reseller (SP) ESP Full MVNO  
Sales     
Marketing     
Customer Service     
Billing     
Provisioning (issue SIM)     




, MMS**, etc.) 
    
Manage Core Network     
Manage Radio Access 
Network (RAN) 
    
Own Spectrum Rights     
*SMS: short message service 
**MMS: multimedia messaging service 
Table 1.   Range of Services From Reseller Through MNO10 
b. Mobile Virtual Network Enablers 
According to McNally et al. (2007), a MVNE ―provides infrastructure and 
services to enable MVNOs to offer services‖ (p. 38) to consumers. The MVNE fills the 
gap between the services the MVNO chooses to provide and those that the MNO will 
maintain. Consider, for example, a firm aspiring to function as a SP (i.e., provide sales, 
marketing, customer service, and billing) under a MNO that does not wish to provide the 
intermediate services (i.e., those listed under ESP and full MVNO in Table 1) to enable 
the SP’s business model. A MVNE may provide a service to the SP by offering 
provisioning and messaging services, for example, on behalf of the SP. This relationship 
allows a MVNO the flexibility to start its business at any point in the MVNO continuum, 
focusing on the set of services that allows it to maximize its profit while potentially 
developing competency in offering more services. Over time, if supported by its business 
model, the MVNO can take over services from the MVNE.  
Extending the MVNE model, an entity called the Mobile Virtual Network 
Aggregator (MVNA) has recently joined the European industry. This type of firm does 
                                                 
10 Adapted from data presented by Jasper et al. (2007) and White (2009). Note: while the terms SP and 
ESP do not appear globally standardized, they do seem well understood in the European industry. 
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not currently appear to have a strong presence in the United States, but it may expand 
into the U.S. market, so it is briefly described here. A MVNA provides services similar to 
those of a MVNE. Additionally, the MVNA ―purchases mobile airtime in bulk from the 
partner mobile operator, adds its service platform and wholesales this airtime to multiple 
MVNOs‖ (A. White, 2010). The U.K. company x-Mobility represents an example 
MVNA.11 
c. Supporting Service Providers 
McNally et al. (2007) have drawn attention to the existence of underlying 
service providers that enable the value-added services hosted on MNO networks. These 
firms are not depicted in the diagrams, but are worth mentioning as enablers of the 
MNO’s functions. Radio Access Network (RAN) providers such as American Tower 
Corporation and Crown Castle International Corporation construct base station towers, 
lease the equipment to MNOs, and may provide operational support.12 While they act as 
network device providers, these firms also participate in providing the MNO function. 
Concordantly, within the core network, specialized firms may provide messaging 
capabilities (e.g., voicemail, SMS, and MMS messaging), Internet Protocol (IP) 
subsystem, telephone number clearinghouse, and other services. Core network providers 
may include the provision of some of these services along with their infrastructure 
equipment, but standalone providers also exist in this submarket. In the current work, we 
consider these entities part of the MNO business—they are mentioned here to shed light 
on a submarket existing beyond the scope of this analysis. 
3. Market-Influencing Factors 
A description of this industry is incomplete without consideration of the forces 
that contribute to its current state and evolution. Additionally, Figure 3 includes 
government regulation and standardization. Beyond general business regulations, 
                                                 
11 X-mobility claims to provide the services of MVNO, MVNE, and MVNA. See http://www.x-
mobility.com/mvna-mobile-virtual-network-aggregator/. 
12 The Mergent Online database (2008) described American Tower Corporation as an owner and 
operator of wireless communications sites; and Crown Castle, listed as a competitor, has a similar business 
description. 
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governments can significantly influence the actions of private and public businesses. In 
the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces the 
telecommunications stipulations in the Telecommunications Act. The FCC’s 
management of the commercial electromagnetic spectrum shapes the industry because all 
activity centers on the ability to transmit and receive radio signals. The FCC assigns and 
manages spectrum rights through licenses.  
Likewise, technical standards and protocols (e.g., standard hardware interfaces or 
Code Division Multiple Access) influence the design and construction of devices as well 
as how they are used. Standards place limits on either the type or method of hardware 
production, but they also help to foster interoperability between components 
manufactured by different vendors. They encourage and enable rapid and wide fielding of 
the complex the technologies at the heart of this industry. The influence of both of these 
forces is clarified in the industry analysis.  
4. Value Network 
Figure 6 illustrates the Value Network diagram resulting from the above 
discussion of industry participants. Each square represents a market participant. Lines 
represent some relationship between them, and the arrows indicate a positive flow of 
value or benefit. For instance, the double arrow on the link between handset 
manufacturers and network operators indicates that each entity benefits from the 
relationship (i.e., value flows in both directions). The analyses of the MNO and handset 
manufacturer markets provide further insight into these relationships. 
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Figure 6.   Industry Value Network13  
B. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
This industry analysis employs Porter’s five forces analysis technique to 
illuminate the drivers of industry profitability (Porter, 2008). Due to the complex set of 
interrelationships between entities, two separate analyses were conducted: one from the 
perspective of MNOs, and the other from the handset manufacturers’ perspective. This 
separation follows the argument that industry functions exist in two broad segments. One 
segment focuses on content-related services and applications, and the other focuses on 
network infrastructure and edge devices (Sabat, 2003). The MNOs act as the hub of  
 
                                                 
13 Developed using methods discussed by Christensen (1997) and Peppard & Rylander (2006). This 
figure was influenced by similar diagrams presented by Peppard & Rylander (2006), Lin (2003), and 
Whalley and Li (2002). 
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content-related services and applications, and the handset manufacturers provide the edge 
devices. Infrastructure developers and vendors serve as the suppliers and enablers of 
these two markets. 
The following list describes Porter’s five forces:14 
 Threat of Entry: A high threat of entry by new firms tends to limit 
profitability through downward pressure on prices. Analysis 
mostly consists of consideration of the barriers to entry. 
 Supplier Power: The bargaining power of suppliers can affect 
prices, costs, and the actions of industry participants. Powerful 
suppliers tend to limit profitability by seizing a greater share of the 
value of products and services.  
 Buyer Power: Powerful consumers can limit profitability by 
demanding lower prices. 
 Threat of Substitutes: Porter describes substitutes as ever-present 
but easily overlooked. A high threat of substitutes limits 
profitability. 
 Rivalry: Indicative of competition and taking many forms, a high 
degree of rivalry limits industry profitability. 
Porter (2008) has also considered the following four factors that intersect multiple 
forces: industry growth rate, technology and innovation, government (regulation), and 
complementary products or services. Two goods are complements if an increase in the 
price of one good leads to a decrease in demand for the other (Mankiw, 2006)—
consumer demand for both goods is synchronized. Additionally, and along the same lines 
of complements, this industry is susceptible to network effects that may impact multiple 
forces. This phenomenon links a product’s value with the number of consumers using 
it—that is, buyers place greater value on a particular product as the product’s user base 
increases (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Discussion of these factors is included at the end of 
each analysis. 
                                                 
14 As described by Porter (2008). 
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1. Five Forces Analysis of Mobile Network Operators 
Overall, the U.S. MNO market appears highly attractive and profitable for 
incumbents. MNOs face a very low threat of entry, they are strong compared to buyers 
and suppliers, substitutes are limited, and rivalry remains tempered by a high growth rate 
and high technological innovation. 
The fact that only a few MNOs control the majority of the market share 
(Datamonitor 2010b) serves as strong evidence supporting the notion that MNOs reside 
in a generally comfortable position. Figure 7 illustrates the market share of the leading 
MNOs, showing that these four firms control 89% of the market. The strong positioning 
of these market leaders gives them an advantage in seizing new opportunities that result 
from the high industry growth rate. The market value growth rate was 7.7% between 
2005 and 2009 (Datamonitor, 2010b). 
 
Figure 7.   U.S. Mobile Network Operators’ Market share15 
The following paragraphs assess each force, identifying the driving factors, and 
assigning a score of either low, moderate, or high.  
                                                 
15 From Datamonitor (2010b). 
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a. Threat of Entry 
Entry barriers determine the threat of entry into the market. The 
predominant barriers for this market include capital requirements and regulation (i.e., the 
way the FCC allocates spectrum and interprets and enforces telecommunications policy). 
The threat of entry into the industry as an MNO is assessed as low. The driving forces are 
discussed in the ensuing paragraphs. 
(1) Capital Requirements. The data from the 700 MHz cellular 
auction that closed in March 2008 illustrate the large capital requirements for entering the 
MNO market. The FCC awarded approximately one thousand licenses for approximately 
$19B (FCC, n.d.).  
(2) Regulation. In its auction 73 fact sheet, the FCC (2008) 
lists specific permissible operations to which MNOs are constrained during the ten-year 
license period. For example, licensees holding Cellular Market Area (CMA) and 
Economic Area (EA) licenses must meet benchmark criteria for providing cellular 
coverage to specific amounts of the population in their license area. They must file 
construction notices and supporting documentation to show compliance with the 
benchmarks. Noncompliance results in a two-year reduction of the license term. While 
the FCC levies these requirements to ensure that licensees develop and provide services 
with the spectrum they acquire, these requirements also increase firms’ barriers to entry 
by increasing legal and capital requirements. 
The FCC also takes actions that encourage competition and result 
in lowered barriers to entry. It offers bidding credits, in the form of either a 15% or 25% 
discount on winning bids, to small and very small businesses respectively. A small 
business has a three-year average annual revenue of between $15M and $40M, and a very 
small business has a three-year average annual revenue of less than $15M). The 
commission also incentivizes development on federally recognized tribal lands by 
offering additional bidding credits to those firms bidding for spectrum on those lands. 
Notwithstanding these mitigations to high entry barriers, the largest bidders still 
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maintain a healthy competitive advantage. The data show that the two largest U.S. 
MNOs, AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless, own winning bids worth nearly $16B 
(82% of the sum of all winning bids) in auction 73.  
This assessment does not include the entry of subindustry 
participants such as MVNOs. The threat of entry for these entities is increasing due to 
FCC policy,16 but MVNOs by definition lack the resources to affect the business viability 
or profitability of MNOs.  
b. Supplier Power 
The main suppliers to MNOs include radio access and core network 
providers, messaging providers, content providers, and various other service providers. 
Supplier power is assessed as low due to standardization, an abundance of suppliers, and 
substitutes for content providers. Table 2 lists examples of standards for RAN providers, 
core network providers, and content providers.  
RAN Core Network Providers Content 
Providers 
UMTS SMS MNO Portal 
GPRS MMS WAP 
HSPA+ SS7 IP 
Table 2.   Example Standards for Suppliers of MNOs17 
Standardization reduces entry barriers for the network and service supplier 
markets, and it reduces suppliers’ opportunities to differentiate from competitors. 
Suppliers’ inability to differentiate is an indicator of low supplier power (Porter, 2008). 
This situation results in larger numbers of suppliers and, therefore, higher competition as 
the supplier base increases. Supplier power decreases as the combined size of suppliers 
increases relative to the size of MNOs. This relationship exists because an MNO can use 
                                                 
16 See http://wireless.fcc.gov/licensing/index.htm?job=secondary_markets. 
17 After McNally et al. (2007) and 3GPP,  http://www.3gpp.org.  
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the competition between suppliers to induce lower prices. More suppliers equates to more 
leverage for an MNO. These phenomena reduce the power that suppliers can wield over 
MNOs.  
In evaluating content providers, McNally et al. (2007) asserted that the 
power of content providers decreases as users gain options for accessing content. For 
instance, as Table 2 implies, users have the option of accessing content directly via the 
Internet instead of having to transit an MNO portal, content aggregator, or specially 
formatted WAP page. The existence of HyperText Markup Language (HTML) browsers 
on handsets greatly increases the amount of content a user can reach and simultaneously 
reduces the power of content providers and aggregators relative to that of MNOs. 
c. Buyer Power 
General categories of buyers include residential, corporate (both small 
business and large enterprise), and government customers. The market position of the 
MNOs, previously presented in Figure 7, represents a significant factor in limiting buyer 
power. The high rate of growth and the large number of consumers also drive buyer 
power downward; therefore, buyer power is assessed as low.18 
The CTIA (2010c) reported the number of mobile subscribers as 292M in 
the second quarter of 2010. It also reported that the average local monthly bill was 
$47.47, translating to $570 per year. Individually, each customer lacks the power to affect 
the revenue of even T-mobile, the lowest-earning of the top four MNOs in 2009. As for 
larger customers, the DoD had a total budget of $693B (DoD, 2011) and spent 
approximately $221M19 on mobile services in 2009. This dollar value equals about 1% of 




                                                 
18 Porter (2008) states that the existence of few buyers indicates high buyer power, thereby implying 
that a large number of buyers indicates low buyer power. 
19 Refer to Chapter IV for details on DoD spending. 
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if not the largest—mobile service purchasers in 2009, one may conclude that no single 
large-volume purchaser can exert enough economic influence to affect the margins of 
MNOs.  
d. Threat of Substitutes 
The threat of substitutes is assessed as low due to the high industry growth 
rate and sustained MNO revenues. Porter (2008) defined a substitute as an item that 
―performs the same or a similar function‖ (p. 84) as the item in question. In this case, the 
function performed involves mobile access to voice communications and data services. 
The following set of substitutes provided by Sabat (2003) applies: IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) 
voice and data technology, wireline (e.g., digital subscriber line [DSL], cable, and PSTN) 
voice and data technology coupled with personal computer (PC) functionality, and 
cordless telephones. None of these substitutes offers the same range of capabilities as an 
MNO’s services, indicating a reduced threat. Additionally, the high industry growth rate 
indicates a low threat of substitutes. In terms of revenue, the FCC has reported decreases 
in wireline access accompanied by increases in wireless access (―Trends in Telephone 
Service,‖ 2010). Figure 8 illustrates this trend, supporting the assertion that users value 
wireless service over those of substitutes, especially wired services.  
 
Figure 8.   End-User Telecommunications Revenues20 
                                                 
20 After FCC (2010a).   
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e. Rivalry 
This assessment considers the effect of rivalry on profitability. The large 
market share controlled by the four largest MNOs indicates reduced rivalry. Furthermore, 
Figure 9 displays their net additions—change in subscribership—showing that only 
Sprint has lost market share in recent years while the other three gained more subscribers. 
Given this situation, the intensity of rivalry is assessed as low. The following list provides 
the conditions under which rivalry is most intense, according to Porter (2008): 
 Competitors are numerous or have roughly equal size and power. 
 Slow growth of the industry. 
 High exit barriers. 
 Competitors are highly committed to the business, especially 
beyond economic performance. 
 Firms are inhibited from reading each other’s signals. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Net Additions (Change in Subscribership) of Four Largest MNOs21 
As the industry market share indicates, the major competitors are not 
numerous, and even the four largest firms have widely varying size and power. Similarly, 
the industry’s 7.7% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) demonstrates that the 
                                                 
21 From FCC (2010b). 
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growth rate is not slow. While the high entry barriers tend to increase the exit barriers 
(due to a firm’s drive to recoup its investment), all of the leading MNOs retain 
sufficiently diversified business structures to effect lowered exit barriers for themselves. 
The United States Telecommunications Report (2010) has reported the following 
information: AT&T has its roots, and remains deeply involved, in the fixed line 
telecommunications industry; Verizon Wireless is 45% owned by The U.K.’s Vodafone 
(suggesting international diversification) and participates in the fixed-line market; Sprint 
was founded as a fixed-line company in 1898 and remains involved in that market; 
T-mobile is owned by the globally diversified international company Deutsche Telekom.  
In March 2011, AT&T announced its acquisition of T-mobile.22 There are no apparent 
indications that any MNOs participate in the market for noneconomic reasons or have 
trouble reading each other’s signals. 
Datamonitor (2010b), among others, has reported intensifying 
competition; however, Porter (2008) has noted that ―Competition on dimensions other 
than price—on product features, support services, delivery time, or brand image, for 
instance—is less likely to erode profitability because it improves customer value and can 
support higher prices‖ (p. 86). Therefore, a high degree of competition on a single 
dimension other than price does not necessarily equate to high rivalry; and the data 
indicate that while MNOs compete aggressively for increased market share and revenue, 
this competition does not have a negative effect on their profitability. 
f. Factors Crossing Multiple Forces 
As is apparent in the above analysis, the high growth rate of 7.7%, coupled 
with high entry barriers, helps solidify the position of incumbents. New technology 
requires innovation, which, in turn, requires capital and expertise to manage its high risk. 
Furthermore, this constant innovation is aimed at providing the highly valued capabilities 
of increased mobility and higher data rates. Incumbents gain and maintain market share 
through this cycle of investing capital, accepting the high risk of innovation, and 
providing valuable new services to consumers who demand those services. 
                                                 
22 Press release available from http://www.att.com/gen/landing-pages?pid=6080. 
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The FCC restrictions on MNOs act as a significant barrier to entry, and 
they help shelter the incumbent MNOs from new entrants. In the year 2000, the FCC 
instituted its Secondary Markets Initiative23 to foster the development of secondary 
(reseller) markets for radio spectrum. However, this initiative only reduces the barriers 
for entry into the reseller and MVNO markets. The regulatory barriers to entering the 
market as an MNO remain unaffected by this initiative. 
Porter (2008) stated that ―the need to attract complements can raise 
barriers to entry‖ (p. 87). This assertion, coupled with the complex nature of the MNO 
business, indicates significantly high entry barriers because successful MNOs must work 
with many providers of complementary products and services to attract and retain 
customers. Those providers include handset manufacturers, voice-mail service providers, 
and content providers, among others. This situation supports the conclusion that this 
market remains attractive to incumbents while unattractive to new entrants. 
Vertical integration—one entity offering all services—represents a 
commitment that may attract more customers, however, partial integration via 
partnerships and joint ventures may suffice to increase an MNO’s market share.24 To this 
end, MNOs may use relationships with providers of complements, or they may offer 
specific services, as parts of strategies to leverage network effects. Verizon’s offer of 
unlimited calls and mobile messaging to other Verizon wireless customers provides an 
example of such a service.25 The network effects of the mobile market magnify the 
resulting increase in customer switching costs—i.e., costs incurred by who those switch 
to a different service provider. Increased switching costs reduce buyer power.  
2. Five Forces Analysis of Handset Manufacturers 
This analysis is limited to the smartphone market, since that platform is more 
appropriate for providing robust mobile computing capabilities. The participants in the 
broader U.S. handset market appear moderately well positioned with smartphone 
                                                 
23 See http://wireless.fcc.gov/licensing/index.htm?job=secondary_markets. 
24 Katz and Shapiro (1985) discuss vertical integration. 
25 Based on information provided at http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/splash/mobiletomobile.jsp. 
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manufacturers less so. The fast-paced nature of the market represents the major challenge 
to the strength of incumbents and market leaders. Also, communication standards and 
protocols, plus the physically limited space for differentiation, allow firms to compete in 
multiple global regions. These facts facilitate entry of new firms, and tend to decrease 
incumbents’ overall power. 
According to Datamonitor (2010c), the top handset manufacturers for all handsets 
include Motorola, Samsung, LG, and Nokia. Global Industry Analysts, Inc. (2010) 
reported the top U.S. smartphone makers in 2008 as RIM (55% market share), Apple 
(20% market share), and others (25%–including Palm, HTC, Nokia, Samsung, etc.). This 
disparity between leading manufacturers of different phone types illustrates the continual 
shift from old technology to that which is newer and more capable.  
a. Threat of Entry 
The threat of entry is assessed as moderate. This market requires relatively 
high capital and a high degree of expertise to design, manufacture, and integrate handset 
components for commercial use. Branding also raises barriers to entry and helps solidify 
the positions of some incumbents such as RIM and Apple.  
The market research firm, Pyramid Research (2009), reported the 
smartphone market share in quarter 3 of 2009 as follows:  
 RIM:   50% 
 Apple (iPhone):  24% 
Note that both RIM and Apple vertically integrate their handsets with in-
house produced OSs. They also have strong brand images as leaders in the corporate user 
group (RIM) and innovation (Apple). The remainder of the market share remains 
fragmented between nonvertically integrated manufacturers. This situation suggests a 
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lower threat of entry; however, new entrant opportunities are buoyed by the overall 
market growth rate of 5.8%26 and the decreasing cost of the smartphone.27  
Finally, the actual entry of new firms signals decreasing entry barriers. 
Companies producing electronics similar to smartphones may diversify into producing 
smartphones themselves—Apple’s entry into the market with the iPhone serves as an 
example (Datamonitor, 2010c). Other examples include Dell and Acer’s planned entry 
into the market (Business Monitor International [BMI], ―Company Profiles,‖ 2010), and 
Hewlett Packard’s acquisition of Palm (Edwards, 2010). 
b. Supplier Power 
Smartphone suppliers reside in one of two groups: those supplying 
components common to all handsets, and the suppliers of components unique to 
smartphones.  Common component providers have low power because, as previously 
asserted, standardization yields larger numbers of providers. The providers of the more 
valuable features that are unique to the smartphone, such as the operating system and 
touch screen, wield much more power than other providers because they provide 
capabilities highly valued by end users. Therefore, supplier power is assessed as 
moderate. 
Table 3 presents selected data from an iPhone 3G component teardown 
showing the differences in component costs. Higher cost components indicate a higher 
value, which, in turn, suggests higher bargaining power for suppliers of those 
components. 
 
                                                 
26 See Datamonitor’s (2010c) reported market value CAGR. 
27 Multiple sources including MarketsandMarkets (2010) and Global Industry Analysts, Inc. (2010). 
Exemplar data provided by The NPD Group (2009).  
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Component Cost ($) % of total 
Improved Touch Screen $ 20.00 12.0 % 
Display $ 20.00 12.0 % 
Application Processor $ 13.50 8.0 % 
HSDPA* Digital Baseband $ 15.00 9.0 % 
1Gbit SDRAM — Mobile DDR $ 5.00 3.0 % 
WLAN** chipset $ 4.00 2.5 % 
RF Transceiver $ 4.25 2.5 % 
Total Bill of Materials (BOM) Costs 
(Direct Materials Only) 
$ 164.00 100 % 
*HSDPA: High-Speed Downlink Packet Access 
**WLAN: Wireless Local Area Network 
Table 3.   Cost of Selected iPhone Components28 
c. Buyer Power 
The buyers of smartphones consist of MNOs and third-party retail 
businesses, who, in turn, sell phones to end users. As discussed earlier, MNOs represent 
the most powerful entities in the industry, and they tend to buy phones in large quantities. 
These facts suggest a strong potential for high buyer power. The handset does maintain a 
key position as the user’s entry point to access the network and reach content. Marketing 
directly to end users, entering into partnerships, and entering exclusive agreements with 
MNOs may help smartphone manufacturers maintain some of their power. The recent 
Microsoft-Nokia partnership illustrates these points.29 This partnership allows Nokia to 
differentiate its phones from those running Apple and Android OS, and Microsoft gains 
exclusivity with an overall leader in the handset market. It is unclear whether marketing 
and partnerships significantly affect the behavior of buyers. Given these facts, buyer 
power is assessed as high. 
In both its phone and services industry profiles, Datamonitor (2010b; 
2010c) reported the 2009 market values for services (operators) and phones (handsets) as 
$152.6B and $10.4B, respectively. Based on this data, Figure 10 displays the percentage 
of the combined total that each market captures. This comparison of market values 
                                                 
28 From Carson (2008). 
29 As reported in Microsoft and Nokia Partner on Smartphone Future by Ionescu, D. on February 11, 
2011. Available from http://www.pcworld.com. 
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illustrates the ability of MNOs to pull more value from the industry, and from 
partnerships, than handset manufacturers. These data support the conclusion that buyer 
power is high. 
 
Figure 10.   Difference in Value Captured by MNO and Handset Markets30 
d. Threat of Substitutes 
The threat of substitutes for smartphones is similar to the threat of 
substitutes for MNOs. While a wide range of devices can perform a subset of smartphone 
functions, no devices currently provide the same set of capabilities. Similar devices 
include tablet PCs, personal digital assistants, pocket PCs, netbook PCs, and 2-way 
radios. Some of these devices, such as laptops, may also act as complements, since users 
tend to own both a handset and a laptop (Datamonitor, 2010c). Due to the smartphone’s 
unique set of capabilities, the threat of substitutes is assessed as low. 
e. Rivalry 
Based on Porter’s (2008) criteria for highly intense rivalry, listed in the 
above MNO analysis, rivalry for this industry is assessed as low. 
                                                 
30 After FCC (2010b). 
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Competitors are relatively few, with RIM and Apple capturing nearly 75% 
of the market value. Although the field is growing, this data indicates low rivalry for the 
present.  
The industry continues to grow in volume, value, and technological 
capability. MarketsandMarkets (2010) reported that smartphones represented 9% of total 
phone sales in the first quarter of 2008, increasing to 23% by the end of 2009, and 
projected to continue on that trend through 2014. Finally, there are no indications that any 
manufacturers participate in the market for noneconomic reasons or have trouble reading 
each other’s signals. 
f. Factors Crossing Multiple Forces 
Similar to the MNO market, the high technological and economic growth 
rate increases market attractiveness for incumbents. However, the reduced entry barriers 
for smartphones also make the market appear attractive for new entrants. The growth rate 
increases innovation and drives competition on quality and capability higher, but rivalry 
for those innovation leaders remains low—that is, the competition does not significantly 
affect their margins. Furthermore, the high rate of technological change increases market 
profitability. 
The existence of complementary products and services can significantly 
impact the success of a handset. For example, if a handset manufacturer partners with a 
strong MNO, licenses a highly valued OS, or delivers its own complementary services 
(e.g., RIM’s enterprise services), that manufacturer could enjoy greater sales. Nokia’s 
strategy to bolster its business sales by partnering with Microsoft epitomizes this 
argument.31 The possibility of these alliances increases entry barriers and competition 
because it induces manufacturers to partner with both sellers and buyers who offer 
complementary products and services. Additionally, network effects of the market can 
increase the magnitude of the effects of these scenarios.  
                                                 
31 See press release, Nokia and Microsoft announce plans for a broad strategic partnership to build a 
new global ecosystem. Available from http://press.nokia.com. 
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C. INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 
Based on market trends and data presented in the Five Forces analyses, this 
section estimates impending changes to the industry and explores the areas that the DoD 
may best leverage to maximize performance, security, and cost savings.  
While the number of wireless subscribers has been steadily increasing since 1985, 
the rate of that growth (measured in percent change) has been steadily decreasing (CTIA, 
2010c). Figure 11 depicts this situation. These trends indicate that both increases in 
subscribers and increases in revenues are approaching zero, serving as an indicator of 
market saturation. Reduced growth yields reduce opportunities for differentiation, lead to 
increased rivalry, and create a higher likelihood of price competition in the markets that 
benefit from subscriber growth.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Total Wireless Subscribers, Total MNO Revenues, and the Growth Rate of 
Each32 
                                                 
32 From CTIA (2010). Note: the estimated MNO revenues are based on midyear revenue reports. 
Charts depict only recent data here. 
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1. Mobile Network Operator Trends 
Mobile Network Operators are the most powerful industry participants. They 
require products and services from multiple firms in order to conduct business, but they 
still manage to capture a large amount of the industry value, as shown when comparing 
MNO revenues to handset manufacturer revenues (Figure 10). MNOs will likely maintain 
their strong relative position due to no signs of changing government regulation regarding 
spectrum management, thereby keeping the entry threat low. Government efforts have 
encouraged growth in secondary markets (i.e., the secondary markets initiative) and rural 
markets (i.e., the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program [BTOP]).33 These 
incentives, coupled with MNOs’ willingness to support the MVNO business case, will 
support the continued growth of the MVNO, MVNE, and MVNA markets. BTOP Funds 
are not necessarily for cellular work, but could spark niche market growth in rural areas 
for either cellular or substitute technologies.  
The efforts to develop faster and more capable networks (e.g., LTE and WiMax), 
coupled with standards organizations’ efforts to proliferate standards, contribute to the 
continued consolidation of wireless technologies.34 Network equipment costs are also 
decreasing (Morgan Stanley, 2009). As more operators adopt increasingly more capable 
radio access and core network technologies, they will gain capacity to provide better 
services to users, but they will lose the ability to differentiate on that facet. This situation 
will contribute to increased rivalry. MNOs will likely seek increased revenues on unused 
capacity via MVNOs. Continued rivalry could induce MNOs to resort to price 
competition, sacrificing profit margins to retain customers. 
Although price competition between MNOs represents a logical possibility, its 
likelihood is reduced by the fact that these trends have so far had no appreciable effect on 
MNO revenues. Figure 12 displays the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA)—an indicator of profitability—over the past five years for 
selected MNOs. This data shows that even the profits of smaller MNOs—Leap and U.S. 
                                                 
33 BMI (―Market Data,‖ 2010). Also see BTOP website at http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/. 
34 The FCC (2010b) discusses the development of this situation. 
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Cellular in this case—have either remained constant or increased. Their ability to sustain 
profitability shows that MNOs have so far been able to find ways to maintain operating 
efficiency to make up for decreasing revenues. In addition, they have avoided price 
competition by offering increased quality or services (e.g., 4G technology).  
 
Figure 12.   Annual EBITDA Per Subscriber for Selected MNOs35 
2. Handset Manufacturer Trends 
Given the impending market saturation, handset manufacturers will compete more 
and more aggressively for lower numbers of new consumers. For the near term, 
smartphones will be less affected by this situation because that market is still growing. 
Figure 13 illustrates the percent breakdown of the handset market between smartphones 
and feature phones. The number of smartphones in the market is predicted to overtake the 
number of feature phones by the end of 2011 (MarketsandMarkets, 2010). As 
smartphones reach the saturation point in adopters, competition between handset 
manufacturers will intensify.  
                                                 
35 After FCC (2010b). EBITDA is a measure of profitability based on accounting profits before 
deducting interest expenses, corporate income taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
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Figure 13.   Handset Market Share of Smartphones and Feature Phones36 
New entrants into the smartphone market will also contribute to increases in 
rivalry.37 This increased rivalry will be fueled by the convergence of smartphone 
capabilities with those of PCs; and, like the PC, smartphones will likely begin to become 
commoditized. Less expensive components will decrease handset costs as well as barriers 
to entry for both handset manufacturers and their hardware suppliers. Figure 14 illustrates 
the reduction in smartphone selling price between 2006 and 2009. This scenario will 
result in an overall weakening of the bargaining power those firms in the handset market.  
                                                 
36 From MarketsandMarkets (2010). 
37 Between 2006 and 2009, the number of handset manufacturers that distribute within the United 
States increased from eight to 16 (FCC, 2010b). 
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Figure 14.   Average Smartphone Selling Price38 
The weakening of handset manufacturer bargaining power gives OS providers an 
opportunity to potentially gain greater value from the handset market. Among suppliers, 
OS providers maintain a unique position among handset component providers. For 
example, people commonly use the term Android Phone to describe smartphones running 
the Android OS. This circumstance provides them with a great deal of leverage in the 
form of marketing potential. Given a small field of OS providers and the 
commoditization of handsets, a situation similar to what occurred between Microsoft and 
PC-makers in the 1990s could reoccur. At that time, Microsoft, enjoying a near monopoly 
as an OS provider to PC-makers, raised the price of its OS and caused an erosion of 
profitability throughout the PC market (Porter, 2008). Handset manufacturers who do not 
vertically integrate (provide their own OS) risk suffering a similar fate. The potential for 
this scenario to occur will likely induce smartphone manufacturers to pursue partnerships 
with OS providers or work to gain a competency in developing their own value-added 
OS.  
Vertically integrated smartphone manufacturers, such as Apple and RIM, are 
better positioned. Like the Macintosh computer, the Apple iPhone will continue to 
differentiate itself from the commodity handsets, potentially creating a separate market 
space and avoiding commoditization. RIM has the same opportunity, and it will likely 
                                                 
38 After FCC (2010b). Dollar values represent smart phone prices after provider subsidies. 
MarketsandMarkets presents similar data showing the same trend in prices before subsidies. 
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maintain a decent hold on the corporate market due to its focus on integrated security 
features. The performance of competing security solutions will depend on consumers’ 
perceptions of the price-performance tradeoffs.  
3. Security in the Mobile Communications Industry 
Commercial market trends in the inclusion of security functionality influence the 
extent to which the DoD requires a separate architecture to facilitate secure mobile 
communications. The current DoD solution, the secure mobile encrypted portable 
electronic device (SME PED), uses commercial services provided by MNOs (including 
RANs, core networks, and services) for mobility. The SME PED leverages handset 
controls with limited government-operated infrastructure controls to protect data (e.g., 
antitamper design, end-to-end cryptography, and hardware separation).39 This 
demonstrated solution shows that, at most, the DoD does not require a separate 
infrastructure if it utilizes a handset capable of sufficiently protecting information 
residing on, and transiting between, network end points (e.g., handsets, servers, and 
databases). The SME PED exists because the DoD has historically been unable to obtain 
commercially provided solutions. However, reduced bargaining power of handset 
manufacturers and increased visibility of security functionality indicates that the potential 
exists for successfully acquiring suitable solutions at market prices. RIM’s smartphone 
market share indicates that an appreciable number of corporations value security, but the 
iPhone’s reported growth in the corporate segment highlights the struggle between 
demand for security and demand for greater functionality in the commercial industry.40  
a. The Meaning of the Term “Security” 
The terms secure and security can take on widely varying meanings, 
depending on subject matter and context. In this work, the terms security and secure refer  
to the concepts presented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
in its widely accepted definition of computer security. This definition exists in terms of 
                                                 
39 See Appendix E for a brief list of features. 
40 Report on iPhone’s growth in the enterprise market: ―iPhone Infiltrates Corporate World with Help 
of Security Apps.‖ Source: Channel Insider (2011). Pages 1-3. Retrieved from EBSCOhost database. 
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the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems and the data stored 
therein. The NIST Special Publication 800-12 (1995) has stated that these principles also 
apply to network security. The following list summarizes the definition:
41
 
 Computer Security–Extending protection to an information system in 
order to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system 
resources. These resources include hardware, software, data, and 
telecommunications (i.e., data in transit). 
o Confidentiality–The requirement to safeguard private information 
from disclosure to unauthorized entities. 
o Integrity–Integrity includes timeliness, accuracy, completeness, 
and consistency of information. However, as computers cannot 
guarantee all of these qualities, integrity is separated into the 
following two categories: Integrity includes maintaining 
information nonrepudiation and authenticity. 
 Data integrity–―A requirement that information and 
programs are changed only in a specified and authorized 
manner‖ (as cited in NIST, 1995). 
 System integrity–A requirement that a system ―performs its 
intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from 
deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the 
system‖ (as cited in NIST, 1995). 
 Authenticity–The property of genuineness and the ability to 
be verified and trusted, resulting in confidence that a 
transmission, message, or message originator is valid. 
 Nonrepudiation–False denial of having executed a 
particular action or instruction. 
o Availability–Timely and reliable access to, and use of, 
information. 
 
                                                 
41 Definitions from NIST Special Publications 800-12 (1995) and 800-53 (2010). Available from 
http://www.nist.gov/publication-portal.cfm. 
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b. The Supply of Security in the Commercial Market 
Sabat (2003) has argued that scale and scope economies drive emerging 
market trends,42 alluding to the notion that custom solutions are more expensive because 
of their limited economies of scale. Based on Sabat’s assertions, a solution meeting the 
needs of more buyer groups will proliferate more quickly at the most economical prices 
for all buyers.  
Some commercial security solutions claim to rely on a multiple 
independent levels of security (MILS) architecture,43 defined as a high assurance 
architecture designed to enable secure information partitioning (Boettcher, Delong, 
Rushby, & Sifre, 2008). Other, possibly more effective, high assurance security 
architectures exist.44 A commercial high assurance separation, or similar, architecture 
may potentially be used to implement the following government concepts: 
 Cross domain solutions (CDS)–―controlled interface [devices] that 
provide the ability to manually and/or automatically access and/or 
transfer information between different security domains‖ 
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2010). 
 Multilevel secure (MLS) systems that enforce national policy with 
respect to the protection of information.45  
The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS, 2010), defines MLS 
as the ―concept of processing information with different classifications and categories  
that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and denies 
access to users who lack authorization‖ (p. 47). It defines MSL as a ―capability of an 
                                                 
42 Scale refers to the property of decreasing total cost as output increases (Mankiw 2006). Scope 
involves reaching broader market segments as implied by Sabat’s argument that applications developemnt 
platforms drive scope economies. 
43 For example, see SYSGO’s discssion of its PikeOS security certification at 
http://www.sysgo.com/products/pikeos-rtos-and-virtualization/security-certification/. 
44 See Levin, Irvine, and Nguyen (2006), for example. 
45 Refer to Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI, 2007). 
  47 
information system that is trusted to contain, and maintain separation between, resources 
(particularly stored data) of different security domains‖ (CNSS, 2010, p. 48).46  
Currently, RIM’s BlackBerry represents the foremost provider of security 
to the commercial market (Reed, 2010). RIM markets an enterprise solution to 
government and corporate customers providing encryption, strong authentication, and 
remote device administration (RIM, 2011). Their integrated architecture and services 
provide a much higher degree of confidentiality, integrity, and availability than 
standalone handsets. This fact, combined with RIM’s strong brand image for providing 
enterprise services and the smartphone’s strength in meeting corporate users’ needs,47 
helps explain RIM’s early and continued dominance of the enterprise smartphone market. 
Still, the comparison of selected security features in Table 4 shows that the BlackBerry 
Enterprise solution does not provide security services comparable to SME PED devices.  
 SME PED BlackBerry 
High assurance separation architecture   
Domain switching   
CAC reader   
Type 1 encryption capability   
Non Type 1 encryption capability   
SCIP** capability*   
HAIPE capability*   
GSM network compatibility   
CDMA network compatibility   
Wi-fi network compatibility Some devices Some devices 
Data sensitivity certification At least Secret Sensitive but unclassified 
*Enables secure voice or data communications 
**Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol 
Table 4.   Comparison of Selected Security Features in BlackBerry and  
SME PED Devices48 
                                                 
46 These definitions are cited in NIST’s Glossary of Key Information Security Terms. Available from 
[http://www.nist.gov]. MLS is defined similarly by the IETF (2000). 
47 RIM was ranked number 63 on Interbrand’s top 100 best global brands in 2009, and it received the 
Best Mobile Enterprise Product or Service award from the GSMA (Datamonitor, 2010a). 
48 After: GD Sectera Edge Literature (n.d.), available from [http://www.gdc4s.com/]; L-3 Guardian 
Data Sheet (2007), available from [http://www.l-3com.com]; http://us.blackberry.com/ataglance/security. 
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Virtualization represents a key feature that enables the replication of OS 
functionality in multiple domains. Commercial adoption of virtual machine support on 
handsets, combined with MLS policy enforcement, would represent a major step toward 
potentially achieving overlap between commercial and DoD security requirements. Use 
of virtualization to separate resources between domains appears to be the implementation 
that has gained traction among both hardware and software companies. Table 5 provides 
examples of firms that are currently working, or have recently worked, to implement 
solutions that employ virtualization on mobile platforms to separate domains. This table 
includes firms that are producing both Type 1 and Type 2 virtual machine monitors 
(VMM). Type 1 pertains to implementations on hardware, while Type 2 refers to 
software implementations within a host operating system.49 Chapter III provides more 
technical discussion on this subject. 
 Firm Major Partner  
 VMWare LG  
 Xen Samsung  





 Red Bend 
(VirtualLogix) 
Multiple  
 SYSGO Multiple  
 Wind River Samsung  
Table 5.   Examples of Multilevel Handset Efforts50 
One website includes the following in its short list of requirements for 
such technology to gain popularity: the need for a mobile device powerful enough to 
support virtualization while maintaining a level of usability commensurate with other 
devices on the market (Virtualization.info, 2008). This statement suggests that the 
relatively low level of processing power in handsets has been a contributing factor to the 
                                                 
49 Brodkin (2010) refers. 
50 From multiple sources: Luna (2010); Red Bend Software (2011); Virtualization.info (2008); Suh 
(2007); Nunez (2010); http://www.ok-labs.com/solutions/the-okl4-microkernel-advantage; 
http://www.sysgo.com; http://www.windriver.com/. 
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absence of strong security features. Although the impetus to virtualize has centered on 
improved functionality and efficiency, these firms and their partners have displayed a 
willingness to market the security benefits of their solutions.  
The security technology company Koolspan provides a solution called 
Trustchip that acts as an interface between the handset and the network to create an 
encrypted tunnel and protect data in transit (J. McGann, personal communication, 10 
February 2011). The Trustchip is part of a larger solution that facilitates management of 
symmetric keys and allows remote administration. Koolspan promotes its solution to 
corporations such as law firms, financial intermediaries, and international corporations 
(McGann, personal communication, 10 February 2011). Furthermore, Koolspan partnered 
with AT&T in the past to provide an encrypted voice communications capability to 
enterprise, government, and law enforcement customers.  
These examples do not, of themselves, indicate the existence of a high 
assurance secure mobile communications market, but they do show that efforts exist to 
provide competitive commercial security solutions. This situation is important because, 
whereas leaders like RIM may prefer to maintain their virtual monopoly instead of 
developing solutions for the DoD, new firms that are trying to establish themselves may 
be much more willing to work and innovate in the provision of security features. The 
multiple existing partnerships also indicate the willingness of other market participants to 
invest in the development of security-enhancing features. 
In accordance with the economic definition of a market,51 the existence of 
a commercial market for secure communications requires both supply of security 
technology and demand for security features. However, a discrete gap exists between 
commercial and DoD demand for security functionality. 
                                                 
51 Mankiw (2006) defines a market as ―a group of buyers and sellers of a particular good or service,‖ 
64. 
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c. Potential Sources of the Gap Between DoD and Commercial 
Demand for Security 
The DoD has historically taken a very conservative approach to protecting 
information due to the high impact of a compromise of classified information. A 1970 
report by Ware (1970) demonstrates the organization’s longstanding perception of high 
risk. The relatively low commercial demand for security features provides little incentive 
for producers to develop secure communications capabilities that meet both DoD and 
commercial requirements. 
The magnitude of commercial demand depends on buyers’ perceptions of 
the value added by security technology. Buyers’ perceived values dictate their actions 
(Peppard & Rylander, 2002); therefore, they will demand security commensurate with 
their perception of the value of (or risk to) the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of their information. This argument leads to the conclusion that residential consumers 
will demand (and be willing to pay for) increased security functionality as they use 
mobile devices for more sensitive transactions (e.g., mobile commerce activities).  
The fact that most people do not judge probability well (Wildavsky & 
Wildavsky, 2008) can result in incorrect evaluation of risk. This situation offers an 
explanation of the lag in demand for security versus functionality. Use of a formalized 
risk management process can help mitigate this situation, but the technical complexities 
of the computer and telecommunications environment can lead even subject matter 
experts to underestimate their risk exposure. As an example, Luallen and Hamburg 
(2010) reported that 24% of industrial control systems professionals indicated a disbelief 
in threats that could affect their operations. 
Corporations who employ a formal risk assessment process, such as that 
described by NIST (2002), should achieve more accurate risk assessments; however, 
regulations meant to ensure the persistence of information security or privacy may 
inadvertently interfere with the risk assessment process. For instance, medical 
organizations tend to prioritize HIPAA requirements over protecting information.52 They 
                                                 
52 Based on the experience of the privacy company, WebLOQ (G. Sidman, personal communication, 
18 November 2010). 
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aim first to reach regulatory compliance, and after doing so, they may never reach beyond 
that threshold. The regulation potentially creates a ceiling for security efforts instead of 
enhancing security posture. In this situation, corporations’ focus on increased security is 
replaced with a focus on satisfying the regulatory requirements—i.e., the perceived risk 
of not following the regulation outweighs the perceived risk of not providing robust 
security controls. 
4. Potential Ways Forward 
Based on the above Five Forces analysis and analysis of trends affecting the 
MNO and handset markets, this subsection discusses potential areas in which the DoD 
can work with market participants to achieve lower cost equipment, lower cost services, 
increased network and handset functionality, and maintain or improve the overall level of 
security. 
It is in the handset that the DoD’s requirements for high assurance security 
features differ most from those of residential and corporate customers. The potential cost 
of meeting these requirements depends on a number of factors, and is therefore highly 
variable. Many of these factors depend on the amount of perceived value that both 
producers and consumers hold for security-enhancing features. 
During this early stage, the DoD has the opportunity to influence the outcome of 
the ―winning‖ solution, if one exists that can serve both commercial and government 
needs. Broad industry acceptance of Suite B53 would represent a successful example. If 
security providers believe that its inclusion in all products will enhance profits, then they 
are more likely to work toward its implementation. Ultimately, the expectation of 
obtaining greater profits depends on consumers’ perceptions that ―government-grade‖ 
encryption, in this case, adds value to the product.  
Each of the DoD’s strategic options, discussed in the following subsections, may 
require gaining or augmenting its organizational competencies in order to execute that 
strategy.  
                                                 
53 Suite B is a set of cryptographic algorithms for protecting information up to the Secret level. See 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml. 
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a. Leverage MVNO Flexibility 
In regard to network operators, changes in the market may allow the DoD 
to reap savings while obtaining equivalent or better service than it is currently obtaining. 
Market saturation may induce MNOs to seek additional revenues from resellers and 
MVNOs, thereby making it easier for new entrants to start MVNO operations. This is 
especially true if the MVNE and MVNA markets expand, prompting those firms to offer 
expanded services and support while competing on quality. Given the trends in the MNO 
market, the opportunity for the DoD to implement an MVNO business model could 
increase.  
The DoD may employ an MVNE or MVNA to facilitate acting as an 
MVNO (i.e., incur costs and provide services to DoD personnel in the same way that an 
MVNO provides service to consumers). Alternatively, the DoD may utilize the services 
of an existing MVNO that can tailor its business to the DoD’s particular values. The 
DoD’s current model requires purchasing wireless services in the same way as residential 
consumers. The advantage of acting as an MVNO is that prices of network-based services 
(voice minutes and data amounts) will be wholesale prices, which, at greater volumes, 
potentially bring greater savings. Chapter IV provides further analysis of this approach. 
DoD’s application of the MVNO business case does not imply 
competition with commercial MNOs, but this scenario represents a potential unintended 
consequence if the industry perceives DoD’s actions as threatening to their business. As 
such, implementation of this strategy would require careful management of signals and 
monitoring of industry perceptions.  
Additionally, acting as an MVNO would provide the flexibility to 
purchase handsets directly from manufacturers instead of through intermediaries—the 
current practice. These purchases would occur at wholesale rates, and this strategy would 
afford the DoD more flexibility in obtaining commercial handsets that best suit its needs. 
The drawback to this strategy is that it requires developing a competency regarding 
handset acquisition. 
  53 
b. Exploit Handset Manufacturers’ Reduced Bargaining Power 
In the handset market, reduction of handset manufacturers’ ability to 
differentiate will reduce their bargaining power, thus increasing buyers’ opportunities to 
obtain higher quality handsets at potentially lower costs. The increasing competition 
among handset manufacturers may facilitate buyers’ attainment of new features (e.g., 
security functionality) due to increased negotiating leverage for buyers. Ultimately, the 
outcome of a negotiation will depend on a multitude of quantifiable and nonquantifiable 
factors. In theory, a firm will decide to undertake a venture if the net present value (NPV) 
of that investment is projected to be positive—in other words, if the expected benefit 
outweighs the estimated cost; however, in reality, future expectations are subject to 
manipulation or miscalculation due to a multitude of potential factors including the 
subjective nature of prediction. For example, after Hewlett Packard’s (HP) acquisition of 
Palm in 2010, the head of HP’s Personal Systems Group made the following statements 
(Edwards, 2010): ―Some analysts were saying Palm was worth nothing. And some people 
said it was worth $14 a share. We paid $5.70 a share. We judged our willingness to pay 
based on the opportunity.‖ These words exemplify the fact that a firm’s willingness to 
undertake new ventures depends on its assessment of the opportunity at the time. For all 
handset manufacturers, the strong drive for firms to maximize economies of scale and 
scope54 provides potential leverage for influencing them to undertake new types of 
ventures as the market approaches saturation. 
c. Team With Large Corporations  
The overlap between government and corporate requirements that are 
different from those of residential users would foster a niche subindustry. The demand for 
unique capabilities may limit the providers, thereby increasing rivalry while also 
increasing buyer power due to the relatively small number of buyers who purchase large 
 
 
                                                 
54 Sabat (2003) has argued that scale and scope economies are the major driving forces of growth in 
the mobile wireless industry. 
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quantities. Security functionality is one potential area where sufficient overlap of 
requirements exists, especially for those major corporations with a need for high 
assurance data protection.  
d. Education 
To date, a gap has existed between commercial and DoD demands for 
security functionality. This gap may be partially driven by misperceptions of risk. 
Assuming that users will perceive greater personal risk as they engage in transactions 
involving more sensitive information, such as banking activities via mobile devices, this 
gap should lessen with time. However, a strategy to increase awareness and 
understanding may contribute toward reducing the gap more quickly. For instance, the 
DoD may benefit from participation in a joint education campaign with academia and 
industry participants to improve the accuracy of consumers’ perceptions of vulnerabilities 
and threats. Such a strategy might also be effective when implemented on the supply 
side—for standards developers, manufacturers, and service providers. Such an effort may 
yield improved awareness of security issues, more robust development practices, and 
ultimately lead to improved security functionality in COTS software.55 
                                                 
55 This conclusion is supported by Davidson. See http://blogs.oracle.com/maryanndavidson. 
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III. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS FOR SECURE COTS 
HANDSETS 
This chapter outlines a business case for leveraging COTS technology to reduce 
the traditional high cost of secure mobile technology (e.g., SME PED), increase 
functionality, and maintain or improve the level of security.56 However, to provide the 
same high level of security found in currently fielded devices and increase functionality, 
some tradeoffs are required. This chapter will discuss the tradeoffs and costs associated 
with the estimated reduction in risk. Figure 15 provides an illustration of the desired 
characteristics for the business case. This chapter highlights a business case that 
potentially meets all three characteristics. The ideal system provides high levels of 
security and functionality at a low cost. In contrast, the SME PEDs provide high levels of 
security and functionality (i.e., the devices meet the thresholds of the smartphone 
definition provided in Chapter II); however, given the current level of demand in the 
DoD, the devices are extremely costly from a Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) 
perspective.  
High Level of Security
Low Cost 
System
High Level of 
Functionality
 
Figure 15.   Desired Characteristics 
 
                                                 
56 Refer to Chapter II for a discussion of security. 
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A. BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 
Based on the mobile industry analysis presented in Chapter II, the authors assume 
the current method for procuring secure mobile communications is not optimal. The 
industry is continually evolving and producing innovative technology outside of the 
smaller military niche market. For example, according to their product sheets, the SME 
PEDs—developed for a government-only market—seem behind the commercial market 
in the availability of innovative features (e.g., until recently the devices lacked the ability 
to connect to wireless local access networks).  
1. Total Cost of Ownership 
When considering the TCO for secure smartphone communications, the cost of 
service is included with the device cost. In the commercial market, the network operators 
subsidize the handsets to increase their average revenue per user (ARPU), which 
ultimately increases the consumer’s TCO (i.e., device cost + service cost across the 
duration of the plan + switching cost) (Global Industry Analysts, 2010). Essentially, 
subscribers are offered a lower initial cost for their phone if they agree to a longer service 
contract—in the end, the network operators increase their ARPU. As described in 
Chapter II, the authors assume that this type of transaction is mutually beneficial or it 
would not continue to occur.  
In Figure 16, the first (topmost) option illustrates a two-year service contract with 
a subsidized smartphone device (i.e., network provider pays a proportion of the handset 
cost). The second option illustrates the nonsubsidized device with a change in providers 
during year two for the lower-priced plan. The third option also illustrates a subsidized 
device, but the customer decides to end the contract halfway through execution and 
switch providers. In so doing, he incurs switching costs (i.e., the cost to cancel the 
original contract). The TCO for options 1 and 3 are $2070 and $2130, respectively, but 
the TCO for the option 2 device is only $1980. The takeaway from this example is the 
device TCO should consider the duration of the service plan when negotiating the 
procurement. Using the SME PEDs as an example, the current process requires customers 
to choose the carrier prior to procuring the device (i.e., the device’s air interface chip 
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needs to match carrier’s signal). Once the device is procured, the customers are locked 
into the carrier until they change hardware. As previously mentioned, the handset 
hardware is extremely expensive, making the option to change carriers cost prohibitive 
(i.e., the high cost hardware reduces flexibility for the customer).  
 




$80 per month plan
Device Carrier 1
$300 $960
TOC = $1980$60 per month plan
Carrier 2
$720
$80 per month plan
Device Carrier 1
$150 $960





Figure 16.   Total Cost of Ownership Options 
2. Base Case Platform (SME PED) 
Based on the current U.S. government secure smartphone products (i.e., the 
General Dynamics [GD] Sectera and the L-3 Communications [L3] Guardian), this paper 
assumes that the current costs are too significant for defense-wide adoption—as 
evidenced by fewer than ten thousand handset purchases over the past half-decade.57 
According to the National Security Agency (NSA) program office (I851), the Sectera 
product was developed as a partnership between NSA and GD. The Guardian device was 
independently developed, certified, and accredited under an L3 research and development 
(R&D) program. The original R&D contract was awarded as a shared effort where the 
government shared the R&D cost with the contractors—the initial R&D cost to the 
government for both devices is about $38M.58 Later, the government distributed an 
additional $5.5M to GD for upgrades to include forced reauthentication, black-side 
antivirus, DISN security accreditation working group accreditation, Secure 
Communication Interoperability Protocol-232 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
cryptographic mode, top secret data, red side antivirus, and e-mail classification. 
                                                 
57 This fact is discussed later in the chapter. 
58 In addition to $4M of R&D cost for the network architecture. 
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According to the program office, the high unit price is representative of low 
volume procurements and routinely evolving requirements. The device’s cost totals about 
$4,000 to procure the handsets, antivirus client software, and additional hardware 
accessories. Other costs that a customer can expect to incur include: approximately 
$1,000 for the connecting local server, longer than commercial lead times resulting from 
bundled procurements, and an ultimately reduced feature set relative to commercial 
devices. The reduction in features stems from low volume orders that do not justify 
frequent technology refreshes. Additionally, the supply duopoly has strong potential for 
limiting future innovations due to the absence of competition. For example, a 
government-only product without a requirement for additional capabilities provides a 
disincentive for suppliers to incorporate future technology advances (i.e., a lack in 
demand leads to a lack in supply). However, since the devices remotely access classified 
networks (i.e., the Defense Information System Network [DISN]) the authors assume the 
device properties are adequate for processing this level of information; therefore, this 
chapter will focus on highlighting less costly alternatives that have potential to provide at 
least the same level of assurances regarding computer security defined in Chapter II. 
Refer to Appendix F for a summary of the SME PED features. 
According to the same program office, and consistent with trends in recent 
delivery orders, the SME PED annual demand is estimated at 1,500–2,000 devices. As of 
February 2010, the total quantity procured since the program’s inception is about 5,500 
devices.59 Given this demand and an average $4,000 per device, the annual amortized 
(i.e., across two-year estimated lifetime) expenditures for SME PED devices are 
calculated at $4M per year—this cost only includes the cost of handset equipment and 
accessories. The wide area network (WAN) service for these devices is provided over the 
commercial networks and, therefore, the handset TCO should include the wireless 
connection cost. According to the program office, in addition to the monthly reoccurring 
service charge there is an annual reoccurring fixed cost, independent of demand, for 
connecting the SME PEDs to the Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISAs) 
networks (i.e., the DISN)—approximately $2M per year.  
                                                 
59 I851 Program office provided total. 
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As discussed earlier, when evaluating the TCO for mobile handsets the cost of 
services is included in the calculation; however, for this chapter the cost of service is 
excluded. Chapter IV more thoroughly details the associated service cost. These 
procurement trends only represent the SME PED demand. The DoD currently has a 
significant demand for secure fixed or wireline devices (e.g., Secure Terminal Equipment 
[STE]) and basic mobile phone devices (e.g., Qualcomm QSec). These trends were not 
included in the analysis, because this research focused on requirements akin to those of a 
smartphone. This paper assumes that, if the cost to procure secure smartphone 
capabilities is significantly reduced, the candidate devices might replace the traditional 
STE or QSec requirements. 
An area of interest when considering cost is the cost of the next feature based on 
the current SME PED model. Figure 17 illustrates the various feature upgrades to the 
Sectera Edge device on the horizontal axis and their associated cost to the government on 
the vertical.60 The figure includes DSAWG (Defense Information Assurance Security 
Accreditation Working Group) accreditation because it represents a significant cost for 
system changes affecting information assurance. Based on these historical costs, the 
average cost for an upgrade is $790K with a standard deviation of $250K and a 
confidence level (95%) of 0.61. The low scoring confidence level (i.e., high variability 
between upgrades) leads to the conclusion that, within a rough order of magnitude, a 
future feature might cost the government between hundreds of thousands and a few 
million dollars. 
                                                 
60 NSA (i851) provided data. 









Figure 17.   Sectera Edge Upgrade Cost (Millions) 
3. Proposed Platform (Commercial Device) 
Since the SME PED devices provide the functionality to securely communicate 
independently within two separate sensitivity domains, this paper assumes the ideal 
COTS solution must provide a similar multi-domain capability. In order to prevent 
information from spilling across domains, DoD (i.e., Unified Cross Domain Management 
Office [UCDMO]) policy requires additional assurances to mitigate risk.61 In an effort to 
maintain the high functionality commonly provided by modern day high-end operating 
systems and to reduce the amount of components, potentially suitable COTS security 
architectures may virtualize (i.e., through a Virtual Machine Monitor [VMM]) the guest 
OS for each domain while using a high assurance VMM as the underlying separation 
platform. As discussed in the previous chapter, the commercial market is moving toward 
the provision of such architectures on handsets. However, none of the previously 
mentioned operating systems is listed as an UCDMO-approved solution.62 This is 
important to note when considering acquisition procurements, but not a significant 
deterrent when considering technology feasibility.  
In the architectural approach described above, a lower layer separation kernel 
provides the device’s high assurance security functionality. Many separation kernels exist 
                                                 
61 Refer to CJCSI 6211.02B, Defense Information System Network and Connected Systems, 31 July 
2003 for further details. 
62 Reference UCDMO Baseline Version 3.7.0. 
  61 
and differ drastically in implementation, but they share the same basic property of 
providing isolation or resource partitioning to prevent sharing and limit covert channels 
(Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006). Essentially, when resources are shared across domains, 
the addition of nonkernel trusted elements to the architecture increases its potential for 
malicious activity or unintentional starvation. For example, given two independent 
processes on two independent processors, the probability of information transferring from 
one process to the other is very low. However, when the processes share resources, 
including the processor, the probability of policy violation increases with information 
transfer. Care must be taken to identify all possible overt and covert information flow 
channels (Lampson, 1973). Another important characteristic absent from commercial 
offerings of separation kernels is the concept of least privilege, which can assist in 
limiting users or programs from exceeding their authority. This not only protects the 
system from unintentional accidents or errors, but also additionally assists in mitigating 
potential malicious activity (Levin, Irvine, & Nguyen, 2006). As mentioned before, the 
commercial market provides various CDSs for high-end computing systems; however, no 
smartphone solution is available with a Common Criteria Evaluated Assurance Level 
(EAL) 6+ certification.63 The business case for leveraging this concept on smartphone 
devices has traditionally failed to exist because of a lack of resources required to host 
multiple domains. However, given recent innovations, the resources (i.e., ARM Cortex 
A9 or A15) needed to support a CDS capability may now exist. In a phone discussion, 
one manufacturer mentioned staffing this idea in the past; however, the firm determined 
that the cost was not commensurate with the potential benefit. 
Figure 18 illustrates an abstract example of a separation architecture. The VMM 
in this figure virtualizes the different untrusted subjects—guest operating systems (e.g., 
android, iOS, Windows Mobile, etc.). For a more in-depth technical discussion on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the various solutions, refer to the UCDMO. 
                                                 
63 Appendix A provides an introductory discussion of the Common Criteria. 
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Figure 18.   Cross Domain Solution Example64 
B. COST 
1. CDS Architecture Cost 
Since a COTS smartphone containing a high assurance separation kernel acting as 
a VMM is not currently available in a competitive open market, the value for this 
technology is still difficult to discern. Therefore, the authors assume that the value of 
such an architecture lies between the manufacturer’s willingness to pay and the platform 
(software) provider’s willingness to accept. The next two subsections provide different 
perspectives (i.e., manufacturer, and platform provider) on the value of a high assurance 
separation architecture implanted on a smartphone device.  
a. Manufacturer Perspective (Willingness to Buy) 
Based on conversations with handset manufacturers, the aggregated 
willingness to pay for an architecture intended to meet high assurance separation 
objectives on modern smartphone devices, described above, is listed in Table 6. The 
                                                 
64 Image generated from (Uchenick, et al., 2005), (Boettcher, et al., 2008) and the description found in 
(Levin, et al., 2006). 
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manufacturer licensing fee is the price the platform provider charges to license the 
software per device. These cost estimates assume the manufacturer has enough 
bargaining power to control the prices for the CDS platform providers.  
 MILS Software Through Manufacturer Low High
      manufacturer licensing fee 1,500,000.00$ 5,000,000.00$ 
      Development License (SDK) 50,000.00$      100,000.00$    
      Per developer license 1,000,000.00$ 2,000,000.00$ 
Total 2,550,000.00$ 7,100,000.00$  
Table 6.   Manufacturer Option 
According to a leading manufacturer, these estimates seem reasonable 
because these platform providers are not current players in the handset market.65 The 
manufacturer-driven solution would provide the platform providers an entry into the 
handset market. In Table 6, the manufacturer licensing fees are estimated at $0.10 to 
$1.50 per phone with a 10–50M device volume.66 The manufacturer might incur some 
upfront development costs, but these costs are highly variable based on the strength of the 
negotiations. The software development kit (SDK) and developer license cost seem fairly 
consistent across multiple providers—these estimates assume enterprise pricing for 
developers. Those SDK and individual developer license costs are potential necessities if 
the receiving organization requires the trusted subject or microkernel to run trusted 
applications for evolving mission critical functions vice a guest OS using inherently 
untrusted programs. The burdens of the developer licensing fees are endured by the 
organizations willing to build trusted applications.  
b. Platform Provider Perspective (Willingness to Sell) 
If the DoD were to develop and advance the technology using its own 
funding, the potential range of costs could exceed those of the manufacturer. Table 7 
illustrates costs the DoD could expect to pay for the technology—these costs are slightly 
                                                 
65 January 2011 discussion. 
66 These numbers represent manufacturer’s willingness to pay. The actual price will greatly depend on 
each organization’s negotiation strengths. 
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higher than the manufacturers’ option.67 These estimates only represent a few platform 
providers’ perspectives. The actual cost could drastically differ depending on deviations 
from their current roadmaps, the complexity contained within the various layers, the 
design of the architecture, etc. Due to potential unknown high assurance development 
considerations, the maximum cost for the technology could exceed the estimates 
presented in Table 7.  
 MILS Software Through DoD Acquisitions Low High
      Porting code to prototype 100,000.00$    1,000,000.00$ 
      runtime license 2,000,000.00$ 6,000,000.00$ 
      Development License (SDK) 50,000.00$      100,000.00$    
      Per developer license 1,000,000.00$ 2,000,000.00$ 
Total 3,150,000.00$ 9,100,000.00$  
Table 7.   DoD Acquisition Process Option 
This seems reasonable since the DoD has very little buying power when 
compared to the commercial market, which provides greater volume. The costs in Table 7 
were aggregates of platform providers’ estimates. The cost varies depending on the 
intended platform. For example, some providers’ software is embedded on the chip, 
requiring specific processor compatibility. If the provider’s product line was built around 
different technology than the desired platform (e.g., platform provider’s software was 
built on an Intel processor and the requested handset leveraged an ARM processor), the 
necessary porting would require a significant amount of reengineering. The estimated 
porting prices for these products were about double the price in Table 7. 
Considering the cost to the DoD, the two development approaches (i.e., 
commercial manufacturer vs. platform provider) would drastically differ. The authors 
assume the commercial manufacturer would incur the burden of the software license fees 
during sales as a percentage of revenue. The DoD procurement option would incur the 
burden of licensing fees during the R&D phase. From the CDS platform provider 
perspective, it seems less risky to opt for the intrinsic value (i.e., the DoD option); 
however, the option value seems more valuable considering the return. The real option 
                                                 
67 These price points were aggregated from a couple different platform providers. 
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value could provide an entry into the market, product line architecture monopoly, and 
additional unintended innovations that the consumer adapts into a disruptive technology. 
Since the price per unit drastically depends on procurement negotiations and volume, it is 
difficult to enumerate price based on known costs. Given that RIM is the current 
commercial North American smartphone market leader and provides a valued security 
solution, it seems feasible that the high assurance secure architecture implemented on 
COTS phones would proliferate as a threatening competitor. If this becomes reality, then 
the cost for this technology will likely be representative of today’s current RIM device 
(i.e., leveraging economies of scales). 
2. Encryption Cost 
Once these devices support a high assurance secure architecture, the next valued 
capability is noncryptographic controlled item (CCI) encryption algorithms. The current 
SME PED devices leverage the NSA-certified Type 1 encryptor (e.g., High Assurance 
Internet Protocol Encryptor [HAIPE]).68 This paper considers the dedicated hardware 
required to support the Type 1 encryption capability as an added cost. If the device hosts 
HAIPE hardware—requiring a classification of CCI—the handheld device becomes less 
mobile and constrained in marketability. Mobility is reduced since DoD policy requires 
added physical security measures (e.g., DoD policy requires that CCI equipment remain 
in constant possession or secured in an approved location). Additionally, the market size 
is constrained, because the CCI classification requires export controls. Alternatively, to 
assist in reducing cost by increasing the potential market the CDS approach could 
leverage a non-CCI HAIPE (e.g., Suite B, Cryptographic High Value Product (CHVP)) 
(National Security Agency, 2010). The cost to procure a HAIPE Suite B capability is 
difficult to estimate since the commercial market does not offer an approved NSA-
certified and accredited smartphone client. Considering that the commercial market 
provides various noncertified solutions, the cost for this capability takes on a broad range 
 
 
                                                 
68 Sourced from the website: http://www.disa.mil/services/SME PED.html. 
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depending on requirements. According to various vendors, if the manufacturers adopt this 
technology, the cost to develop and produce the encryption functionality is currently 
projected at less than a few dollars per device.69 
3. Future Features Upgrades 
Based on the earlier SME PED discussion regarding the associated cost of adding 
features, this section assumes the commercial market manufacturer cost is similar to what 
the government spent for the SME PED upgrades.70 The current SME PED demand 
yields an estimate of the cost for each aftermarket feature to equal about $260 per device. 
This assumption is based on the average cost for each additional feature. As highlighted 
in the beginning of this chapter, the average cost per SME PED feature is about $790K. If 
the DoD leverages the commercial market economies of scale (i.e., 10 to 50M devices), 
each upgraded feature would result in a cost of $0.02–$0.79 per device. These high 
volume markets provide lower cost, but traditionally require a more feature-rich device. 
Assuming that an architecture exists which meets high assurance security requirements 
while also providing the features expected of other smartphone OSs, the market may 
adopt a more secure solution—especially since the banking and medical industries have a 
strong financial interest in protecting their information. 
4. Additional Costs 
Additional costs not included in this analysis are commercial application 
development for DoD-specific requirements, reduced procurement lead times, 
maintenance and support, internally developed applications, and technology refresh every 
2–3 years. Some of these costs appear negligible since these devices are potentially 
becoming commoditized. For example, as mentioned in the industry analysis section, the 
convergence of multiple 3G chipsets (e.g., CDMA2000, WCDMA, UMTS, etc.) into a 
single 4G technology (i.e., LTE) creates the potential for larger volumes in the converged 
market. Since three of the four major carriers invested in the LTE technology, their future 
                                                 
69 Some vendors that provide this functionality are: certicom, cellcrypt, koolspan, fortress 
technologies, etc. 
70 Reference Chapter III, Section A, Paragraph 2. 
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smartphones could potentially share the same chipset. This could create a larger market 
for the chipset manufacturers and contribute toward commoditizing the component. 
However, since the FCC is auctioning the LTE spectrum across fragmented frequency 
bands, this single chipset concept might fail to materialize. 
C. BENEFITS 
The benefits received from leveraging CDS smartphones vary drastically across 
the quantifiable space. For example, assuming the CDS smartphone contains enough 
resources and implements the correct security properties to run more than two domains, 
this could facilitate accessing the DISN while on the move. The ability to access multiple 
domains (i.e., Internet/NIPR/SIPR/JWICS) from one device without requiring a 
stationary console represents at least a convenience and at most a significant increase in 
productivity. This research focuses on the benefits discussed below; however, other 
benefits exist that fall beyond this paper’s scope. 
1. Flexible Demand 
One of the most notable benefits of this concept is the flexibility to a support 
higher demand (i.e., assuming a lower cost system translates to less procurement policy 
restrictions. For example, assuming the total expenditures for SME PEDs is about $75M 
(i.e., cost to the government for R&D, upgrades, production, etc., not including the 
network operator charges, infrastructure, or security middleware cost) the manufacturer 
option, listed in the cost section, could support a much higher volume of devices for the 
same amount of expenditures. As mentioned in that section, the manufacturer would bear 
the initial burden of the R&D cost and potentially relay the cost to the end customer. This 
option provides the DoD a larger market to share the burden of the new technology. 
2. Reduced Risk of Handset “Jailbreak” 
A high assurance platform foundation could facilitate a policy that limits the 
ability to circumvent the security controls in a handset. For instance, the iPhone 
―Jailbreak‖ story provides an example of a vulnerability that is potentially preventable 
with a correctly implemented security architecture. Essentially, a jail-broken device is no 
  68 
longer restricted to the policies the network operator and handset manufacturer 
implement. In the iPhone case, the device was designed to only operate on the AT&T 
network; however, after a phone is jail-broken, the phone can then be configured to 
operate on other networks, install third-party applications, customized ring tones, etc.71 
The benefit received from the reduction or elimination of this vulnerability in a 
smartphone is a function of the impact (i.e., in the handset case, the cost of the device, the 
information contained on the device, and the networks that the device can potentially 
compromise).  
3. Classified Mobile E-Mail Cost Savings 
Currently, non-SME PED users are required to access their classified domains 
from a secure facility with wide area network (WAN) connectivity into the DISN. From 
the authors’ perspective, the capability to remotely access SIPR or JWICS e-mail 
accounts while on the move provides a significant savings in travel time. The current 
SME PED devices provide this functionality, but only for a few thousand users. A lower 
cost COTS CDS device could facilitate defense-wide adoption, yielding growth in the 
number of users to hundreds of thousands or potentially millions. In this example, the 
time saved is the amount of time it takes to travel (including system login and application 
startup time) to and from the secure location. Using this example, it is possible to 
estimate a total savings in recovery cost from loss of productivity or opportunity cost.  
In order to estimate the total cost per hour of employees’ time, the authors used a 
statistics program (i.e., Oracle’s Crystal Ball) to simulate the cost based on FY2011 DoD 
end strength distribution by pay scale.
72
 Since the purpose of this model is to illustrate 
potential cost savings and not holistically portray the actual benefits, the authors used 
only active duty personnel end strengths and pay scales. If this model were to capture all 
of the DoD’s savings, the model would need to account for the end strength and pay of 
civilian, reservist, contractor, and other personnel.
73
 Since this example accounts for only 
                                                 
71 Cassavoy, Liane. 2010. ―What Does It Mean to Jailbreak an iPhone?‖ About.com. 
http://cellphones.about.com/od/glossary/f/jailbreak_faq.htm. 
72 These authors used Oracle’s Crystal Ball Statistic program. 
73 Reference Appendix D for actual end strengths and pay scales used in analysis. 
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cleared personnel (i.e., those who hold a clearance), the model estimated the lowest paid 
service member’s hourly rate (i.e., E-5 at $25 per hour considering secret-level clearance) 
and the highest paid (i.e., O-10 at $117 per hour), then varied the expected rated based on 
the FY2011 end strengths distribution—the observed distribution closely matched a 
gamma distribution.
74
 Since the authors estimate the current SME PED demand at about 
2,000 users, the lower limit on demand was set at this constant. Since the total end 
strength of E-5 and above is about 783,000 personnel, the demand’s upper bound was set 
at this constant. The simulation varied the demand, based on a triangular distribution, 
with 100,000 being the most likely demand. The authors assume that the ceiling on the 
demand currently enforced by policy will likely change once the devices become cost 
efficient. Since the current unclassified cellular demand for DoD is estimated at greater 
than 300,000 subscribers, the authors assume that if the devices approved for connecting 
to classified domains becomes cost efficient, the demand could significantly increase.75  
 
Figure 19.   Potential Cost Savings for Mobile Classified E-Mail 
                                                 
74 Rates and end strength totals referenced from individual services FY2011 budgets. 
75 Chapter IV provides the analysis on the demand. 
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Figure 19 illustrates the results of the simulation after 100,000 trials. The 
mathematical mode of the results indicates that the most likely potential recovery is about 
$791K. This assumes each person can save between 1 to 10 minutes of productivity by 
having his or her classified e-mail messages on his or her hip rather than in a remote 
classified facility—of course, each individual case could vary drastically depending on 
his or her location relative to the facility. In the mobile classified e-mail simulation, the 
most likely daily recovery cost is $791K (i.e., for 10 minutes of saved productivity) 
multiplied by 240 working days in a year results in an annual recovery of $190M (NPV 
of $363M considering 2 years’ life cycle of the device with a 3% discount rate). 
Alternatively, Figure 20 illustrates the data from a different perspective (i.e., reducing the 
probability from including all cases).76 The blue portion under the curve indicates that—
under the same productivity assumptions—adoption of a COTS CDS smartphone affords 
the DoD, within a 95% probability, a recovery of at least $428K per day or $73M per 
year in opportunity cost (i.e., the next high-valued alternative). 
 
Figure 20.   Minimum Potential Cost Savings 
                                                 
76 Notice the differences in the certainty value and the y-axis labels between the graphs. 
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4. General Productivity Increase 
Productivity increases seem debatable, depending on the various researchers and 
analysts. Some researchers and analysts report an increase, and others report a marginal 
decrease, in productivity from the use of smartphone technology. For example, the 
research firm Basex conducted surveys and interviews to establish the cost of 
interruptions. They categorize interruptions as either active (i.e., personal choice) or 
passive (i.e., external interruption—e-mail, phone, text, etc.). Of these interruptions, the 
respondents rank the most acceptable interruptions as supervisor needs immediate 
response, and colleague, subordinate, or friend/family member has a question. As a result 
of these interruptions, their research found 28% of a typical workday was wasted 
(Feintuch & Spira, 2005). Another survey from MIT highlighted some benefits of 
smartphones as an increase in mobility and a medium for communications during down 
time (Mazmanian, et al., 2006). Conversely, the survey highlighted the disadvantage of 
an increase in stress from the expectation of an increase in response time—supervisor 
expects immediate response (Mazmanian, et al., 2006). Essentially, the smartphone 
provides a medium for constant connectivity regardless of location and, therefore, should 
provide the flexibility to respond to inquiries at a faster rate. Alternatively, another 
research firm, Bay Street Group, reported 83% of their surveyed respondents agreed that 
the smartphone provided an increase in personal productivity. The respondents said the 
smartphone gave them the ability to instantly access information and rapidly convey the 
responses to clients, resulting in less wasted time and faster responses to customer 
questions (Telberg, 2007). Another report from the Ipsos Reid firm quantified the 
advantages of smartphones as a function of productivity increases. The report surveyed 
over one thousand BlackBerry users and over one thousand information technology 
managers who supported from 1 to 500 devices within their respective organizations. The 
report concluded two major findings (Moro 2007): 
 A typical mobile user converts 60 minutes of downtime per day 
into productivity.77 
                                                 
77 This number represented the median of responses and is considered a typical user, because it was 
more conservative than the mean (i.e., 63%). 
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 Operations staffs have more time in their schedule than executives 
and, therefore, have more potential to recover more downtime. 
Figure 21 represents the distribution of responses (Moro, 2007) 
 
Figure 21.   Productivity Recovery Potential (From Moro, 2007) 
Section 3, ―Classified Mobile E-mail Cost Savings,‖ assumed most users would 
use the device for reading and sending their classified e-mail. Since a CDS smartphone 
would theoretically have a number of capabilities other than mobile e-mail, this example 
assumes these added capabilities could save at least 1 minute and at most 10 minutes of 
productivity independent of what domain the user accesses. This assumption is based on 
the knowledge that approximately 90% of DoD employees currently lack the ability to 
use official smartphones for their daily work activities.78 The authors recommend future 
research to focus on determining the DoD-specific marginal increases in productivity 
from using a smartphone device for official business. For this example, the statistical 
model varied the productivity savings from 1 to 10 minutes with a uniform distribution. 
The total number of users varied from 200,000 (minimum), to 340,000 (most likely), and 
to 400,000 tsubscriber (maximum) demand. These numbers were derived based on 
estimated DoD demand for cellular services and the maximum number of active duty 
employees. Again, this number could greatly increase if the model included civilians, 
reservists, contractors, etc. The hourly rate per employee ranged from $16 (i.e., E-1) to 
$117 (i.e., O-10) based on the different service’s FY2011 estimated end strength 
                                                 
78 Conservatively estimate 300,000 current DoD wireless subscribers proportionately to 3M DoD 
employees. 
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distributions.79 Figure 22 illustrates the results of the simulation after 100,000 trials. The 
mode, $679K, indicates slightly less savings than the previous examples.  
 
Figure 22.   Potential Cost Savings for an Increase in Productivity 
Given the few minutes of potential daily savings in productivity, the resulting 
opportunity cost is most likely $679K a day or $163M annually, which is a little less than 
the previous e-mail example. This example is likely more realistic because this model 
accounts for the total DoD population (i.e., a significant amount of comparatively lower 
paid employees). The previous model only included the personnel with a clearance and 
the authorization to have a secure smartphone (i.e., on average they are higher paid than 
the general population). Figure 23 illustrates the data from a different perspective (i.e., a 
reverse cumulative frequency view that provides probabilities). Under the same 
productivity assumptions, if the DoD proliferates smartphone usage throughout the 
organization, the blue area under the curve indicates that the DoD has a 95% probability 
of recovering at least $277K per day or $66M per year in opportunity cost.  
                                                 
79 Rates and end strength totals referenced from individual services FY2011 budgets depicted in 
Appendix D. 
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Figure 23.   Minimum Potential Saving for Increase in Productivity 
5. Reducing DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides Cost 
According to policy outlined in DoDD 8500.1, DoDI 8500.2, CJCSI 6510.01, AR 
25-2, and AFI 33-202, DISA is required to develop and provide security configuration 
guidance for IT systems. The current process for developing new Security Technical 
Implementation Guides (STIGs) can take a significant amount of time, depending on the 
inherent security vulnerabilities within any given system. A STIG is essentially 
instructions or procedures on how to configure a system in line with a baseline level of 
security.80 The cost of the STIG process is a function of development, implementation, 
and opportunity cost. 
 STIG development cost—the number of labor hours times the personnel 
cost. 
                                                 
80IASE website:  http://iase.disa.mil/stigs. 
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 STIG implementation cost—number of labor hours for local telecom 
offices to read, interpret, and implement the STIG configuration times the 
number of different systems configured. 
 Opportunity cost—cost of not utilizing the technology to maximize 
mission effectiveness (e.g., the DoD releases a STIG for iOS products one 
year after the first commercial market availability—ultimately stifling 
operating cost, productivity, etc.) 
The potential high assurance virtualization architectures could reduce the time 
required to produce a STIG for future mobile systems. Figure 24 illustrates the STIG 
process. The actual STIG development time varies based on individual IT systems. For 
example, even though personnel are working to finish an iOS and Android STIG, as of 
March 1, 2011, the STIGs still are not completed. Alternatively, if the DoD adopted these 
operating systems without an approved configuration, more vulnerabilities could exist. 
 
Figure 24.   DISA STIG Process (From Defense Information Systems Agency, 2010) 
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6. COTS Option Value 
A benefit not easy to quantify without further research is the concept of 
commercial solutions providing large option values. The SME PEDs were created to have 
specific capability sets where COTS smartphones are created with unknown capability 
sets (e.g., the idea of 3
rd
 party application developers designing new innovative 
capabilities independent of the handset manufacturer’s original intent). From a security 
perspective, this extensibility becomes a significant concern, since not all developers are 
equal. For example, a nonmalicious software programmer could ignorantly include 
vulnerable code or unintentionally introduce bugs. Alternatively, a malicious programmer 
could embed devious or potentially criminal code. 
D. RISK 
In an effort to evaluate the risk associated with the different smartphone 
architectures, this paper leverages the following equation: Risk = Vulnerability x Threat x 
Impact.
81
 As described in Chapter II and Appendix A, risk is a function of the 
vulnerability, the threat, and the total impact of potential compromise. In an attempt to 
relate a vulnerability score to current OSs, the authors assume that the OSs with higher 
EALs have more security controls to protect against threat events. Table 8 highlights a 
few OSs and their associated Common Criteria assurance levels. Not all OSs listed are 
available for mobile smartphones.  
 
                                                 
81 Refer to Appendix A for a more thorough discussion surrounding the risk equation and 
methodology. 
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Vulnerability (Operating System82) CC Scale83 
Apple Mac OS X 10.6 EAL3+ .50 
Windows Mobile 6.5 EAL4+ .36 
Windows XP EAL4+ .36 
BlackBerry Device Software 5.0 EAL4+ .36 
BAE XTS-400 EAL5+ .21 
Green Hills Software INTEGRITY 178B EAL6+ .07 
Table 8.   Operating System Common Criteria Categories 
For this section, the smartphone device is considered independent of the 
connecting network. The threat and impact variables are considered constant across the 
various OSs, leaving vulnerability as the only variable. Since this approach only varies 
the vulnerabilities based on the properties of the OS, this paper only considers the 
technical vulnerabilities for the handset BCA. Therefore, risk is a function of the level of 
assurance of each OS. This paper uses an OS’s EAL as a tool to measure and rank its 
level of assurance. 
Since this chapter focuses on the costs and benefits of a standalone handset, the 
impacts and threats are considered constant. The value for impact is a function of the 
handset cost, and the cost of the information contained on the device. As defined in 
Appendix A, the value for threat is a function of the potential for an event to occur. Since 
this business case only recommends a variation in the technical approach (i.e., CDS vice 
commercial standard), these values are held constant (i.e., impact and threat = 1). 
Therefore, risk is equal to vulnerability (i.e., Risk = Vulnerability x 1 x 1). Based on this 
reasoning, a lower CC rating yields an inadequate system for higher risk environments. 
                                                 
82 Nonmobile device operating systems were included to provide a frame of reference. 
83 Scale = (Max CC score – CC score) / (Max CC score). 
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E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As previously discussed in Section C, Paragraph 4, a mobile device with a CDS 
capability can potentially provide increases in productivity. To quantify a range of 
potential opportunity costs, Table 9 enumerates the associated cost per minutes of time. 
Table 9 uses the same assumptions and methodology as Section C, Paragraph 4; however, 
this example varies the amount of recovered productivity time. For example, a mobile 
subscriber recovers 10, 20, 30, or 60 minutes a day from a weather application on his 
mobile device, instead of sitting through a 60-minute news show. A military commander 
receives intelligence updates through a personally customized widget application on his 
secure smartphone instead of through a 60-minute staff brief. This example varies the 
number of subscribers between 300K and 400K and assumes every subscriber can 
recover the same amount of productivity within the row threshold (i.e., gap of minutes). 
The expected (per day or annual) columns list the amount of opportunity cost the DoD 
could expect to recover. The minimum (per day or annual) columns show, with a 95% 
confidence level, that the DoD could recover at least the amount listed. 










1 - 10 Mins 678,882$       162,931,680$      276,768$         66,424,320$        
11 - 20 Mins 2,633,840$   632,121,600$      1,458,187$      349,964,880$     
21 - 30 Mins 4,180,651$   1,003,356,240$  2,563,484$      615,236,160$     
31 - 60 Mins 7,785,020$   1,868,404,800$  4,717,347$      1,132,163,280$   
Table 9.   Productivity Savings for 300K to 400K Subscribers84 
Table 10 uses the same assumptions, but it shows variation of the number of 
subscribers that could recover opportunity cost. This table assumes a gamma distribution 
for the number of subscribers who could recover opportunity cost. For example, not 
every person in the DoD might be able to recover the same value. A gamma distribution 
weights more occurrences toward the left—it is more likely to have 10%, 20%, or 30% of 
subscribers recovering opportunity cost rather than 100% (i.e., Table 9 illustrates the 
                                                 
84 Appendix H includes the remaining tables. 
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recovery opportunity based on all subscribers receiving the same amount). Given these 
assumptions, the DoD is more likely to recover costs similar to those displayed in Table 
10; however, Table 9 is worth evaluating if the entire subscriber base can recover an 
equal amount of time. For example, if all subscribers used the Exchange e-mail service, 
and each one could recover 10 minutes of time, then Table 9 applies. However, if the 
subscribers have unique applications that save these individuals time, then Table 10 is 
more representative of the recovery cost. 
 1 to 400K subscribers (FY2010) Gamma Distribution
Productivity Increases








1 - 10 Mins 94,776$                  22,746,240$        38,030$         9,127,200$         
11 - 20 Mins 423,422$                101,621,280$      162,115$      38,907,600$       
21 - 30 Mins 731,530$                175,567,200$      274,357$      65,845,680$       
31 - 60 Mins 1,238,500$            297,240,000$      470,253$      112,860,720$     
Table 10.   Productivity Savings for 1 to 400K Subscribers85 
Another question of interest is how much does antiquated technology cost the 
DoD over time. The results illustrated in Figure 25 use the same assumptions in the 
previous examples, but vary the amount of productivity across the years with constant 
increases in the subscriber base (i.e., the data is based on an unknown subscriber base). 
The authors assume the increase in subscriber base will follow the same DoD trends as 
the past 6 years.86 The lines represent the amount of minutes recovered from an increase 
in productivity. Figure 25 illustrates the minimum amount of potential savings. 
                                                 
85 Appendix H includes the remaining tables. 
86 Reference Chapter IV for DoD cellular demand trends. 
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Figure 25.   Cost of Antiquated Technology (Uniform Distribution [in U.S. Dollars]) 
Figure 25 assumes all subscribers receive the same level of productivity increases. 
However, the authors assume the subscriber base will receive a varied savings (i.e., 
gamma distribution) rather than a constant savings (i.e., uniform distribution) used in 
Figure 25—as in the user-specific application example where the individuals choose 
unique applications to meet their specific requirements. This assumes fewer subscribers 
will actually receive any savings from the added capabilities. Figure 26 represents the 
estimated FY2016 probability distribution (gamma) of subscribers who are expected to 
receive an increase in productivity from leveraging capabilities resident in smartphones.87 
The horizontal axis represents the number of subscribers. The vertical axis represents the 
likelihood that those subscribers will receive a productivity increase. Of 700K total 
subscribers, about 100K are most likely to receive a productivity increase. 
                                                 
87 Figure 23 represents the estimated FY2016 DoD subscriber demand of 700K. 
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Figure 26.   Expected Distribution of Subscribers Who Receive Productivity Increase 
Figure 27 illustrates the same productivity model represented in Figure 25; 
however, it applies the gamma distribution illustrated in Figure 26. The results appear 
more realistic because the authors assume a significant number of subscribers will not 
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Figure 27.   Cost of Antiquated Technology (Gamma Distribution [in U.S. Dollars]) 
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In conclusion, from the productivity models, the authors estimate that a 
significant amount of opportunity cost is recoverable from larger procurements of 
smartphone devices. When considering the marginal productivity increase, the authors 
found that current subscribers are less likely to receive an increase in productivity—the 
current subscribers most likely already recover the lost time. However, since the 
unclassified domain receives an estimated demand of 10% saturation (i.e., as of FY2010, 
340K subscribers among 3M employees), the potential for recovery exists as the 
subscriber base increases by up to 90%. Since the current demand for secure smartphones 
(SME PEDs) is extremely low in comparison to the total population, the potential for 
secure communication productivity increases is also high. 
F. SUMMARY 
In quantifying the net present value (NPV) for the various solutions, the authors 
assume that the previous or future R&D expenses are fixed and, therefore, negligible in 
comparison. Even though the SME PED program costs the DoD about $44M, and the 
proposed COTS CDS is estimated at $10M, the authors consider the recurring costs as 
the drivers of the NPV. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, if the DoD can 
leverage the commercial market’s economies of scale, a COTS CDS smartphone is 
estimated to have a cost similar to that of BlackBerry devices. A comparison is presented 
in Table 11. Since the network costs are required to accurately calculate the TCO NPV, 
the COTS CDS versus SME PED comparison is included Chapter V. 
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Component Annual Cost88 Component Annual Cost89 
SME PED Device $2000 COTS CDS Device $183 
MCEP $900 Annual Upgrade $2 
Apriva Server $150   
Upgrade cost $625   
Total $3675 Total $185 
Table 11.   Device Comparison 
The authors assume the software licensing fees, and potential additional server 
costs, are negligible as the commercial market economies of scale offset the cost. The 
break-even mark for quantity is a function of the cost for the current SME PEDs. Table 
12 highlights the quantity of potential devices under the same amount of funding 
allocated for the SME PEDs. Additionally, Table 12 highlights the potential quantity of 
devices as a function of productivity benefit.90 Higher benefits are possible—especially 
since some of the research suggests productivity increases in the amount of 60 minutes. 
However, the authors chose a more conservative comparison by using a gamma 
distribution of demand, resulting in receiving between 21 and 30 minutes of savings per 
day. 
 Unit Cost Qty Total Cost 
SMEPED $3450 1500 $5,512,500 
COTS CDS $185 37,297 $5,512,500 
CDS Benefit   $78,709,200 
COTS CDS $183 425,455 $78,709,200 
Table 12.   Device Cost Benefit Comparison 
                                                 
88 Amortized across expected 2-year lifetime. 
89 Amortized across expected 2-year lifetime. 
90 Productivity benefit considers at least 20 mins per day leveraging the gamma distribution model. 
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IV. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS FOR LEVERAGING MOBILE 
VIRTUAL NETWORK OPERATOR SERVICES 
Figure 15, in the previous chapter, provides an illustration of the desired 
characteristics for the business cases. This chapter evaluates a business case for 
implementing services typically managed by network operators (i.e., MNO, MVNOs, or 
MVNEs) in an effort to reduce cost from the current implementation, increase signal 
coverage (i.e., add functionality), and increase security functionality (i.e., reduce risk). 
The proposed business case leverages edge networks that operate on commercial 
licensed, unlicensed, and government reserved spectrum. This analysis seeks to identify a 
system that is capable of providing a high level of security and functionality at a low cost. 
For example, the various network architectures can provide additional signal coverage, 
enhance data services, or extended voice services where tactical communications become 
extended into commercial networks. 
A. BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS 
Given the continuing government cost-cutting efforts, the authors assume the 
DoD’s current policy for wireless procurements is not sustainable. The ensuing 
subsections describe the current wireless DoD contracts, associated expenditures with 
trends, wireless best business practices, and a potential framework to mitigate various 
inefficiencies.  
1. Current DoD Contracts 
The DoD leverages various contracts and agreements to purchase cellular 
services. In this chapter, the authors focus on the common reoccurring cellular services 
and device procurements. These contracts and agreements establish the base case or ―AS 
IS‖ model in evaluating the DoD’s cost for cellular services. The Army and Air Force 
leverage the Army Contracting Command (ACC), National Capital Region Contracting 
Center (NCRCC), and Information Technology E-Commerce and Commercial 
Contracting Center (ITEC4) to generate and maintain their wireless service agreements 
(i.e., the Army Air Force Blanket Purchase Agreement (AAFBPA)). The Navy and 
  86 
Marine Corps leverage the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Fleet & 
Industrial Supply Center (FISC) to generate and maintain their wireless service contracts 
(i.e., the Nationwide Department of the Navy [DON] Wireless Contracts [NDWC]). Until 
recently, the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) program office (PMW-200) procured 
the wireless services for Navy and Marine Corps commands with access to the NMCI 
network through the Electronic Data Systems (EDS) contract. According to a recent 
report, the future EDS contract will only include data card services, and as of fiscal year 
2011 (FY11) all NMCI customers must rely on the NDWCs to support the DON wireless 
requirements (NMCI, 2010). These agreements and contracts only specify the terms and 
conditions of the procurements. The local contracting offices retain the responsibility to 
generate the tasking and delivery orders (i.e., for the indefinite delivery, indefinite 
quantity [IDIQ] contracts), which detail the specifics of the procurement and delineate 
the funding lines for deducting expenses from the requesting command.  
Table 13 provides a list of the various contracts supported by the two main 
contracting offices (i.e., only for the noncontrolled cryptographic items (non-CCIs)). As 
mentioned in Chapter III, the SME PED contracts are separately accounted for under the 
NSA I851 program office.91  
NAVSUP FISC (N00244) NDWC ACC NCRCC ITEC4 (W91RUS) AAFBPA 
N00244-05-D-0010 (AT&T / Cingular) 







W91RUS-06-A-0006 (Worldcell, Inc) 
W91RUS-06-A-0007 (Skytel Corp.) 
W91RUS-06-A-0008 (Alltel Corp.) 
 W91RUS-06-A-0009 (USA Mobility) 
Table 13.   Major DoD Cellular Service Contracts 
 
                                                 
91 The SME PED contracts are classified and not available for public release. 
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These contracts and agreements service all the major components within the DoD, 
including the Defense Telecommunications Services–Washington (DTS-W) customers. 
Even though these contracts provide a procurement medium for cellular services, they 
differ drastically in their design. The NDWCs are firm fixed price IDIQ contract and the 
AAFBPA is a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA)—where one is a contract and the 
other is an agreement. The advantage of these procurement vehicles is that they reduce 
administrative time and cost, delivery times, and ultimately streamline the process for 
high demand federal procurements (Compton, 2010). The IDIQ contracts require the 
government to quantify a lower and upper limit of supplies or services (FAR 16.504(a)). 
With this type of contract—such that the government is obligating a minimum amount of 
purchases upfront—by design, it provides negotiation advantages for facilitating a lower 
price (FAR 16.501-2(b)). Alternatively, the upper limit in a multiple contractor award 
could limit the flexibility of the government to purchase from the market-dominating 
vendor. Essentially, one vendor is favored over the others because that vendor provides a 
better service. Once this vendor reaches its upper limit threshold, its contract is locked 
from further tasking or delivery orders. In this case, the government is confined to 
ordering from the remaining vendors until the contract date expires. Although this paper 
does not focus on the performance of the contracting mechanisms, a DoD-wide strategy 
may be more advantageous to the DoD than three separate strategies. Refer to Appendix 
B for more details illustrating the trends of each contract and agreement. Understanding 
the difference between these two procurement methods is essential when comparing the 
DoD trends against the commercial market’s best business practices.  
2. Current DoD Procurement Trends for Wireless (Mobile) Services 
Figure 28 illustrates the combined expenditures over the past 6 fiscal years for the 
DoD contracts and agreements. The data is represented by fiscal years in an effort to 
align the results for comparison with the DoD budget. These procurement trends are 
consistent with DoD base budget trends. Since 2005, the DoD base budget has steadily 
increased (Department of Defense, 2010).  
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FY2005* FY2006* FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Army AAFBPA $25,000,000 $40,000,000 $64,302,923 $97,527,037 $119,563,392 $131,986,823 
NMCI EDS $5,000,000 $10,000,000 $14,699,780 $26,880,933 $41,462,241 $39,245,310 
FISC NDWC $19,473,117 $38,053,130 $46,823,658 $56,997,334 $59,517,776 $62,438,221 
% of Carrier Rev.** 0.02% 0.03% 0.08% 0.10% 0.11%
$19 
$38 $47 










































Figure 28.    DoD Cellular Procurements92,93,94 
An important trend to note with Figure 28 is the rate of change over the past 6 
years. The average expenses are increasing at a rate of $40M per year (i.e., with an R
2
 
value of 0.9811). However, given that the wireless procurements are directly controlled 
by DoD policy, these trends are likely to continue until noticeable waste is identified and 
drastic organizational changes are made. For example, the EDS contract discontinued all 
wireless procurements possibly because of higher service cost in comparison to the 
NDWC.95  
Figure 29, illustrates the past 4 years of DoD procurement trends separated by the 
four major vendors. Only four vendors are depicted because they account for the majority 
of the procuremnts. Figure 29 trends are very similar to the commerical market share 
distributions (i.e., the top two network operators dominating the market with a combined 
                                                 
92 Contract totals obtained from extracting and aggregating the data from 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/ (Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation) Addendum 1 – 
contains actual results. 
93 *FY2005 and FY2006 EDS and AAFBPA data are illustrated as estimates. 
94 **The FY2010 commercial carriers top lines were estimated since their financial records are not 
published. 
95 Refer to Appendix B for the contracts and agreements trends. 
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$160M revenues from the DoD during FY2010). These close trend correlations are 
signficant, because across the different contracts and agreements these correlations cease 
to exist. This suggests that as a single contract or agreement, the acquisition process 
might fail to provide adequate competition.  
 
Figure 29.   Breakdown of DoD Wireless Expenditures by Vendor 
Based on FCC and CTIA data, the commercial annual ARPU was about $565 in 
2009 (FCC 2010). Since DoD procurement trends are similar to those of the commercial 
market, the authors assume a similar if not greater annual ARPU. In an effort to estimate 
the total annual DoD subscriber base, the authors calculated total annual expenditures 
divided by this commercial ARPU. This resulted in over 400K subscribers based on 
FY2010 expenses. Assuming the DoD uses more data and voice minutes than average 
commercial subscribers, this assumption decreases the estimated demand to 340K 
subscribers based on FY2010 expenses.96 Therefore, the authors estimate DoD’s 
(FY2010) wireless demand is between 300K to 400K subscribers. Using this same logic, 
Figure 30 illustrates the estimated demand from FY2005 to FY2017. The estimated 
                                                 
96 DoD ARPU ($680) is based on EDS (NMCI) accurately quantified demand and verified 
expenditures. In an effort to make the ARPU comparable across all contracts and agreements, the authors 
subtracted out the NMCI overhead from the EDS ARPU.  
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demand results in an average subscriber increase of 55K per year. However, this trend is 
not likely to occur, as policy will most likely limit procurements based on the increasing 
wireless cost. 
 
Figure 30.   DoD Wireless Demand 
3. Best Practices 
The Aberdeen Group conducted a study between August and September 2010 that 
summarized the best business practices for controlling wireless expenses. The report 
reflects three major practices that the DoD lacks in their current procurement processes 
(Quickcomm, STS International, visage Mobility Central, 2010):  
1. Automate the enforcement of contracts and policies,  
2. Centralize the management of all devices, and 
3. Track voice, data, and costs associated with wireless usage. 
First, the DoD has auditing processes in place, but there are no tools for defense-
wide proactive enforcement. For example, if the wireless procurement is under $3000, 
the local contracting office could finalize the purchase without leveraging one of these 
contracts or agreements. In this case, the purchase is more difficult to track as a wireless 
procurement. In some cases, external contracting offices (i.e., other than the four military 
services), submit tasking orders against these contracts and agreements. Again, this is 
impossible to prevent, however, it is easily identifiable after the fact. No automated 
process exists to prevent out-of-contract procurements. Secondly, the DoD leverages two 
different offices, which use two different strategies for the contracts or agreements. 
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Therefore, holistically, the DoD does not have any process in place to centrally manage 
these devices. If the devices were procured against the NDWC or AAFBPA, and the 
contracting line item number (CLIN) referenced a handset, then at least the DoD could 
determine actual on-hand numbers by referencing the delivery orders. However, in most 
cases the handsets are either provided in conjunction with service—and therefore 
routinely not listed on the tasking order—or purchased through a general CLIN defining 
the purchase as a handset. Finally, since the local commands make the purchases directly 
with the vendors, it is not feasible to know about all of the devices purchased let alone 
managing or tracking usage. In an effort to estimate usage, the contracting offices request 
the individual vendors to supply quarterly reports but, when correlated with our known 
procurements (i.e., manually compiling the tasking and delivery orders submitted against 
these contracts), their data is drastically under reported.  
According to a report from the Avotus Corporation, ―Managing your Mobile and 
Wireless Spend,‖ they suggest developing a sourcing strategy by creating bucket plans, 
pooled minutes, or flat rate plans (Avotus, 2006). The pooled concept (i.e., tasking orders 
can pool their minutes to reduce overages) is common practice within the plans; however, 
the strategy still produces overage charges. The overage occurs when the usage exceeds 
the tasking orders’ combined limits. For example, five employees within the same 
command procure wireless services at the same time, under the same tasking order. These 
five employees have the option to pool their minutes under one plan. In this case, each 
employee is allocated 500 minutes per month. By pooling their minutes, the combined 
five employees share the 2,500 minutes vice their individual 500 minutes. The other 
strategy—contracting flat rates—mitigates the overage charges, but might be difficult to 
negotiate. If the DoD centrally contracted and combined the buying power, this flat rate 
might be more easily obtained.  
As previously mentioned, the DoD is procuring wireless services from the 
vendors under the NDWCs, the EDS contract, or the AAFBPAs97. The authors assume 
the tasking and delivery orders placed against these contracts and agreements represent 
                                                 
97 The AAFBPA includes the DTS-W contracts. 
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the majority of the expenditures associated with providing the DoD mobile wireless 
access (i.e., via COTS smartphones and SME PEDs) to the DISN enterprise services from 
commercial cellular networks. The authors assume that the expenditures under $3K (i.e., 
a credit card purchase and not included in contracts or agreements totals) are negligible 
since the cost of the device and associated annual service plan per customer is a 
significant proportion of the $3K limit. Additionally, the authors assume the expenditures 
are negligible because the customers are incentivized to pool minutes in order to receive 
the highest value for the lowest cost. The expenditures include the handset cost—even 
though in most cases the handsets were provided (―free of charge‖) with bundled 
procurements for wireless services. Currently, these contracts are negotiated from the 
perspective of the end users—where the services are grouped together by vendor and sold 
as a consumer product. Traditionally, this affords the DoD a fairly flat discount rate from 
the commercial market because of its large, semi-consolidated consumer base. 
Alternatively, the DoD could negotiate individual services (i.e., customer care, business 
to business, machine to machine, voice-mail, messaging services, etc.) based on the 
business case of outsourcing vice in-housing. This may provide the DoD a more 
substantial discount, facilitate more flexibility for integrating operational 
communications, and more control of wireless networks.  
4. Mobile Virtual Network Operator Model 
In an effort to assess a solution that potentially offers a lower cost for greater 
capability, this chapter evaluates the MVNO model. As explained in Chapter II, the 
commercial MVNO business model complements the MNO. In one case, the MVNO 
may provide services to otherwise underserved customers. According to an MVNO 
market research report, the MVNO industry differentiates their service offering according 
to the targeted customers demand (MindCommerce, 2010). Since the DoD has 3M 
employees, with an estimated 300,000 current subscribers and a unique requirement for 
tailored services, this MVNO model might benefit the department as long as the 
implementation does not result in the government competing with industry. Therefore, 
the DoD should investigate leveraging various commercially available services in the 
underserved regions. For example, Fort Knox, an Army base, is a region with comparably 
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less commercial cellular coverage than other military bases. Figure 31 illustrates the 
coverage maps copied from the corresponding network operator’s website. Basically, the 
colors depict the various signal strengths. These figures represent the carrier’s 






Figure 31.   Network Operators’ Coverage Maps for Fort Knox, KY98 
In this example, the DoD might consider requesting additional coverage from 
each of the network operators but, in some cases, the business case to support the 
additional equipment might not justify the expense. Another option is that the Army 
could purchase commercial grade base stations, outdoor repeaters, or indoor femtocells 
depending on the requirements. In the case of the Army purchasing the base stations, the 
Army would need to contract additional services in order to support the installation, 
operation, and maintenance of the equipment. Each of these options is commercially 
available and, in some cases, has already been implemented. Although each of these 
options meets one of the desired outcomes (i.e., increased coverage), they still fail to 
either reduce costs or increase security.  
When evaluating the same problem from a global perspective, Figure 32 
illustrates a reasonable representation of the GSM coverage. When considering the 
various cases for increasing coverage, this figure provides a high-level overview. The 
                                                 
98 Network operator provided images. 
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areas that already contain commercial spectrum licenses provide the DoD with a 
significant opportunity to leverage the preexisting infrastructure and innovative 
technology advances. However, across a significant portion of the globe, commercially 
available coverage is completely missing. 
 
 
Figure 32.   GSM Worldwide Coverage99 
The DoD has over 3M employees, with some residing in underserved regions 
(e.g., military training areas, remote locations, operational deployments, etc.), and the 
cost for services are increasing at a rate of $40M per year. The idea of the DoD providing 
MVNO service for employees might be worth exploring—especially in areas where the 
DoD receives inadequate coverage. Another use case is the deployed environment where 
the military services require a higher level of security assurance.  
Figure 33 divides the various MVNO concepts into useful categories for 
evaluating the potential cost when considering a DoD implementation. For reference, 
Appendix G provides a technical overview of the integrated mobile network architecture. 
                                                 
99 GSM world coverage map sourced from http://www.coveragemaps.com/gsmposter_world.htm. 
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Figure 33.    MVNO Divided Services100 
The following list describes Figure 33: 
1. Customer Service, Sales, and Billing. The commercial equivalent 
of the function is a service provider or reseller. This is a fully outsourced business model 
in which the DoD would contract a third-party provider to host all cellular services. In 
this model, the DoD would provide the front-end customer service (i.e., similar to the 
current base telecommunication offices), a virtual store for sales, the billing function 
through inherent contracting offices, and the remaining services are outsourced.  
2. Integrated Voice-Mail and Messaging Services. This model is 
similar to the enhanced service provider as described in Chapter II; however, in this 
model the DoD provides the messaging services. Potentially, DISA could add additional 
voice-mail and messaging servers or alternatively outsource the service depending on 
best value.  
3. Edge Network Hosting. This model differs from the commercial 
MVNO model. As discussed in Chapter II, an MNO usually owns the spectrum and 
therefore retains responsibility for the edge network equipment. However, the DoD might 
require edge network control for austere environments, humanitarian support, disaster 
relief, or underserviced domestic training bases. 
4. Core Network Hosting. This model completely integrates all of the 
core network functionality under the MVNO. As discussed in Chapter II, some 
commercial MVNOs internally operate, maintain, and support core networks, but 
leverage other MNOs for the edge networks. 
                                                 
100 Refer to Appendix C, for a full list of cost normally associated with MVNOs. Those line items 
were used as a basis for developing the following cost estimates.  
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B. MVNO COST ANALYSIS 
1. Customer Service, Sales, and Billing 
As previously mentioned in Chapter II, a significant number of MVNOs start as 
resellers or service providers—they buy wholesale cellular services from a strategic 
partner (i.e., MNO) and resell the services with the added value of better customer 
service, sales, or unique handsets. For example, this approach is similar to the original 
Boost Mobile, Consumer Cellular, Locus Telecommunications, Page Plus Cellular, 
Platinum Tel, and Qwest Wireless business models (H. White, 2010). As these MVNOs 
grow in customer base, the companies start in-housing services to realize more cost 
savings. For example, with a small amount of traffic, it is fairly easy to dedicate resources 
for that wholesale customer. However, once the customer base reaches a significant 
number of users, the traffic starts saturating the partitioned resources. Higher end 
switching centers can support millions of users, but if capacity is underutilized, the 
hardware costs and high fixed costs cannot be spread as far. This situation results in 
decreased operating margin. It seems reasonable that once a company’s customer base 
reaches enough capacity to require a dedicated high-end core network, the MVNOs might 
either start in-housing the services to realize larger profit margins or merge with their 
partnering MNO. For example, Boost Mobile is no longer an MVNO, as they are wholly 
owned by their underlying network operator, Sprint Nextel. Given an open and 
competitive market, the large MNOs seem reluctant to provide ubiquitous cellular 
services, and therefore small niche markets arise from MVNOs. This is consistent with 
the sourced after action reports (see Addendum A)—government regulations required 
extended coverage areas for disadvantaged users; and therefore, the last 20% of coverage 
accounted for 80% of the cost.101 
If the DoD desires to internalize various MVNO services, the first categories with 
which to evaluate attributable costs are customer service, sales, and billing. This is based 
on traditional MVNO startups, and it seems easiest to internalize without incurring a 
significant change in organizational structure. Since a significant amount of military 
                                                 
101 Given the sensitivity of this AAR, the Addendum is labeled as government distribution only. 
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bases currently contain telecommunication offices with customer service support for the 
wired telephony, it seems reasonable that these offices could support wireless customer 
requests. The authors note from personal experience that, some commands currently offer 
a significant number of services for cellular devices. For example, some commands 
receive devices from the providers, inventory the items, and contact the service provider 
to provision the devices prior to delivery to final customers. This added process allows 
the commands to track devices and arguably better manage their communications.  
In the commercial market, considering a 200,000 to 1,000,000-member customer-
base, the cost to provide the services in the first category (customer service, sales, billing, 
etc.) could range from $5M to $23M per year.102 The cost driver in this model is the 
labor cost. Although difficult to quantify, the number of employees required to support 
the subscriber base significantly affects the price. Since the added value of most MVNOs 
is an increase in customer support (i.e., as compared to MNOs), this model accounts for a 
customer-service-representative-to-user ratio of 1:5000, vice the industry standard of 
1:10,000 users.103 The majority of the cost associated with this category is the marketing 
cost (i.e., 40–62%). Assuming the DoD modifies the wireless policy by requiring all 
official wireless procurements to purchase services under this proposed model, the DoD 
could eliminate the cost of marketing—traditionally spent by the commercial market. 
Therefore, the tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars in marketing costs were 
not included. Since the DoD inherently maintains wireline services, the authors assume 
some level of wireless services support could come from the current facilities—especially 
if the wireless subscriber base increases and the dependency on wireline services 
decreases. The potential sunk cost associated with the current wireline customer service 
was not included in the final calculation. In addition to the front-end customer service, 
sales, and billing cost there exists a cost for the underlying commercial wireless network 
(i.e., the reselling part). The cost to procure the remaining cellular services varies 
drastically depending on the negotiated rate with the strategic wholesale partner. Based 
                                                 
102 Cost based on MindCommerce MVNO Business Case report from VIBE cost reporting and other 
market research. 
103 Industry standard referenced in MindCommerce MVNO Business Case report from VIBE cost 
reporting and other market research. 
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on a commercial provider’s estimate of the remaining services required to support 
smartphone capabilities, and assuming the same customer base, the cost ranges from 
$49M to $180M per year.104,105
 
An additional capability of interest is the ability to tunnel 
communications through commercial networks in roaming environments. Since the SME 
PED program currently implements this functionality at a cost of $2M per year (i.e., 
Apriva Multi-Carrier Entry Point [MCEP]), and other commercial providers offer this at 
an arguably reduced level of assurance for about $500K per year. The authors assume the 
cost to add this functionality is estimated at about a couple million dollars per year. 
Therefore, the final cost estimated to support this category is between $56M and $205M 
per year. However, as the years progress and the DoD subscriber base increases toward 1 
million users, the cost will increase toward the $23M for the customer service, sales, and 
billing support. This trend will ultimately drive the wholesale cost for the underlying 
network beyond the annual cost of $205M.  
2. Integrated Voice-Mail and Messaging Services Cost 
In some cases, the MVNOs attempt to differentiate their offered services by 
providing unique services. For example, Boost Mobile originally offered Boost Walkie-
Talkie service including specialized wallpapers, games, applications, voice-mail greeting, 
and other customized services (H. White, 2010). Kajeet, a family oriented MNVO, 
offered parental management tools, a time manager, and a content manager to assist 
parents in limiting features on the children’s handsets (H. White, 2010). Sti Mobile 
specialized in push-to-talk (i.e., with Sprint Nextel as the underlying operator), MMS, e-
mail, and instant messaging (H. White, 2010). The idea is that the MVNO model 
provides the flexibility to specialize in the areas that the niche market requires. In the 
DoD’s case, a specialized voice-mail (e.g., a single voice-mail that is permanently 
associated with each employee independent of their current phone number or attached 
command) or integrated messaging (e.g., an enterprise global access list with the ability 
to send SMS, MMS, or instant messaging without knowing the individuals phone 
                                                 
104 Reference Addendum B for carriers provided wholesale cost (distribution restricted). 
105 Appendix C list additional services that were considered as remaining. 
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number—a DoD-wide phonebook searchable by name). The integrated messaging service 
could leverage a service similar to DISAs current enterprise directory service (i.e., Global 
Directory Service / Joint Enterprise Directory Service). These services provide the first 
steps toward a true ubiquitous mobile communication capability.  
Based on a coalition partner’s MVNO business case (Addendum A) and past 
procurements of cellular infrastructure by Yuma proving grounds, the cost to purchase 
voice-mail servers, short message service (SMS), multimedia messaging service (MMS), 
and enterprise servers for hundreds of thousands of users could range from $2M–$4M 
and incur a $200K per year cost for maintenance and support.106 Using the same five-
year range the NPV results in a cost of $4.6M. This option considers purchasing the 
equipment and contracting out the maintenance and support. Although some additional 
fixed costs exist, the authors consider them negligible in order of magnitude (e.g., 
certification and accreditation). 
Another option is to procure the services through a third-party vendor outside of 
the traditional major carriers. These third-party vendors—message aggregators—provide 
the interconnect between network operators. They facilitate delivering person to person 
(P2P) and application to person (A2P) messages between wholesale customers. For 
example, a P2P delivery occurs when a Verizon subscriber sends an SMS to a Sprint 
subscriber. An A2P delivery occurs when an advertising company sends mass SMSs to 
hundreds of thousands of subscribers across all the network operators. The military could 
leverage A2P services during disaster situations, for distributing recall messages, or 
publicizing command wide notices.  
3. Edge Network Hosting Cost  
As previously mentioned, the MVNOs usually defer the ownership of the edge 
network107  equipment to the MNOs because the ability to propagate cellular signals 
requires either spectrum licenses or leasing agreements. From a technical perspective, 
                                                 
106 Referenced sources are labeled as government distribution only; however, the data presented in 
this section is distilled into a public released format. 
107 See Addendum A for previous business case analysis. (distribution restricted). 
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this approach (i.e., hosting edge network devices) seems more valuable than owning the 
entire network. The military services travel worldwide to places that lack commercial 
signals including austere environments, international waters, and natural disaster 
environments. In these locations, the military needs the ability to leverage inherent 
communications devices.  
When developing the concept of operations (CONOPS) for wireless 
communications, an important consideration to evaluate is the electromagnetic emission 
environment for the mission. Since spectrum is a finite resource with a high demand, and 
ownership varies by region, this requirement could limit the remaining available options. 
A number of other environmental conditions further restrict the options. For example:  
Is there an emissions threat? How austere is the terrain? How mobile is the operation? 
What is the number of users per area? What is the duration of sustainment without 
resupply?  
Each region around the world drastically differs in the applicable policies and 
regulations for managing spectrum. Therefore, the business case for integrating 
smartphones into military operations must be adaptable to every potential environment. 
This section discusses the various integration concepts based on the potential wireless 
environments, which are allocated as commercial licensed, unlicensed, or government 
spectrum. The commercial licensed spectrum includes all frequency bands, which are 
allocated globally for mobile cellular communications. The unlicensed spectrum includes 
the globally allocated bands for wireless communications. The government spectrum 
includes all domestically and internationally allocated frequencies for military operations. 
a. Commercial Spectrum 
If an environment exists where emission security is not a concern and 
commercial spectrum is available, the DoD could leverage two different types of edge 
network concepts based on their mobility requirements. For example, on a domestic 
military base that is underserviced with cellular coverage, the DoD might require fixed 
base stations to provide intranet-like services (i.e., the base owns and controls the entire 
network under an enhanced security policy). In this case, fixed commercial base stations 
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and controllers could satisfy the requirement. Alternatively, for military mobile 
operations (e.g., an on-the-move training exercise in areas without commercial cellular 
coverage) or rapidly deployable situations (e.g., disaster relief operations) the ruggedized 
mobile stations become desirable. 
(1) Radio Access Network. In areas of lower commercial demand 
and therefore gaps in the cellular coverage, the DoD might require additional assets to 
transport government furnished equipment (i.e., DoD purchased smartphones) traffic. 
The required edge equipment can range from fully commercial-grade fixed base 
transceiver stations (BTS) / base station controller (BSC) or Node B (NB) / radio network 
controllers (RNC) to simple in-building repeaters or gap-filler picocells / femtocells (i.e., 
smaller sized base stations). In some cases, the fixed commercial-grade RANs (i.e., 
BSC/BTS/RNC/NB) will satisfy most CONUS operations. The cost to provide these 
assets can vary based on the required user capacity, RAN scalability, and procurement 
quantities. Table 14, illustrates the cost and lifetime of commercial RAN equipment 
based on data in Addendum A and correlated with Yuma proving grounds previous 
procurements.108  
 
Description Quantity Minimum Maximum 
BTS / NB109 
(Macro/Pico/Femto) 
1500–4000 $45,000,000 $180,000,000 
Installation and Additional 
Material Cost 
 $4,500,000 $20,000,000 
BSC / RNC 20–35 $6,000,000 $14,000,000 
Total  $55.5M $214M 
Total per year (7 year lifetime)  $8M $30.6M 
Table 14.   Standard Fixed Commercial RAN Costs 
                                                 
108 Referenced sources are labeled as government distribution only; however, the data presented in 
this section is distilled into a public released format. 
109 Assuming 3 sections with 2 transceivers; costs can vary depending on manufacturer and size. 
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Table 14 highlights RAN equipment costs based on a concept of 
operations in which the devices are fixed to a specific location. The quantities represent a 
rough order of magnitude given the DoD’s current estimated demand. Quantities greatly 
depend on the area covered and subscriber density; however, the ratio between BSC/RNC 
and BTS/NB should roughly remain constant. The equipment costs delineated in Table 
14 are represented as an order of magnitude to support tens of thousands to millions of 
subscribers across varied distributions. Refer to Appendix G for the current DoD 
distribution of wireless procurements. The demand percentages in Appendix G are 
illustrated by region, based on the physical locations of the funding offices. In some 
cases, the illustration might be misleading because the subscribers continually travel and 
rarely remain stationary in one region. Therefore, the authors recommend a more 
thorough study be completed to determine a more accurate representation of wireless 
usage by region. The accuracy of that study could drastically reduce the variability of the 
projections in Table 14. 
(2) Ruggedized Mobile Base Stations. Addendum D illustrates the 
costs and specifications of candidate ruggedized mobile RAN systems. Other variants are 
commercially available. The authors chose to list these variants, because of personal 
experience with purchasing the device and familiarity with the technical advantages and 
limitations.  
Some of the equipment listed in Addendum D provides additional 
capabilities not found in the standard commercial equipment (i.e., SIP server, a Wi-Fi 
access point, MSC capabilities, etc.). However, all of these devices leverage the standard 
commercial cellular protocols and operate on the standard commercial mobile spectrum. 
These devices were developed for austere environments and marketed towards federal 
departments. The cost per subscriber is roughly similar to the fixed commercial 
equipment; however, in some cases the small size and ruggedization creates higher per-
subscriber cost. 
(3) Spectrum Cost. Since all of the devices mentioned in this 
section operate within standard commercial cellular protocols, the systems only operate 
on commercial spectrum. Therefore, when evaluating the TCO, the business case should 
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include the cost for leasing the spectrum. According to various MNOs, the vendors were 
willing to lease spectrum under two conditions: 1) the region of interest lacked cellular 
signals and failed to present a reasonable business case for adding additional coverage 
(i.e., limited demand); 2) the region of interest proved infeasible for establishing tower 
real estate (i.e., lack of geography for new towers). If either of those conditions were met, 
the price for leasing spectrum ranges from hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per 
location, per month, and per frequency channel. In addition to the spectrum cost other 
costs can exist, but those special cases are not accounted for in the above examples. For 
example, other costs can include the cost for the power to run equipment, shipping and 
transportation, yearly maintenance and support, and labor hours for training new 
personnel on how to use the equipment. 
b. Unlicensed Spectrum 
Another option when considering wireless communications is unlicensed 
spectrum. From a cost perspective, this option is the most efficient solution (i.e., licensed 
spectrum requires fiscal expenditures to lease and government spectrum requires a loss in 
opportunity cost). Regarding availability, there exist many different COTS devices with 
the capability of facilitating communications across the unlicensed spectrum. Of the 
commercially available devices, Table 15 lists their various associated unlicensed bands 
according to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) website.110 
 Frequency Description Standards Max Power 
902-928 MHz ISM Band (GSM in some countries)   
2.400-2.4835 GHz ISM Band 802.11b/g/n 4W 
5.150-5.250 GHz UNII 802.11a 200mW 
5.250-5.350 GHz UNII 802.11a 1W 
5.250-5.350 GHz UNII 802.11a 4W 
5.800-5.925 GHz ISM Band   
 
 
Table 15.   Unlicensed Bands 
                                                 
110 Sourced from the NTIA website: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.html. 
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Of these unlicensed bands, this paper assumes a significant number of 
modern smartphones have the capability to connect to Wi-Fi access points. From a 
security perspective, the commercial signals fail to provide adequate protection against 
malicious attacks.111 However, in some environments, a reduced likelihood of emission 
threats may provide an opportunity to leverage these bands. For example, within the 
United States, under FCC regulations, and within highly utilized public WiFi hotspots, 
the wireless service seems sufficient, otherwise the service would not exist. If the service 
was too slow or was continually interrupted, then perhaps other transport mediums would 
arise. In these areas, given the high demand, it seems feasible that the military could 
propagate signals across unlicensed bands without malicious interference. 
(1) Secure VoIP Via Tactical Network Extension. Figure 34 
illustrates a simplistic overview of a comparably inexpensive architecture to extend voice 
and data services to modern smartphone devices. This concept assumes that the phone is 
configured with a separation kernel and VMM capabilities to provide the user interface 
and additional layers of protection (i.e., assuming the device is certified with a high CC 
score).112 This implementation assumes that the various operational use cases would 
consist of environments without emission control restrictions. In this instance, the Wi-Fi 
access points provide the bridge between the tactical network and the commercial 
protocol. Another assumption is that the smartphones host Suite B algorithms to encrypt 
all data prior to transmission. In this case, the wireless access points have the capability 
to decrypt the packets prior to routing through the tactical network. Although not 
considered in the below cost analysis, another option is to not decrypt the packets until 
they reach the PBX network. 
                                                 
111 Refer to (Dixon, 2010) for a more in-depth discussion about signal vulnerabilities. 
112 Chapter  III describes the separation kernel with VMM approach. 






Figure 34.   Wi-Fi Architecture 
Figure 34 represents an architecture to leverage existing tactical 
communications networks. For fixed enterprise architectures, the radios are replaced by 
routers and switches, and the wireless access points are replaced with enterprise variants. 
Across all variations and architecture designs, the cost for this capability remains limited 
in comparison to previous concepts. The cost for the wireless access points depends on 
manufacturer and variant, but can range from $500 to $5,000 per device. Since each of 
the military services inherently has VoIP networks, and in some cases leverage the VoIP 
infrastructure to manage their wireline networks, the other required equipment (i.e., 
tactical radios, smartphones, PBX server, PSTN, etc.) is considered a sunk cost. The 
difficult number to calculate in this concept is the quantity. How many additional 
domestic wireless access points are required? How many deployable access points would 
the services require to support current and future operations? These questions are 
extremely difficult to answer, especially since the military services differ in their 
opinions of the CONOPS. For example, in a public wireless conference, an Army 
representative stated that every Solider should have a smartphone device, and the Marine 
Corps representative stated only the squad leaders and higher should carry devices.  
(2) Secure / Unsecure VoIP Via Garrison Networks. For garrison 
environments, the architecture is similar to that shown in Figure 34—where the Wi-Fi 
access points route the client handset traffic. However, for this use case the service 
members are located inside their command building or surrounding area. This concept 
assumes that the base provides a fairly high level of physical security to limit potential 
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threats. Additionally, this paper assumes emission security vulnerabilities remain 
negligible when physical security measures are enforced aboard continental U.S. 
(CONUS) military bases. For this use case, there are two architectures to evaluate. The 
first implements link encryption through similar Wi-Fi access points as listed in the 
previous section. The second architecture is purely a COTS Wi-Fi access point. This 
implementation adds no additional security measures to the standard Wi-Fi router. This is 
valuable because the access points are drastically less expensive and commonly available. 
Since all of the infrastructure concepts presuppose an edge device with a high assurance 
security kernel and added end-to-end Suite B encryption capabilities, the link layer 
encryption might prove of little value due to the increase in latency. The cost for these 
architectures is a function of the number of bases multiplied by the number of additional 
wireless sites required (existing access points are considered a sunk cost). Although 
difficult to enumerate without implementing scalable pilot programs, these architectures 
coupled with the MVNO concept can bring significant cost savings. As an example, T-
Mobile offers cellular plans that provide unlimited VoIP minutes independent of 
customers’ cellular minutes and at no additional cost to the customers.  
c. Department of Defense Allocated Spectrum 
The final option to consider when developing a communication plan is 
whether to use DoD-owned or allocated spectrum. For example, in some instances, the 
government spectrum might be the only authorized frequencies for military services. 
When deployed overseas, the available spectrum is allocated by the host country or other 
coalition partners. Domestically, if commercial signals are unavailable or unlicensed 
spectrum is too congested, the DoD spectrum remains the only feasible option. From the 
authors’ personal experience, the military services’ inherent wireless communications 
devices provide robust signals for the most extreme austere environments. These signals 
provide security properties that are not found in the commercial market (i.e., low 
probability of detection (LPD), low probability of intercept (LPI), low probability of 
exploitation (LPE), and antijamming (AJ)). Although some commercial signals 
inherently provide a limited level of these characteristics (i.e., CDMA), the signals were 
not intended for protecting against emission threats; rather, the commercial signals were 
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designed with these properties to increase connectivity performance (Dixon, 2010). Since 
the DoD spectrum is more widely available for military operations, and the military 
wireless communication networks are designed around these frequencies, it seems 
feasible to evaluate the cost of the spectrum and potential architectures that leverage this 
spectrum. 
(1) Spectrum Cost. Given that spectrum is a finite resource and 
continually in high demand, some argue that the federal government should reallocate 
more spectrum for commercial purposes. This argument is hard to discount when looking 
at the resulting revenue from various actions. For example, the U.S. federal government 
received over $19B from the 700MHz band and over $13B from the Advanced Wireless 
Services (AWS) band actions—although reallocating this spectrum did cost the 
government in terms of labor and equipment to move or modify the systems (FCC 2009; 
FCC 2010). In some cases, the legacy equipment was obsolete and, therefore, newer 
equipment was easier to buy without major loss in capabilities. In other cases, the newer 
system was not feasible and, therefore, a loss in capability was inevitable. To mitigate a 
large detriment in capabilities, the reallocation period was extended over a couple of 
years, depending on the specific circumstances.  Fortunately, for the affected government 
agencies, on December 23, 2004, President Bush signed the Commercial Spectrum 
Enhancement Act (CSEA) to provide assistance in recovering reallocation costs from 
auction proceeds (Office of Management and Budget, 2007). For the AWS band, the 
government allocated over $1B of the revenue towards facilitating the reallocation of 
Federal communications systems (Office of Management and Budget, 2007). Of the $1B 
in recovery cost, the DoD only received a proportion. Table 16 illustrates DoD 
allocations: 
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Departments Amount Timeline 
Systems 
Affected 
Air Force $106,753,481 48 Months 36 
Army $15,933,043 36 Months 31 
Navy $134,465,000 36 Months 29 
DoD-wide support $98,200,000 72 Months  
Total $355,351,524   
Table 16.   DoDs Plan for Spectrum Reallocations Funds 
The licenses auctioned under the 700Mhz and AWS bands were 
issued for 10 to 15 years.113 Given the combined sum of about $33B minus the few 
billion in reallocations cost, the federal government is still poised to realize an increase in 
at least $2B per year across the next 15 years. Therefore, the argument against 
maintaining exclusivity of government spectrum is very difficult to justify. The CSEA 
has made the reallocation of spectrum a little less burdensome for the effected bureaus; 
however, these organizations never receive the full recoupment of cost. Although these 
two bands received a high return at auction, some spectrum is not valued as ―prime real 
estate.‖ When evaluating future bands for reallocation, the business cases should 
ultimately look at the opportunity cost—how much is it costing the government to 
maintain exclusivity rights. Alternatively, as a representative from ASD NII stated, even 
though the government business case looks promising, the individual departments’ 
business cases fail to provide enough justification for releasing the spectrum. For 
example, using the AWS band, the DoD was allocated $355M in return for their lost 
spectrum. When dividing that across 15 years, that returns $24M per year. Those funds 
seem sufficient to cover the cost of modifying and procuring the equipment (i.e., 96 
systems); however, they may not be sufficient for leasing back the spectrum when 
needed. As quoted from network operators, the cost to lease spectrum can range from 
hundreds of dollars per month to thousands, depending on the area. Given these price 
                                                 
113 Sourced from the FCC Fact Sheet. Retrieved from 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=66. 
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points and assuming the DoD occupies at least 100 locations with underserved coverage, 
the cost to lease the spectrum to propagate cellular emissions (i.e., base stations) could 
range from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions. 
(2) Tethered. The tethered concept leverages inherent IP-based 
military radios for all wireless transmissions.114 Assuming the approach in Chapter III 
exists (i.e., the smartphone devices already supports high assurance separation and 
virtualization as the architectural foundation for any guest operating systems), the level of 
modification required to implement the tethering concept is trivial and the cost is 
insignificant (Lyons, 2011). If the smartphones only contained the high-level operating 
system with an inherent unmodified kernel, this concept’s TCO becomes cost prohibitive, 
fails to address various security vulnerabilities, and requires additional cabling. Figure 35 
illustrates a simplistic view of the concept, but additional variations are feasible (i.e., 
vehicle mounted radio with dash mounted sled, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 35.   Tethered Smartphone to Military Radio 
(3) Tactical Waveform. In environments that preclude commercial 
emissions due to threats of detection, interception, or exploitation, tactical signals 
continually prove adequate for mitigating the risk. However, those capabilities 
traditionally come with a loss of functionality. The tactical radio signals can provide the 
ability to increase emission security, but the radios’ functional inefficiencies inhibit their 
ability to match the communication capabilities of commercial devices. In an effort to 
                                                 
114 Refer to Dixon (2010) and Lyons (2011) theses for more details surrounding the tethered concept. 
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provide both these capabilities, this paper suggests designing and manufacturing a small 
chipset with inherent tactical signals contained within current military radios. From a 
sleeve design, similar to common cases for almost every modern day smartphone (e.g., 
Figure 36), these chipsets and added battery power could provide the transport medium 
for smartphones. Essentially, a smartphone wrapped with these sleeves facilitates modern 
day innovative features while maintaining traditional emission securities. However, this 
approach assumes the handset leverages the high assurance separation architecture as 




Figure 36.   Smartphone Sleeve Concept115 
The cost to research and develop this specialized sleeve is difficult 
to estimate since very few publicly available efforts are known. Lockheed Martin has a 
program that attempts to use their proprietary base station and wireless protocol. Their 
sleeve and associated base station are not exactly the same as this concept, but at least are 
one step closer. Additionally, the device communicates between the smartphone and the 
sleeve via standard Wi-Fi protocol, whereas this concept should leverage tethered links 
via the USB or 30 pin connectors. The cost for Lockheed Martin’s sleeve is around a 
thousand dollars. Mass quantities could drive the price lower. The difference in the 
concept presented here is that the sleeve connects directly with legacy radios vice a 
modified base station. Therefore, the cost of Lockheed Martin’s base station is not a 
factor when considering similarities. Since this concept leverages preexisting waveforms, 
the typical tens of millions of dollars spent on protocol research and development would 
also not be a factor. However, the cost to consider here is the porting of the protocol (i.e., 
waveform) from the current form factor to a small chipset—additional costs to consider 
                                                 
115 Image retrieved from www.apple.com. 
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include: personnel, encryption (Type 1 vice Suite B), supply chain, maintenance and 
support, etc. The authors suggest a feasibility study be conducted for this approach—
currently a significant number of unknown variables exist. 
4. Commercial Grade Core Network Cost  
This section captures the cost116 of procuring core network capabilities to host 
2G/3G cellular services. The cost estimated in this section is based on the business case 
that is detailed in Addendum A. Additionally, previous Yuma proving grounds core 
network expenses were used as a comparison for estimating the cost to support millions 
of subscribers.117 Table 17 lists the aggregated services and their respective costs 
required to host a 2G/3G core network. These services can vary depending on 
requirements. This paper considers the base station controllers as an edge network 
component, and therefore those costs are not included in this section. However, there are 
a significant number of other potential costs (i.e., additional labor for maintenance and 
support, additional plant property and equipment [PP&E] to support extra equipment, 
etc.). The authors believe additional work is necessary to accurately depict all the 
associated cost; however, based on our knowledge, these estimates seem reasonable. 
                                                 
116 See Addendum A for previous business case analysis. 
117 Referenced sources are labeled as government distribution only; however, the data presented in 
this section is distilled into a public released format. 
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Description Quantity Minimum Maximum 
Mobile Switching Center (incl. Visitor 
Location Register (VLR)) 
2 $1,600,000 $2,000,000 
Media Gateway 2 $400,000 $600,000 
ISDN user part (ISUP)/Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) 
2 $400,000 $600,000 
Home Location Register 
(HLR)/Authentication Center (AuC) 
2 $200,000 $1,400,000 
Short message service center (SMSC) 2 $600,000 $1,400,000 
Voice-mail Server 2 $800,000 $1,000,000 
Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) 2 $200,000 $1,000,000 
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) 2 $200,000 $300,000 
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) System  1 $100,000 $200,000 
Total  $4.5M $8.5M 
Total per year (7 year lifetime)  $640K $1.2M 
Table 17.   Potential Cellular Core Network Cost 
C. BENEFIT 
Since the purpose of the MVNO business case was to highlight solutions to 
reduce cost, increase security, and increase signal coverage, this section details the 
benefits within those categories. 
1. Customer Service, Sales, and Billing 
From the fifty-thousand-foot view, the benefit for in-housing the customer 
service, sales, and billing portion of wireless services is the reduced procurement cost and 
added security policy capabilities. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the 
DoD spent roughly $235M in FY2010 and continues an increasing trend of $40M per 
year for cellular services. Over the next 5 years, given a constant discount rate of 3%, the 
net present value for the potential cost is about 1.475B. If the customer service category 
is adopted using the worst scenario from the cost section, the cost to the DoD is about 
$577M. Therefore, the total realized saving from implementing this concept is about 
$898M. 
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a. Telecommunication Expense Management 
A Telecommunication Expense Management (TEM) solution provides 
services for sourcing, procurement, and auditing (Goodness & Redman 2010). These 
services provide the customers with data points for negotiating prices, contract terms and 
conditions, improved financial forecast, and usage planning (Goodness & Redman 2010). 
Additional services include ordering and provisioning, inventory, usage, and dispute 
management (Goodness & Redman 2010). Since these categories are a subset of the 
customer service, sales, and billing MVNO concept, the benefits of a TEM solution are 
very similar in comparison. Assuming that a significant part of the DoD already contracts 
TEM providers (i.e., multiple TEM providers are listed under the General Services 
Administration (GSA) contract site), then a portion of the benefit is representative of their 
cost. Searching the GSA website, the cost for these solutions resides in the vicinity of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. The remaining benefit is representative of the 
wasted expenses from non-TEM participating departments. This could result is millions 
of dollars in annual savings by consolidating the various TEM providers into one DoD 
solution. Based on a market research report, the best-in-class commercial company is 
able to save 18% annually on wireless expenses by leveraging TEMs services. Assuming 
25% of the DoD does not implement a TEM solution, then this would provide a benefit 
of $49.5M for FY2011 (i.e., $275M [projected FY2011 expenditures] x 18%). Although 
not included in many of the TEM solutions, some TEM providers are including 
increasingly valued over-the-air Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions as a way 
to differentiate their product offerings (Goodness & Redman 2010). This capability 
provides real-time access and control of every mobile wireless device. Again, since this 
service is inherently available for MVNOs the benefit is difficult to enumerate. 
b. Local Telecommunication Offices Capacity 
Since a majority of base telecommunication offices support wireline and 
limited wireless services, their unused capacity may be considered sunk cost or 
opportunity cost. If this MVNO concept was implemented, these telecom offices 
represent a prime candidate for providing the base customer service offices. Since the 
DoD has wireline services, the organization is already structured to facilitate 
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communication like processes (e.g., DISA operates the defense switch network). 
Therefore, in some cases, and depending on capacity, the added wireless services might 
only require additional personnel instead of completely reorganizing the personnel, 
facilities, work processes, etc. 
c. Reduced Contracting Costs 
Another benefit not thoroughly investigated in this paper is the reduction 
in contracting cost. Under this MVNO concept, the generation of tasking orders and 
delivery orders might be replaced with military interdepartmental purchase requests 
(MIPRs) or other interdepartmental funding processes. Since the actual purchases from 
commercial vendors are consolidated under a program office and procured in bulk orders, 
the individual commands can maximize opportunity cost by reallocating resources. For 
more insights into the actual cost savings, a further analysis through business process 
reengineering is suggested. 
2. Integrated Voice-Mail and Messaging Services 
Since this concept builds from the previous MVNO concept (i.e., customer 
service, sales, billing, etc.), the same benefits exist. However, a couple unique benefits to 
this concept exist as a result of inherently controlling the voice-mail and messaging 
services.  
a. DoD SMS/MMS 
In disaster situations, where distributing recall messages or publicizing 
command-wide notices is extremely important, an automated initialization service vice a 
human-in-the-loop process potentially becomes a necessity. Assuming a majority of 
department personnel have mobile devices provisioned under this service or linked 
through a client application, this approach (i.e., sending instant notifications) seems 
feasible. For example, military commands develop threat levels with associated policies 
and procedures for instances of severe weather that could cause loss of life or equipment 
degradation. The ability to automate the delivery of these notifications can significantly 
enhance the response time. Continuing with this example, and leveraging the capabilities 
that this concept provides, the commander, department head, or delegated authority could 
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implement an instantaneous unit-wide notification directly to every handheld device. 
Additionally, these systems could facilitate automatic tallied responses for personnel 
accountability purposes. Essentially, as the storm rolls through the region, the leaders 
could send and receive real-time updates on threat levels and personnel readiness. The 
benefit received potentially equals the cost of a loss in life or equipment. Since the 
military has extremely high valued equipment (i.e., in the order of billions) this paper will 
only quantify the value of a life to evaluate an order of magnitude for benefits. Using the 
value of life equation cited in a previous cost benefit analysis, this paper defines the value 
as a function:118 
 
Figure 37.   Value of Life Equation (From Lakamp, McCarthy 2003) 
In Lakamp’s (2003) thesis, the author’s value of life was about $3.7M per 
employee. Since they used military personnel and DoD civilian employees in calculating 
risk, the results are similar to this example. Additionally, their assumptions for employee 
earnings were roughly similar to this example.119 Assuming a more conservative value of 
life at $3M per employee, the added benefit in this example results in $3M times the 
number of potential deaths for any given disaster situation. As the number of potential 
deaths increases beyond 333 employees, the cost breaks the billion-dollar threshold. 
However, the likelihood of this number of casualties seems small. The referenced thesis 
used the Oklahoma City terrorist attack as a potential event, which resulted in 14% 
fatalities. Obviously, when evaluating the benefit received from a technology that could 
prevent loss of life, the return is high.  
                                                 
118 David Lakamp; Gill McCarthy. (2003, December). ―A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Security at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.‖ Monterey, CA. 
119 The thesis valued $55,890 as the average annual earnings. 
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b. Integrated Voice-Mail 
Another benefit is the ability to consolidate all voice-mail services into 
one secure solution—a secure solution meaning inherently owning the management, 
operational, and technical policies governing the implementation.120 For example, 
military personnel might have one or many phone numbers assigned to them as they 
progress through their career. This type of solution could enable a secure voice-mail 
service per employee, independent of their current phone number or attached command, 
that would travel with them as they move—similar to official e-mail accounts. Some 
benefits potentially received from this type of service are a reduction in vulnerability 
from the current system (i.e., assuming the current systems are vendor-provided 
solutions), an increase in usability (video voice-mail or voice-to-text voice-mail service, 
etc.), and the added convenience of a consolidated voice-mail rather than three separate 
voice-mails on three different networks.  
3. Edge Network  
Since this concept builds from the previous MVNO concepts (i.e., customer 
service, sales, billing, integrated VM, and messaging), the same benefits exist. However, 
a couple of unique benefits to this concept exist as a result of inherently controlling the 
edge network devices.  
a. Mobile Intranet (Data Side) 
If the DoD decides to procure edge network base stations and access 
points, the decision could provide the ability to connect via an intranet network. 
Essentially, the locally owned, controlled, and approved access points or base stations 
could provide the entry point for on-base intranet access. The ability to integrate the 
voice capability via standard cellular protocols would still require a core network. 
However, a secure VoIP architecture leveraging SCIP might provide an alternative  
 
 
                                                 
120 Refer to Appendix A in regards to security definitions. 
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method for voice communications and on-base DISN access. Unless the phones were 
customized with an inherent SCIP capability, the devices would require a client 
application to participate in that network.  
b. Increased Signal Coverage 
As previously highlighted in Figure 30, the world still lacks ubiquitous 
commercially available cellular coverage. This MVNO concept provides the flexibility of 
adding additional edge network devices to connect CDS COTS smartphones. This could 
provide the military services with a marginal productivity increase for operational 
deployments that lack commercial signals (i.e., resulting capability from adding the data 
functionality to a traditional voice only network). For example, in areas that lack 
sufficient commercial signals, the military services could erect edge network equipment 
to support the mission throughout the duration of an exercise. Alternatively, on domestic 
military bases with limited cellular coverage this MVNO concept provides the ability to 
add the coverage based on military priorities vice commercial market demand. 
c. Added Competency for Operational Deployments 
Another advantage of owning the edge network devices is the ability to 
grow inherent competency surrounding the base station technology. As the use of this 
technology increases, the operators and maintainers of the equipment will develop a 
greater understanding of commercial systems. This knowledge could provide a solution 
for military operations that require interoperable commercial communications with the 
local populace or coalition forces. 
4. Commercial Grade Core Network  
a. Mobile Intranet (Completely DoD-Owned Network) 
This paper presents only a few potential benefits from adopting an MVNO 
approach, because a comprehensive perspective seems difficult to quantify with any 
degree of accuracy. One could postulate that the benefits received from typical enterprise 
architectures exist in the MVNO model. In Figure 38, the top block represents a typical 
model a residential customer could implement with service from a commercial network 
  118 
operator. The middle block represents the architecture that same residential customer and 
every other mobile subscriber shares when leveraging mobile services. Alternatively, for 
the higher end customer (i.e., large organizations), the lower architecture is a potential 

























Figure 38.   Network Architectures 
In essence, these three models reflect basic mechanisms for connecting 
services through the Internet. Arguably, the enterprise architecture includes a protection 
layer that the other blocks are missing, including such additional services as firewalls, 
demilitarized zones, storage and power redundancy, network management suites, etc. If 
the DoD adopted the MVNO model, these different types of intranet services become a 
reality. Internalizing MVNO services can facilitate a separation or buffer between the 
end-subscriber and the external networks; otherwise, since the network operators own 
and control the radio access and core networks, the handset devices end up directly 
attaching without a mediator. As mentioned in the SME PED architecture, the MCEP 
middleware functions as a mediator. There are services unique to smartphones on which 
other computing devices are not typically dependent (i.e., SMS, MMS, Voice-mail, HLR, 
VLR, etc.), but these services are essential to provide the complete functionality of 
traditional services. Since these services exist, the MVNO becomes a desirable model to  
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leverage a more secure implementation. Since this model positions the DoD to procure 
the minutes and data rates at wholesale prices (i.e., in bulk), the organization can finally 
leverage economies of scale. 
5. General MVNO Benefits 
The following paragraphs provide various benefits shared across all the MVNO 
approaches. 
a. Realigning Incentives 
Currently, the DoD contracts and agreements facilitate pool options (i.e., 
monthly shared minutes, SMS, data, etc.) by tasking order to help reduce overage fees; 
however, the underutilizing user ends up bearing the cost of those unused minutes. The 
users who exceed their ―allotted‖ minutes receive the additional minutes at the expense of 
the other users. For example, users 1 and 2 share a 500-minute pooled plan for $60 per 
month. User 1 uses 400 minutes, and user 2 uses 600 minutes. In this example, no 
overages were charged, but user 1 pays 15 cents per minute (i.e., $60/400 minutes) and 
user 2 pays $0.10 per minute (i.e., $60/600 minutes) even though they both contributed 
$60 each to the pooled plan. Assuming the combined users do not consume beyond the 
pooled limit, this model does not incentivize the user to control over usage. Under the 
MVNO model, the organization can buy the service (i.e., minutes, text, data, etc.) in bulk 
and still distribute the minutes to their customers under a pay-as-you-go model. In this 
model, the cost burden is correctly aligned with the usage.  
b. Specialized Handsets 
As previously mentioned in Chapter III, a common method for the 
MVNOs to add value is to provide specialized handsets to their niche markets. In the 
DoD’s case, this is extremely valuable for each of the services (e.g., the Army and 
Marine Corps) who have their own operational requirements for smartphone-like 
capabilities. Each of the MVNO concepts facilitates the adoption of SIM branding and 
MVNO unique handsets.  
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c. DoD App Store 
As previously mentioned, the iPhone jail breaking concept illustrates a 
vulnerability that is potentially mitigated via a CDS architecture implemented on a 
smartphone device. Assuming a CDS provides adequate protection against the 
vulnerability of flaws in manufacturer’s installed software (i.e., providing unauthorized 
root access), this MVNO concept could facilitate additional security controls for 
safeguarding against malicious applications. If the DoD implemented an application store 
functionality (i.e., according to the Army, they are already starting the beginning of an 
Army app store), then perhaps third-party applications could enter the devices after 
qualifying the application for DoD use. This MVNO concept could provide the ability to 
―lock‖ the phones from installing third-party applications. The development of an app 
store in conjunction with implementing the MVNO concept provides the ability to 
implement a policy for authenticating applications, validating application integrity, and 
facilitating application authenticity. 
d. Additional Security 
The aforementioned network architectures can provide on-base (i.e., 
military bases) access through the properties required to reduce risk (i.e., increase 
security). The action of owning the equipment and therefore the security policies of the 
edge network provides an advantage depending on the environment. Each of the edge 
network concepts provides advantages such as spectrum agility, reduced cost, greater 
interoperability, and reduced threat. Note that some of the potential threats are not 
preventable through simply owning the edge network device. 
D. RISK 
In evaluating IT risk, the authors use the same risk equation presented in 
Appendix A (i.e., Risk = Vulnerability x Threat x Impact) as a guide. Ideally, an in-depth 
study of the specific threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts of specific architectures would 
yield the most granular comparison of options; however, this study only seeks to evaluate 
the potential for each implementation to reduce the IT risk below the risk level of the 
base case.  
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This section presents an evaluation of the potential for each MVNO network 
approach to reduce the opportunity of threat actions to exploit vulnerabilities—evaluation 
of threat and vulnerability occurred simultaneously.  The authors performed this 
evaluation on the following threat actions that contained the highest combined potential: 
backdoor, electronic tracking, interception, masquerade, and intrusion. These threat 
actions contribute most significantly to the most pernicious threats, and they enable 
opportunities to enact other threat actions. For example, the existence of a backdoor may 
facilitate any combination of the following threats: exposure, falsification, corruption, 
obstruction, misappropriation, and misuse. 
1. Residual Vulnerabilities 
The definitions of the selected threat actions, as provided in Appendix A, follow: 
 Backdoor: resident malware offers functionality allowing an attacker to 
gain access at will 
 Electronic tracking: pinpointing a user’s location via his handset 
 Interception: An unauthorized entity directly accesses data transiting 
between authorized sources and destinations. Examples include theft, 
wiretapping, and emanations analysis 
 Masquerade: an unauthorized entity poses as an authorized entity to gain 
access to a system or performs a malicious act. Examples: masquerading 
via spoofing or malicious logic, system cloning 
 Intrusion: an unauthorized entity bypasses or subverts authentication 
mechanisms to access sensitive data. Examples include trespassing, 
system penetration, cryptanalysis, and social engineering 
Table 18 shows the interpretation of the authors’ evaluation of each network’s 
potential vulnerability, given the listed threat actions. The numbers 0, 1, and 2 represent 
high, medium, and low residual vulnerability, respectively. The left two columns (i.e., 
highlighted with light grey) represent the current approaches authorized to transport 
unclassified and classified information, respectively; the middle columns represent the 
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MVNO approaches, and the far right columns (i.e., dark gray) represent additional edge 












































































































































































Backdoor 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2
Electronic Tracking 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Interception 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Masquerade 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2
Intrusion 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Score 100% 30% 30% 30% 20% 20% 20% 70% 50% 50% 0% 0%
MVNO Edge Network AccessCurrent
 
Table 18.   Residual Vulnerabilities (Network Vulnerability Given Threat Action) 
In Table 18, the current commercial and SME PED approach (light grey columns) 
provides the ―AS IS‖ model. The MCEP essentially provides a secure tunnel for 
connectivity between the SME PEDs and higher domains. By the nature of its design, and 
assuming its proper implementation, the architecture mitigates a significant number of 
threats. Over the commercial mobile architecture, the MCEP protects against the selected 
threats in the following ways: backdoors via physically separated domains; interception 
via HAIPE protected tunnel. The commercial MNO approach results in the highest 
residual vulnerability, because the network implements less desirable management, 
operational, and technical security controls. 
In Table 18, the middle columns leverage the same MCEP architecture and, 
therefore, are afforded the same level of protection. However, since the MVNO 
approaches integrate edge and core networks inside base perimeters, the threats are  
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potentially limited to the base. For example, positioning the base stations inside military 
bases perimeters reduces the threat of RF detection, because personnel access to base is 
limited to authorized personnel. 
Finally, the military network extension approaches (i.e., tethered and sleeve) 
appear to have the lowest risk. Assuming these extensions provide the same level of 
protections as the connecting networks, these approaches inherently offer additional 
flexibility. For example, natural and environmental threats are mitigated by the 
components being ruggedized and portable. The RF properties (e.g., low probability of 
detection, interception, exploitation, and antijamming) of the tactical waveforms provide 
mitigation characteristics to limit signal interception, masquerade, electronic tracking, 
and obstruction. Since the approach does not include network management tools for 
implementing controls against falsification, authorized parties could subvert the system. 
However, the threat is reduced if the system leveraged the MVNO approaches. The 
likelihood of corruption, misappropriation, and misuse is reduced, assuming that the 
military tactical networks are configured manually vice over-the-air (OTA), and the 
previously mentioned mitigations exist. Refer to Appendix I for a more thorough 
discussion surrounding threat action and security controls. 
Figure 39 highlights the same information as Table 18; however, this figure 
provides a better visual comparison of the various approaches. The mobile base station 
approach results in a higher residual vulnerability, because the various vendor solutions 
use the same commercial protocols used in the commercial MNO. Additionally, 
independent of other services, they still lack the network management characteristics 
(i.e., telecommunication expense management, mobile device management, etc.). The 
resultant score is less than the current commercial implementation, mostly because the 
management and operational policies are controlled by the owning organization. 














Figure 39.   Residual Vulnerabilities Graph 
2. Value of Information (Impact) 
Impact represents an important component of the risk equation. This paper 
assumes the marginal risk (i.e., difference between the current risk and the risk remaining 
after implementing a new architecture) represents a benefit to the system. In order to 
quantify risk, the authors assume the value of information is a function of the potential 
for degradation to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Since the various levels of 
classification (i.e., confidential, secret, and top secret) are categorized depending on the 
potential to cause damage, serious damage, and exceptionally grave damage to national 
security, respectively, the authors assume the value of that type of information is directly 
correlated to the value of national security.121 Assuming the United States values its 
national security higher than the cost to operate and maintain the DoD, the value of 
national security is at least the cost to operate and maintain the DoD. According to the 
FY2012 budget, the DoD was allocated about $700B in FY2010; and according to the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. GDP was about $14.6T for 2010. 
Therefore, the authors assume that the U.S. valued its national security at 5% of the GDP 
in FY2010. Based on these ratios, the authors assume the value of information is as 
delineated in Table 19. Although the defining characteristics categorizing these levels of  
 
                                                 
121 Reference Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2, for more details about the current policy in regards to 
these categories.  
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classification are ambiguous, the ratios found in Table 19 seem representative of the 
minimum values (e.g., the characteristic ―exceptionally grave damage‖ seems at least 
equal to 0.068% of a country’s annual income). 
Levels of classification Cost (ratio of 2010 GDP) 
Unclassified Cost of components  
Sensitive but unclassified Hundreds of Thousands 
Confidential Tens of Millions (0.000068%) 
Secret Billions (0.0068%) 
Top Secret Tens of Billions (0.068%) 
Table 19.   Value of Information (Impact) 
3. Risk Calculation 
Combining the percentages in Figure 39 with the cost of the various levels of 
classifications in Table 19, the authors quantified the value of risk associated with each 
MVNO approach. The marginal risk is equal to the difference between the current risk 
(i.e., commercial cellular service + secure service) and the proposed risk.
122
 After 
application of this methodology, Figure 40 represents the overall risk associated with 
each domain. The data point for each approach is the proportion of risk (percentage) to 
the overall risk for each domain. This figure illustrates the distribution of risk for each 
approach across the domains. The current SME PED approach results in a higher risk for 
the domains containing information of low value because the cost of the device 
outweighs the cost of the information. However, as the value of information increases, 
the cost of the devices begins to marginalize—i.e., the high value of information 
overshadows any fixed-price unit cost. The lowest resulting risk is achieved if the DoD 
owns the core network. 
                                                 
122 Current threat and vulnerabilities is illustrated in Figure 40.  












Unclassified Unclassified but 
Sensitive
Confidential Secret Top Secret
Risk
Commercial MNO (Commercial Smartphone) Commercial w/ MCEP (SMEPED)
Customer Service, Sales, Billing (CDS Smartphone) Integrated VM and Messaging (CDS smartphone)
Edge Network (CDS Smartphone) Core Network (CDS Smartphone)
 
Figure 40.   Percentage of Risk for Each MVNO Approach 
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Based on a number of variations in the previous models, it appears that hosting a 
dedicated network to support classified traffic seems infeasible. First, the lower demand 
will not provide enough volume to justify wholesale pricing with the commercial carriers. 
Second, the cost to procure a core network, including the RAN, and backhaul operational 
leasing expenses create a large fixed cost. Even if the cost is amortized over 7 years 
(equipment lifetime), the dedicated network is still cost prohibitive. However, if volume 
increases or the cost of the network is shared with the unclassified DoD cellular 
procurement demand, then the business case might become justified.  
Figure 41 represents the potential cost to the DoD if the MVNO approaches were 
implemented at various levels of demand. The figure highlights approaches with 
relatively low overall cost and low demand, except for the MNO approach. The MNO 
approach assumes the DoD owns the mobile spectrum rather than leasing the spectrum 
from the carriers. The cost to own the spectrum is derived from the previously mentioned 
700MHz and 1710MHz FCC auction examples (i.e., $6B–$9B per carrier for large 
quantities of spectrum amortized over 10–15 years). This approach was not mentioned as 
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a likely candidate, because the cost for owning the spectrum—in either opportunity cost 
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Figure 41.   Cost of MVNO Concepts 
In Figure 41, the ―commercial MNO‖ line represents the cost associated with the 
current commercial network that the DoD uses to connect their smartphones to the DISN 
enterprise services. Notice that as the subscriber base for the MCEP architecture with 
associated SME PEDs increases, the approach becomes cost prohibitive.  
The high unit cost of the SME PED results in a steeper cost curve. However, 
assuming a higher demand correlates to a high number of purchased units, the authors 
assume this translates to an increase in manufacturer efficiencies, which, in turn, reduces 
the device unit cost. However, in low quantities, the SME PED approach (i.e., including 
handsets) is representative of the trend highlighted in the left graph of Figure 42. The 
drastic increase (i.e., at quantity 1000) in the SME PED cost is driven by the cost of the 
handset. The right graph in Figure 42 illustrates the approach without including the cost 
                                                 
123 Refer to Figure 42 for further discussion. 
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of the SME PEDs. Notice the lowest cost approach in Figure 42 is the one where the 
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Commercial MNO (AS-IS) Commercial MNO w/ MCEP (AS-IS) Customer Service, Sales, Billing
Integrated VM and Messaging Edge Network Core Network  
Figure 42.   Cost of MVNO Concepts at Lower Levels of Demand124 
Assuming the cost of the SME PEDs will decrease at higher volumes, although 
the current fixed price contract might limit short-term cost reduction, Figure 43 illustrates 
the estimated trends based on SME PEDs leveraging economies of scale. Another 
important point illustrated in Figure 43 is the tipping point when the higher subscriber 
base starts to favor the core network approach. This is a result of the higher demand 
offsetting the high fixed cost of procuring the equipment. In this figure, the core network 
                                                 
124 Figure 42 is illustrated only to show how unsustainable the SME PED approach is for higher 
demands. 
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approach follows the trend of the other MVNO approaches. This is a result of the cost for 
intercarrier roaming. The authors assume the core network approach can reduce 
commercial MNO dependencies. However, given that DoD personnel would need to 
roam on the MNO networks (e.g., intercarrier roaming) outside of organizational 















Commercial MNO (AS-IS) Commercial MNO w/ MCEP (AS-IS) Customer Service, Sales, Billing
Integrated VM and Messaging Edge Network Core Network  
Figure 43.   Cost of MVNO Concepts at Higher Levels of Demand 
Based on the business case from Network Strategy Partners (2009), the carriers 
pay a significant amount of their operational expenses for interconnecting lease lines. 
Since the DoD already provides internal wireline services (i.e., Defense Switched 
Network), perhaps the cost of interconnecting the bases for ubiquitous wireless services 
can offset or even eliminate the cost by leveraging additional capacity. Figure 44 
illustrates the MVNO cost without including the cost for the interconnecting lease lines. 
Notice the MNO approach becomes more desirable around the 3.5M subscriber level. 
Additionally, if the DoD owned the interconnecting lines rather than leasing them, the 
trends would look similar. An additional point of interest in this figure is the tipping point 
where the core network approach becomes the least costly (i.e., where the size of the 
subscriber base is about the same as the current DoD demand for unclassified wireless 
services). 
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Figure 44.   Cost of MVNO Concepts (Risk and Lease Line Expense Not Included) 
Based on the MVNO concepts and the DoD’s current demand, Figure 45 
represents a more accurate estimate of what the DoD could expect to pay as demand 
increases. Again, these costs represent a very conservative view. The DoD’s actual costs 
are more likely to show a more significant margin between the commercial and the 
proposed MNVO approaches. The cost of the edge network is consistently greater than 
the commercial option, because the cost of the edge network devices and the cost to lease 
the spectrum do not offset any other cost. As illustrated in Figure 45, as the demand 
increases, the marginal cost between the reseller approaches and the core network 
approach increases. This is a result of the high fixed cost for the equipment and the low 
reoccurring operating cost. 

































Cost for MVNO Concepts (DoD Demand)
Commercial MNO (AS-IS) Commercial MNO w/ MCEP (AS-IS)
Customer Service, Sales, Billing Integrated VM and Messaging
Edge Network Core Network 
 
Figure 45.   Cost of MVNO Concepts (DoD Forecasted Demand) 
Figure 46 represents the monthly cost per user for each approach. Based on the 
previous costs, Figure 46 divided the cost by the number of subscribers to highlight a per-
user cost. The most important result is the $20 savings per user per month related to the 
current model. As previously mentioned, marketing costs represent the cost driver in the 
MNO market (i.e., 40–60%). The potential savings shown in Figure 46 seem consistent 
with the cost for marketing. The MVNO core network concept includes the cost of 
owning additional base stations and leasing spectrum. These MNVO approaches provide 





























Monthly Cost per User
Commercial MNO (AS-IS) Commercial MNO w/ MCEP (AS-IS) Customer Service, Sales, Billing
Integrated VM and Messaging Edge Network Core Network  
Figure 46.   Monthly Cost per User for Each MVNO Concept 
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V. COMBINED BUSINESS CASE AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the major results from the analyses that were performed 
in this project. The goal of the analyses was to identify strategies and business cases to 
support reduced costs, increased functionality, and the same or greater level of security 
for mobile communications in the DoD. 
A. COMBINED BUSINESS CASE 
Throughout the paper, the authors present multiple business cases to show the 
significance of adopting the MVNO model. Each of the business cases presents cost 
information, but so far the paper has not applied cost, risk, and benefit across the 
networks including the attached handsets.  
Using this methodology and the data points from the previous chapters, Figure 47 
provides a visual mechanism to evaluate the greatest potential for benefit—the lower the 
percentage (i.e., the lower the bar), the greater the benefits outweigh the cost. Figure 47 
shows the cost of each approach, including the cost of the associated handsets, given a 
300K subscriber demand. Each of the classification categories (i.e., unclassified, sensitive 
but unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret) represents a specific domain 
containing the respective types of information. For example, the commercial MNO 
column over the unclassified category represents a commercial network hosting 
unclassified information. The associated value (i.e., 92%) represents the ratio of costs to 
benefits. An important note to consider is the cost for the commercial with MCEP 
approach. This figure was created with 300K subscribers; the price per unit might 
significantly reduce if the SME PEDs received that level of demand. However, the cost 
might not decrease significantly because the demand still lacks commensurate volume of 
the commercial market. The commercial with MCEP approach is not beneficial at higher 
volumes because of the high per-unit cost; however, as the domains increase in value 
(i.e., they contain higher valued information) the concept becomes more desirable. Notice 
in the unclassified, sensitive but unclassified, and confidential domains, the customer 
service, sales, and billing concept proves the most beneficial given the lower cost and less 
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risk. As the value of information increases, the core network approach becomes most 
desirable because it offers the greatest opportunity for employing operational, 
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Figure 47.   Cost Benefit Ratio per MNVO Concept (300K Demand) 
Figure 48 represents the cost per user of each evaluated option. The commercial 
MNO approach with MCEP and SMEPED serves as the benchmark (illustrated in green), 
with costs accounting for 400K FY2011 projected subscribers for the unclassified 
domains and 2K SME PED subscribers. Since the subscriber base is large enough, the 
core network approach is the most advantageous.  
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Figure 48.   Cost per User for Each MVNO Approach 
Figure 49 displays the cost per user for each of the additional network access 
approaches. These access points are considered as optional extensions depending on the 
current environment. Since these access points are considered optional, the total cost for 
the network devices are not included in the MNVO approaches. For example, the mobile 
base stations are potentially desirable for disaster relief operations; however, a fixed 
garrison environment might not be justifiable given the high cost per user. These costs 
are independent of the quantity because, as the users increase, the amount of required 
























Figure 49.   Cost per User for Each Type of Access Point 
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The per-user costs listed in Figure 49 illustrate a trend of increasing cost for 
devices that assist in decreasing the system-wide risk. For example, compare the 
commercial RAN network to the tactical mobile base stations, or compare the garrison 
enhanced Wi-Fi to tactical enhanced Wi-Fi. The difference in cost of the tethered and the 
wireless sleeve approach is a result of the increase in mobility, which requires additional 
complexity. Ultimately, the sleeve concept costs more per user than the other tactical 
access points; however, the concept provides a significant amount of risk reduction and 
an increase in mobility over the tethered architecture. The high cost for each sleeve is 
expected to decrease significantly, as the technology reaches the tail of its learning curve. 
These costs are only considering the annually reoccurring costs.  
B. CDS SMARTPHONES 
Based on the analysis performed in this project, staying the current course with 
the SME PED approach is more costly in comparison with various alternatives. The 
alternatives mentioned in Chapter III were to acquire CDS smartphones based on a high-
assurance secure virtualization architecture, either via the federal acquisition procurement 
process or through a manufacturer that has integrated this technology into a product line 
architecture. The federal procurement option facilitates a greater control of requirements, 
but the manufacturer option increases the potential to leverage commercial economies of 
scale and decrease procurement times. Ultimately, a reduction in cost can assist in 
removing the self-imposed demand restrictions within the DoD. The following list 
contains some of the advantages to adopting a CDS smartphone that were identified 
through this research: 
R&D Cost 
SME PED (R&D)     $44M (government cost) 
COTS CDS (R&D)   $10M 
Unit Cost 
SME PED (Procurement)   $3675 (Amortized 2 years’ lifetime) 
COTS CDS (Procurement)   $185 (Amortized 2 years’ lifetime) 
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The SME PEDs cost the DoD a significant amount in opportunity cost. Given the 
current demand of 2,000 subscribers (i.e., with policy constraining demand) and an 
average 60 minutes of productivity increase from leveraging smartphones to minimize 
downtime in schedule gaps, we estimate the DoD could recover $100–$300M in annual 
productivity increases  by switching to a COTS solution. The majority of the productivity 
increases are directly correlated to the increase in demand.  
C. MVNO AS A SERVICE 
Staying the current course with commercial retail wireless service cost the DoD 
$235M in FY2010 and an additional estimated $40M per year in each of the following 
years. The MNVO approaches in the worst case showed at least a 25% cost reduction 
(i.e., switching to an MVNO solution would save the DoD $110M annually with an 
increasing savings trend of $16M for each following year), compared to the current 
arrangements. The following table represents the AS-IS cost for the DoD to procure 
cellular services for unclassified and classified domains.  
Current (AS-IS) Expenditures (7 Year NPV) 
Commercial MNO w/ MCEP (SME PED)  $2.9B 
Proposed MVNO (7 Year NPV) 
Customer Service, Sales, Billing MVNO  $1.9B 
Integrated VM and Messaging   $1.9B 
Edge Network      $3.0B 
Core Network      $1.7B 
Given that the current monthly cost is estimated at $60 per month per user, the 
MVNO cost per user resulted in a cost of $40 per month. This cost is conservatively 
calculated because more savings are possible if the approaches are able to leverage sunk 
costs. This point applies if, for example, either the inter-base copper and fiber lines have 
additional capacity to support mobile users’ traffic or the reduction in wireline traffic 
frees up capacity. This additional capacity could reduce the requirement for leasing lines 
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between bases. The current strategy is costing the DoD not only real dollars, but limiting 
the capabilities of the warfighters to leverage the services while deployed. The lack of 
available cellular signals in military training areas and operational environments 
precludes the organizations from leveraging this innovative technology. However, if the 
organizational structure is already built around an MVNO approach, the deploying 
commands could receive the services at their edges.  
D. SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Both the MNO and handset manufacturer markets exhibit trends that indicate 
impending market saturation and increasing competition. The tenets of Porter’s five 
forces state that these trends indicate decreasing bargaining power for those types of 
firms (Porter, 2008). This situation provides the following opportunities for the DoD to 
implement strategies supporting the aforementioned goals: 
 Leverage the growing potential for secondary markets by 
implementing an MVNO business model while taking care to 
avoid the perception of competing with industry. 
 Take advantage of handset manufacturers’ reduced bargaining 
power to encourage development of features that the DoD values. 
 Seek partnerships with entities that have similar values in order to 
increase bargaining power and influence development and offering 
of valued features. 
 Contribute to education and increased awareness of security risks 
for both consumers and suppliers in order to speed the reduction of 
the gap between DoD and commercial demand for security 
features. 
E. FUTURE WORK 
Throughout the performance of this research, the following activities were 
assessed as lying beyond the scope, and therefore identified as future work: 
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1. Stratification of Values and Requirements of User Groups 
An in-depth examination of the values of the commercial mobile user groups 
(e.g., residential, corporate, municipal government, etc.) should be conducted to provide 
the basis for determination of each group’s mobile computing requirements. Knowledge 
of these requirements may then allow more precise identification of the overlap between 
DoD and commercial requirements. This information may contribute toward future DoD 
strategy development. 
2. Detailed Risk, Vulnerability, and Threat Analyses of Specific 
Proposed Architectures 
The risk assessment conducted herein only illuminates the potential vulnerability 
of each notional approach in the context of the evaluated threat actions. It provides an 
estimate of network risk, but contains wide variability depending on network 
architecture, variations in command policies, and differing operational standards.  
Therefore, it does not apply uniformly to all commands within the DoD; however, NIST 
(2002) states that a risk assessment should be tailored to the specific organization. By 
extension, the assessment should also ideally pertain to an existing or proposed 
architecture. To this end, the proposed future work may include determination of suitable 
architectures to implement the most favorable business case, and then perform detailed 
threat and vulnerability assessments in order to determine the risk to the DoD at a more 
granular level. Appendix I discusses a possible approach based on the assessment 
presented in Chapter IV. 
3. Competency Requirement 
Work may be undertaken to identify the competencies the DoD must develop in 
order to implement the business cases analyzed in this paper. An assessment of required 
competencies will assist in determining the viability of successfully executing the 
smartphone options examined in this paper. 
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4. Determine the Best Contracting Mechanism for Obtaining Wireless 
Devices and Services 
This paper does not focus on the performance of the contracting mechanisms. 
More research is needed to evaluate the correct procurement process for DoD wireless 
services. 
5. Determination of DoD Wireless Use by Region 
The demand percentages in Appendix G are illustrated by region based on the 
physical locations of the funding offices. In some cases, the illustration might be 
misleading because the subscribers continually travel and rarely remain stationary in one 
region. Therefore, the authors recommend completion of a more thorough study to 
determine a more accurate representation of wireless usage by region. The accuracy of 
that study could drastically reduce the variability of the projections. 
6. Quantify the Benefits of a Larger Feature Set 
What are the benefits to the DoD of obtaining a larger feature set? For example, 
the SME PEDs are arguably years behind COTS smartphone innovations in features. 
What is the cost for the lack of modern applications or the ability for Soldiers, Marines, 
Sailors, and Airmen to develop in-house applications to increase productivity or refine 
business processes? 
7. Cost of Spectrum 
When evaluating future bands for reallocation, the business cases should 
ultimately look at the opportunity cost—how much is it costing the government to 
maintain exclusivity rights? What regulations or laws need to be enacted to protect the 
current federal spectrum holder or to reimburse the losing organizations for their loss of 
spectrum? These losses manifest as opportunity costs vice reallocation costs. For 
example, if the spectrum was auctioned for billions of dollars, the losing command 
should receive a significant amount of that money. 
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APPENDIX A. RISK, THREAT, AND VULNERABILITY 
The purpose of this appendix is to summarize the definition of risk and present a 
risk evaluation methodology. The threats and vulnerabilities listed below should be 
considered when addressing system protection. They are applicable in the assessment of 
the overall risk to the mobile computing business cases proposed in this paper. 
A. RISK 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined risk to 
information technology (IT) systems as ―a function of the likelihood of a given threat-
source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that 
adverse event on the organization‖ (NIST, 2002, p. 8). The risk determination 
methodology involves evaluating threat and vulnerability to determine a likelihood of 
occurrence, then multiplying this probability by the impact of successful exploitation; 
furthermore, this process involves the determination of security controls to minimize or 
eliminate the likelihood of exploitation (NIST, 2002). Although NIST describes a 
qualitative process for determining likelihood, the following equation depicts the 
relationships between the elements of risk: Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Impact. The 
definitions of threat, vulnerability, and impact follow (NIST, 2002): 
 Threat: The potential for a threat-source to exercise (accidentally 
trigger or intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability 
o Threat-source: Either (1) intent and method of enacting 
intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) a situation and 
method that may unintentionally trigger a vulnerability.  
o Threat action: The method by which a threat-source executes 
an attack. 
 Vulnerability: A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, 
design, implementation, or internal controls that could be 
exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and 
  142 
result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security 
policy.  
 Impact: The estimated quantitative or qualitative value of a loss or 
degradation of any combination of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
1. Threat Actions 
The following list provides a description of selected threat actions pertaining to 
mobile communications and IT systems and networks:125  
 Natural threat actions: For example, ―Floods, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, landslides, avalanches, electrical storms, and other such 
events‖ (NIST, 2002). 
 Environmental threat actions: For example, ―long-term power 
failure, pollution, chemicals, liquid leakage‖ (NIST, 2002). 
 Service abuse: malware or malicious users perform actions that 
cause higher than expected service provider costs. 
 Backdoor: resident malware, possibly organic to the system, offers 
functionality allowing an attacker to gain access at will. 
 Spam: unwanted messages impede other services or result in extra 
charges. 
 Electronic tracking: pinpointing of a user’s location via his device. 
 Exposure: direct release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity. 
Examples: data scavenging, human error, system error, sale of 
personal information. 
 Interception: an unauthorized entity directly accesses data 
transiting between authorized sources and destinations. Examples: 
theft, wiretapping, emanations analysis. 
 Inference: an unauthorized entity indirectly accesses sensitive data 
(possibly information besides the data itself) by reasoning from 
characteristics or byproducts of communications. For example, 
exploiting covert channels via communications traffic analysis or 
signals analysis. 
 
                                                 
125 Sources: (NIST, 2002), (IETF, 2000), and (NIST, 2008).  
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 Intrusion: an unauthorized entity bypasses or subverts 
authentication mechanisms to access sensitive data. Examples: 
trespassing, system penetration, reverse engineering, cryptanalysis, 
social engineering 
 Masquerade: an unauthorized entity poses as an authorized entity 
to gain access to a system or performs a malicious act. Examples: 
masquerading via spoofing or malicious logic, system cloning. 
 Falsification: false data deceives an authorized party. Examples: 
data substitution, insertion, fabrication, and modification. 
 Repudiation: false denial of an action. Examples: falsely denying 
the origin or receipt of a message. 
 Incapacitation: disabling a system component to prevent or 
interrupt system operation. Examples: equipment loss or theft, 
malicious logic, physical destruction (sabotage), human error, 
hardware/software error, denial of service. 
 Corruption: undesirable alteration of system operation through an 
adverse modification of system functions or data. Examples: 
tampering, malicious logic, human error, system error. 
 Obstruction: hindering system operations to interrupt delivery of 
system services. Examples: interference (blocking 
communications), causing an overload of resources, signal 
jamming. 
 Misappropriation: unauthorized assumption of logical or physical 
control of a system resource. Examples: theft of service, 
functionality, or data. 
 Misuse: causing a system component to perform in away that is 
detrimental to system security. Examples: tampering, malicious 
logic, and escalation of privileges. 
2. Vulnerabilities 
Organizations may implement security controls through technology, management 
or operations (NIST, 1995). Given that vulnerabilities include technical, management, 
and operational flaws (Internet Engineering Task Force [IETF], 2000), the set of 
vulnerabilities for a system can be described as consisting of a lack of security controls. 
A vulnerability may also exist if the implementation of a security control lacks 
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robustness—that is, enforced to an insufficient degree. The following list provides a 
compilation of general security controls for both systems and networks:126  
 Identification and authentication: Verification of a subject’s127 
identity ensures that identity’s validity. Examples include 
passwords, personal identification numbers, and methods of strong 
authentication (e.g., token, smart card, digital certificate, and 
Kerberos). 
 Authorization: Authorization enables specification and 
management of a subject’s allowed actions. 
 Access controls enforcement: In short, ensuring authorized 
subjects conform to system security policy via access control 
mechanisms (e.g., sensitivity labels; file permissions, access 
control lists, roles, and user profiles). Access control effectiveness 
depends on system security design and the configuration of 
security rules.  
 Nonrepudiation: Spanning both prevention and detection, this 
control is typically applied at the point of message transmission or 
reception. 
 Protected Communications: Using encryption and cryptographic 
technologies to facilitate trustworthy communications, ensure the 
integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information in transit, 
and mitigate network threats. 
 Transaction Privacy: Using controls such as Secure Sockets Layer 
to protect against loss of privacy. 
 Management controls: Examples include security policy, risk 
management, security planning, and assurance (design, 
implementation, and operational). 
 Operational controls: Examples include organizational training and 
education, contingency and disaster preparation, incident handling, 
and physical and environmental security. 
 Audit trail maintenance. 
 Protection of server resident data: Content, such as electronic mail, 
maintained by a third party may expose sensitive information 
through the third-party server’s vulnerabilities. 
                                                 
126 Note: Systems may implement security controls to varying degrees. This list is based on 
discussions and examples in NIST (1995, 2000, and 2008). 
127 A subject is a system entity that either causes information flow between system objects or effects 
changes in the system state (IETF, 2008). 
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3. Impacts 
Quantitative estimates may represent tangible impacts in the form of lost revenue 
or equipment repair costs; however, other impacts, such as damage to organizational 
interests, may best be measured qualitatively (NIST, 2002). The following list describes 
potential system impacts in terms of a loss or degradation of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability (NIST, 2002): 
 Confidentiality: The impact of an unauthorized information 
disclosure can range from a loss of personal privacy to the 
jeopardizing of national security. It could also precipitate public 
embarrassment or legal action against the organization. 
 Integrity: A compromise of integrity could lead to erroneous 
decisions or cascading degradation to system availability or 
confidentiality.  
 Availability: Losses here may result in reduced productivity, 
ultimately reducing organizational effectiveness. 
B. MEASURING SYSTEM VULNERABILITY 
The Common Criteria represents a widely acknowledged methodology for 
evaluating the assurance level of an information system. Assuming that evaluations for 
higher assurance levels assess potential system vulnerabilities more rigorously than those 
for lower assurance levels, meeting higher assurance requirements indicates reduced 
vulnerability for a given system. Furthermore, the Common Criteria addresses protection 
of assets in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.128 The authors of this 
work leverage the Common Criteria EALs, summarized in Table 20, to estimate 
vulnerability levels of various systems and relate them to one another. 
                                                 
128 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. (2009). Common criteria for information technology 
security evaluation part 1: Introduction and general model. Retrieved from 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra. 
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EAL Summary Description 
1: functionally tested Evidence that the system functions in a manner consistent with its 
documentation. 
2: structurally tested A low to moderate level of independently assured security. 
3: methodically 
tested and checked 
A moderate level of independently assured security. 
4: methodically 
designed, tested, and 
reviewed 
A moderate to high level of independently assured security in 
conventional commodity TOEs 
5: semiformally 
designed and tested 
A high level of independently assured security in a planned 
development 
6: semiformally 
verified design and 
tested 
High assurance from application of security engineering 
techniques to a rigorous development environment 
7: formally verified 
design and tested 
High assurance from extensive formal analysis 
Table 20.   Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Levels129 
                                                 
129 Source: Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. (2009). Common criteria for information 
technology security evaluation part 3: Security assurance requirements. Retrieved from 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra. 
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APPENDIX B. DOD WIRELESS CONTRACTS 
A. ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEM CONTRACT TRENDS 
Figure 50 illustrates the breakdown of expenses over the previous 4 years against 
the EDS contract. NMCI charges a monthly fixed cost to remotely access their network—
the majority of the NMCI expenses are associated with this cost. The NMCI contract 
charges this overhead to offset the operating cost of these services. The other contracts do 
not include these end-subscriber charges, potentially because the operating cost is 
realized as manpower sunk cost (i.e., the local installations provide the services vice a 
contractor). Another interesting trend is the difference in market distribution; unlike the 
commercial market (i.e., where Verizon receives the most revenue), AT&T receives 
twice the EDS procurements as Verizon. The reason for this anomaly is unknown—
especially since the other Navy/Marine Corps contract (i.e., NDWC) is completely 
different. 
 
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
NMCI $9,286,976 $16,841,987 $28,311,162 $24,256,953 
Verizon $126,136 $627,209 $1,243,348 $4,232,398 
AT&T $4,318,256 $8,107,852 $10,528,770 $9,896,748 
Sprint $968,412 $1,303,884 $1,371,868 $841,434 
























Figure 50.   EDS Contract130 
                                                 
130 Contract totals obtained from extracting and aggregating the data from 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/ (Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation). 
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B. NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WIRELESS CONTRACTS 
TRENDS 
Figure 51 represents the procurement trends under the NDWC contracts for 
cellular services and equipment between the years of FY05 and FY10. Overall, the graph 
illustrates a steady increase in procurements for cellular services and equipment. One 
note for this chart is the change in procurement behaviors between FY08 and FY09 under 
the AT&T contract, and under the Sprint contract between FY06 and FY09. These 
changes in behavior might be indicative of Verizon acquiring Alltel in 2008 and Sprint 
losing its market share since 2006 (Pyramid Research, 2009). The procurements against 
these contracts are more representative of the commercial market trends.131 
FY2005* FY2006* FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Verizon contract $5,566,260 $9,331,910 $12,699,792 $21,061,651 $24,668,756 $31,329,150 
AT&T contract $4,804,510 $8,970,983 $14,804,518 $21,393,633 $18,535,107 $21,613,426 

























Figure 51.   NDWC Contracts132 
C. ARMY AIR FORCE BLANKET PURCHASE AGREEMENTS TRENDS 
Figure 52 represents the cellular services and equipment procurements through 
the AAFBPAs. The procurement totals were not available for any year prior to FY07. 
The graph illustrates a significant difference between service providers—AT&T and 
Verizon are represented as dominating the market. Note the differences in trends across 
the EDS, NDWCs, and the AAFBPAs. This data suggests that the EDS contract favored 
                                                 
131 Appendix H – illustrates the distributions of commercial vendors operating wireless revenues. 
132 Contract totals obtained from extracting and aggregating the data from https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/ (Federal 
Procurement Data System – Next Generation) 
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AT&T, which is different from the commercial market share. USA Mobility and 
Worldcell were contracted only for the procurement of data cards. Therefore, the delivery 
order totals are expected to be less than those of the other vendors.  
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Verizon $12,826,478 $27,116,975 $38,314,951 $50,051,342 
AT&T Cingular $19,353,183 $32,306,560 $38,910,080 $46,217,556 
Sprint/Nextel $12,523,663 $16,827,325 $14,831,080 $20,082,971 
T-Mobile $8,792,009 $9,324,478 $12,764,943 $10,641,358 
Skytel $5,602,818 $5,075,665 $5,044,979 $2,217,943 
USA Mobility $336,811 $703,947 $776,248 $2,139,206 
Alltel $1,480,995 $1,676,026 $2,560,377 $224,614 
Cellhire $376,461 $4,365,443 $4,385,757 $408,080 
Appsware Wireless $49,540 $119,325 $(3,275) $165,590 
























Figure 52.   AAFBPA Contracts133 
In summary, these contracts are grossly disjointed. As a research firm suggests in 
its report on managing wireless costs, the best-in-class corporations (i.e., top-rated 
corporations for managing wireless expenses), have complete control of their entire 
inventory of wireless devices, automate the policy enforcement, and maintain a holistic 
view of all usage rates. After consulting with a large wireless services negotiation firm, 
their number one recommendation for reducing cost was to consolidate the contracting 
(Brill Worldwide Investiments, 2010). Centrally managing the sourcing strategy provides 
a number of advantages. As this is not the main focus of the paper, the discussion will not 
digress any further; however, investigation of the use of wireless negotiation firms is 
recommended for future sourcing initiatives. 
                                                 
133 Contract totals obtained from extracting and aggregating the data from 
https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/ (Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation) 
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Tables 21 through 24 present detailed supporting information pertaining to the 
figures presented above. 
  FISC NDWC 
  
 AT&T contract Sprint Contract Verizon contract FISC Total 
FY2005*  $    5,468,206   $    7,736,418   $     6,268,492   $   19,473,117  
FY2006*  $    9,338,364   $   15,778,150   $    12,936,616   $   38,053,130  
FY2007  $   12,536,322   $   14,877,205   $    19,410,131   $   46,823,658  
FY2008  $   19,878,715   $   15,394,125   $    21,724,494   $   56,997,334  
FY2009  $   18,536,925   $   15,687,356   $    25,293,494   $   59,517,776  
FY2010  $   21,613,426   $    9,495,646   $    31,329,150   $   62,438,221  
Total  $    87,371,958   $    78,968,901   $    116,962,376   $   283,303,236  
Table 21.   FISC NDWC Contract Summary by Network Operator 
 




NMCI AT&T Sprint Verizon T-Mobile EDS Total
FY2005* 5,000,000$            
FY2006* 10,000,000$          
FY2007 9,286,976$      4,318,256$      968,412$         126,136$         14,699,780$          
FY2008 16,841,987$    8,107,852$      1,303,884$      627,209$         26,880,933$          
FY2009 28,311,162$    10,528,770$    1,371,868$      1,243,348$      7,093$          41,462,241$          
FY2010 24,256,953$    9,896,748$      841,434$         4,232,398$      17,776$        39,245,310$          
Total 78,697,078$     32,851,627$     4,485,599$       6,229,092$       24,869$          137,288,264$          
NMCI EDS
 
Table 22.   NMCI EDS Contract Summary by Network Operator 
 
 
Alltel AT&T Cingular Cellhire Skytel Sprint/Nextel T-Mobile USA Mobility Verizon Worldcell
Appsware 
Wireless
FY2005* 25,000,000$        
FY2006* 40,000,000$        
FY2007 1,480,995$      21,085,608$        376,461$          $     5,602,818 12,690,740$    8,821,095$      336,811$         13,097,209$        761,647$         49,540$       64,302,923$        
FY2008 1,676,026$      31,440,807$        4,365,443$       $     5,075,665 16,362,387$    9,190,055$      703,947$         26,800,641$        1,792,742$      119,325$     97,527,037$        
FY2009 2,560,377$      39,656,976$        4,385,757$       $     5,044,979 15,282,822$    12,891,759$    776,248$         38,972,801$        (5,051)$           (3,275)$        119,563,392$      
FY2010 224,614$        46,217,556$        408,080$          $     2,217,943 20,082,971$    10,641,358$    2,139,206$      50,051,342$        (161,836)$        165,590$     131,986,823$      





Table 23.   AAFBPA Contract Summary by Network Operator 











 AT&T Revenue Sprint Revenue Verizon Revenue T-Mobile Revenue Total
2004 19,565,000,000$            13,137,000,000$       27,662,000,000$       11,680,000,000$       72,044,000,000$                    
2005 34,468,000,000$            20,181,000,000$       32,301,000,000$       14,806,000,000$       101,756,000,000$                 
2006 37,537,000,000$            31,918,000,000$       38,043,000,000$       17,138,000,000$       124,636,000,000$                 
2007 42,684,000,000$            32,105,000,000$       43,882,000,000$       19,288,000,000$       137,959,000,000$                 
2008 49,335,000,000$            28,435,000,000$       49,332,000,000$       21,885,000,000$       148,987,000,000$                 
2009 53,597,000,000$            25,832,000,000$       62,131,000,000$       21,531,000,000$       163,091,000,000$                 
Commerical Operating Revenue (Wireless)
 
Table 24.   Revenue of Top Four MNOs 
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APPENDIX C. MVNO COSTS 
The following tables provide a full list of services and costs associated with 
MVNOs. Those services were used as a basis for developing cost estimates. 
 Revenue COGS
Population & penetration SIM cards
population growth in period new SIM cards issued
total population SIM cards replacement % in period
Mobile penetration growth in period Total SIM cards issued in period
total mobile penetration (%) SIM card cost
Mobile users SIM Card cost per unit
Prices & margins SIM card shrinkwrap cost per unit
Minute SIM card shipping cost per unit
Messaging Cost to operators
Data Cost to operator per minute
Content contribution Cost to operator per message
value of content download per user per monthCost to operator per mbyte
International calls contribution cost of minutes bundling
% user who make international calls minutes
avg. monthly minutes of int. traffic per user messages
average minute cost for int. calls data
Monthly fees per user Various notification costs
Monthly minute fees per user notifications per user per period
Monthly SMS fees per user notification cost per period
Monthly MMS fees per user Subscriber usages
Monthly GPRS fees per user total Customers minute usage in period
Monthly content revenues per user accumulated quaterly/yearly minutes
Monthly int. calling revenues per user accumulated minutes usage
ARPU levels
monthly ARPU (excluding starter packages)
quarterly ARPU (excluding starter packages)
yearly ARPU (excluding starter packages)
HR Cost
Cust. Serv. Reps.
Back-office outsourcing - per mpl.
Mobile phone usage cost - per empl.
fixed phone cost - per empl
*Supply Management included  
Table 25.   Typical MVNO Costs  
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 CAPEX Other Cost
Hardware boxes Communication costs
boxes for data comm. leased lines (office connection)
equipment for SS7 comm. leased lines (operations connection)
IT for web front-end fixed phone costs
IT for service management mobile costs
IT for usage control & notification IT service cost
IT for billing/financial management external consultants (web front end)
IT for SIM card pre-activation Voice-mail consulting fees
IT for CDR post-processing IT service (running support for office IT)
IT for fraud system IT installation services - operations IT
Misc other hardware SW License fees + one-time fees
Software platforms Billing & CC software (see notes)
SW for CC Modules interconnect fee - payment provider
Call center PBX cost vendor downpayments + integration
SW for usage control & notification CC hotline + SLA fees
SW for billing/financial management bank guarantees
SW for SIM card pre-activation Hosted services cost
SW for CDR post-processing Hosting - CC & Billing servers
HLR SW Hosting - office system
ERP finance system Hosting - database server
IT platform
ERP software
Furniture & office investments
Direct empl. related office costs (furniture)
Other furniture and misc. to office
Office platforms - HW
Laptops & stationary PC (incl. Monitor)
Office mail server




Other equipment to office  
Table 26.   Typical MVNO Capital Expenditure and Other Costs 
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APPENDIX D. MILITARY END STRENGTH AND PAY CHART 
 
militarypay.defense.gov 
    




Basic BAS BAH Total 
hourly 
rate USN USAF USA USMC 
End 
Strength Annual Cost Hourly Cost 
E-1 (less  than 
2) $17,604 $3,900 $9,600 $31,104 $16.20 15385 10541 22342 11277 59545 $1,852,116,261.60 $964,643.89 
E-2 (less than 2) $19,740 $3,900 $10,800 $34,440 $17.94 18688 7003 33939 25479 85109 $2,931,194,812.32 $1,526,663.96 
E-3 (over 2) $22,068 $3,900 $12,000 $37,968 $19.78 38185 48152 60319 44963 191619 $7,275,482,169.12 $3,789,313.63 
E-4 (over 3) $25,476 $3,900 $13,200 $42,576 $22.18 50819 50211 141958 37749 280737 $11,952,793,265.76 $6,225,413.16 
E-5 (over 4) $29,376 $3,900 $14,400 $47,676 $24.83 67520 71123 84132 29646 252421 $12,034,544,758.08 $6,267,992.06 
O-1 (less than 2) $33,396 $2,686 $14,400 $50,482 $26.29 6836 6648 10788 3505 27777 $1,402,240,736.16 $730,333.72 
W-1 (over 6) $41,340 $2,686 $14,400 $58,426 $30.43 1688 
 
3126 258 5072 $296,337,077.76 $154,342.23 
E-6 (over 7) $40,584 $3,900 $15,600 $60,084 $31.29 46588 42146 65605 16853 171192 $10,285,982,300.16 $5,357,282.45 
O-2 (over 2) $43,836 $2,686 $16,800 $63,322 $32.98 7020 7203 7970 3401 25594 $1,620,665,315.52 $844,096.52 
E-7 (over 12) $45,012 $3,900 $16,800 $65,712 $34.23 21586 26341 42237 9133 99297 $6,525,052,126.56 $3,398,464.65 
W-2 (over 8) $48,708 $2,686 $16,800 $68,194 $35.52 535 
 
5533 808 6876 $468,902,494.08 $244,220.05 
E-8 (over 14) $50,292 $3,900 $18,000 $72,192 $37.60 6525 5286 1270 4015 17096 $1,234,202,638.08 $642,813.87 
W-3 (over 12) $57,432 $2,686 $19,200 $79,318 $41.31 556 
 
3592 454 4602 $365,021,804.16 $190,115.52 
O-3 (over 4) $59,424 $2,686 $19,200 $81,310 $42.35 15670 22431 26401 5744 70246 $5,711,707,879.68 $2,974,847.85 
E-9 (over 16) $60,348 $3,900 $19,200 $83,448 $43.46 2712 2635 3593 1595 10535 $879,129,736.80 $457,880.07 
W-4 (over 16) $66,360 $2,686 $21,600 $90,646 $47.21 564 
 
2676 275 3515 $318,620,971.20 $165,948.42 
O-4 (over 8) $70,956 $2,686 $21,600 $95,242 $49.61 10311 14773 18097 3910 47091 $4,485,044,789.28 $2,335,960.83 
W-5 (over 20) $81,852 $2,686 $24,000 $108,538 $56.53 33 
 
570 107 710 $77,062,036.80 $40,136.48 
O-5 (over 12) $82,668 $2,686 $24,000 $109,354 $56.96 6805 9899 9853 1894 28451 $3,111,232,930.08 $1,620,433.82 
O-6 (over 14) $91,716 $2,686 $26,400 $120,802 $62.92 3414 3509 4670 673 12266 $1,481,758,313.28 $771,749.12 
O-7 (over 16) $129,576 $2,686 $28,800 $161,062 $83.89 107 146 153 35 441 $71,028,377.28 $36,993.95 
O-8 (over 18) $147,492 $2,686 $31,200 $181,378 $94.47 69 101 90 24 284 $51,511,374.72 $26,828.84 
O-9 (over 20) $161,640 $2,686 $33,600 $197,926 $103.09 33 38 53 15 139 $27,511,725.12 $14,329.02 
O-10 (over 22) $185,712 $2,686 $36,000 $224,398 $116.87 9 14 12 4 39 $8,751,525.12 $4,558.09 
    
$2,165,604 
 
321658 328200 548979 201817 1400654 $74,467,895,418.72 $38,785,362.20 
 
Table 27.   Military End Strength and Pay for Each Service (From http://militarypay.defense.gov) 



















Table 28.   Distribution of Military End Strength by Hourly Pay Rate 
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APPENDIX E. SECURE MOBILE ENVIRONMENT PORTABLE 
ELECTRONIC DEVICE FEATURES 
The following table provides a brief list of the SME PED features: 134 
 
  
 General Dynamics – Sectera Edge L-3 – Guardian 
Operating System Windows CE Windows CE 
Display TFT QVGA 2.8in., 64k colors High Res. LCD 3in.,  
Memory Unclass. Flash 128MB, RAM 64MB; Class. 
Flash 64MB, RAM 64MB; MicroSD up to 
2GB 
Dynamic Allocated across Unclass. 
And Class. 256MB; MicroSD (up 
to 8 cards) 
Wireless 
Interface 
GSM EDGE, UMTS, HSDPA, CDMA 
1xRTT, EVDO Rev. A, 802.11 b/g 
GSM EDGE, UMTS, HSDPA, 
CDMA 1xRTT, EVDO Rev. 0&A, 
802.11 b/g, 802.15.1 
Battery Life Lithium-Ion 
Standby ~60 hrs, Talk ~5 hrs, Secure Talk 
~3hrs 
Lithium Polymer 
Standby ~50 hrs, Talk ~4 hrs, 
Extended battery provides more 
CAC Enabled DoD PKI DoD PKI 
Security 
Protocols 
SCIP, HAIPE, Suite A/B 
Type 1 and non-Type 1 
SCIP, HAIPE IS, Suite A/B 
Type 1 and non-Type 1 
Weight 12 oz 13 oz 
Environmental MIL-STD-810F MIL-STD-810F 
Purchase Price ~$4000 includes accessories and mail client ~$4000 includes accessories and 
mail client 
R&D Expenses Government proportion: $38M + $5M Upgrades (GD only)135 
                                                 
134 General Dynamics C4 Systems, 2010; L-3 Communications Systems-East, 2008. 
135 NSA program office provided totals. 
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APPENDIX F. DOD PROCUREMENTS BY AREA 
Figure 53 illustrates the distribution of DoD procurements for FY2010 by funding 
office location. According to the procurement trends, Virginia accounted for the top 25%, 
Georgia and D.C. accounted for the next 25%, the yellow states accounted for the next 
25%, and the blue states accounted for another 23%. Even though some of the green 
colored states contain highly concentrated military installations, they provide only 3% of 
the demand. This suggests that wireless demand is not closely correlated to military base 
end strengths. Additionally, this suggests that DoD procurements are not evenly 
distributed across the country—specific areas are more likely than others to purchase 
high quantities of services. Essentially, this data suggests that the majority of the DoD’s 
demand is distributed around specific DoD procurements are closely aligned by regions.  
 
Figure 53.   NDWC and AAFPBA Procurement Distribution 
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APPENDIX G. CELLULAR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 54 illustrates the common, integrated mobile network architecture. If the 
DoD implements the MVNO approaches, the blue arrow illustrates the proportions of the 
cellular architectures the organization would need to adopt. Each cellular architecture is 












































































Figure 54.   2G/3G/4G Cellular Architecture136 
                                                 
136 Network Strategy Partners (2009); Pressley (2010).  
  162 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  163 
APPENDIX H. PRODUCTIVITY RECOVERY CHARTS 
The following tables enumerate the costs for various ranges of productivity 
increases given varying numbers of users (subscribers): 
 1 to 400K subscribers (FY2010) Gamma Distribution
Productivity Increases








1 - 10 Mins 94,776$                  22,746,240$        38,030$         9,127,200$         
11 - 20 Mins 423,422$                101,621,280$      162,115$      38,907,600$       
21 - 30 Mins 731,530$                175,567,200$      274,357$      65,845,680$       
31 - 60 Mins 1,238,500$            297,240,000$      470,253$      112,860,720$    
1 to 500K subscribers (FY2012)
Productivity Increases








1 - 10 Mins 114,526$                27,486,240$        45,874$         11,009,760$       
11 - 20 Mins 520,213$                124,851,120$      198,844$      47,722,560$       
21 - 30 Mins 891,388$                213,933,120$      327,955$      78,709,200$       
31 - 60 Mins 1,523,750$            365,700,000$      573,769$      137,704,560$    
1 to 600K subscribers (FY2014)
Productivity Increases








1 - 10 Mins 134,406$                32,257,440$        54,200$         13,008,000$       
11 - 20 Mins 608,165$                145,959,600$      231,456$      55,549,440$       
21 - 30 Mins 1,041,566$            249,975,840$      388,082$      93,139,680$       
31 - 60 Mins 1,748,913$            419,739,120$      661,057$      158,653,680$    
1 to 700K subscribers (FY2016)
Productivity Increases








1 - 10 Mins 161,933$                38,863,920$        65,283$         15,667,920$       
11 - 20 Mins 733,202$                175,968,480$      275,603$      66,144,720$       
21 - 30 Mins 1,234,957$            296,389,680$      472,179$      113,322,960$    
31 - 60 Mins 2,072,203$            497,328,720$      790,525$      189,726,000$     
Table 29.   Productivity Savings Estimates for Between 1 and 700K Subscribers 
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1 - 10 Mins 678,882$       162,931,680$      276,768$         66,424,320$        
11 - 20 Mins 2,633,840$   632,121,600$      1,458,187$      349,964,880$     
21 - 30 Mins 4,180,651$   1,003,356,240$  2,563,484$      615,236,160$     
31 - 60 Mins 7,785,020$   1,868,404,800$  4,717,347$      1,132,163,280$  










1 - 10 Mins 814,259$       195,422,160$      365,820$         87,796,800$        
11 - 20 Mins 3,468,154$   832,356,960$      2,137,182$      512,923,680$     
21 - 30 Mins 5,481,537$   1,315,568,880$  3,474,686$      833,924,640$     
31 - 60 Mins 10,187,230$ 2,444,935,200$  6,180,598$      1,483,343,520$  










1 - 10 Mins 996,652$       239,196,480$      451,679$         108,402,960$     
11 - 20 Mins 4,281,470$   1,027,552,800$  2,643,735$      634,496,400$     
21 - 30 Mins 6,796,365$   1,631,127,600$  4,568,085$      1,096,340,400$  
31 - 60 Mins 12,398,817$ 2,975,716,080$  7,448,090$      1,787,541,600$  










1 - 10 Mins 1,318,356$   316,405,440$      543,915$         130,539,600$     
11 - 20 Mins 5,098,538$   1,223,649,120$  3,153,427$      756,822,480$     
21 - 30 Mins 7,989,305$   1,917,433,200$  5,432,212$      1,303,730,880$  
31 - 60 Mins 14,891,836$ 3,574,040,640$  9,117,837$      2,188,280,880$   
Table 30.   Productivity Savings Estimates for Between 300K and 700K Subscribers 
The lines in the following figures represent the savings from the minutes that may 
be potentially recovered from an increase in productivity. 
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Figure 56.   Expected Productivity Savings for 1 to 700K Subscribers 
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APPENDIX I. IN-DEPTH RISK ASSESSMENT 
This section provides an example of a more in-depth risk assessment than that 
performed in Chapter IV to estimate the risk levels of potential network service business 
cases. A precondition for an in-depth risk assessment of each case is identification of a 
likely architecture. The architecture drives the system vulnerabilities, and it may contain 
elements that naturally reduce the likelihood of successful, or attempted, threat actions. A 
detailed risk assessment will provide a much more granular depiction of the threats and 
vulnerabilities inherent within candidate architectures, and it will contribute to the 
ultimately choosing the most beneficial business case. 
A. THREAT 
Threat actions are defined and listed in Appendix A. They are essentially a 
method that exploits or triggers vulnerabilities. Based on the network concepts presented 
in Chapter IV, Table 21 depicts the potential of a threat action. The numbers 0, 1, and 2 
represent high, medium, and low threat, respectively. In accordance with (NIST, 2002) 
the following sections describe the level of threats per each category listed in Table 21.  



























































































































































































Natural Threats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Environmental Threats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Service Abuse 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Backdoor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Electronic Tracking 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Exposure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interception 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Inference 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intrusion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Masquerade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Falsification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Repudiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Incapacitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corruption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Obstruction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Misappropriation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Misuse 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Level of Threat 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 85% 85% 85% 85%  
Table 31.   Evaluated Potential of Threat Actions (Example) 
1. Natural Threats 
The mobile base stations, enhanced Wi-Fi, tethered tactical, and sleeve 
approaches are inherently mobile as opposed to the other fixed infrastructure approaches. 
Increased network mobility (i.e., on-the-move, portable, fix, etc.) can assist in physically 
relocating equipment to less threatening environments and, therefore, reducing the 
potential of the natural threats. For example, tornadoes occur frequently in the middle of 
the United States. However, tornadoes are less likely to occur in Alaska. Therefore, since 
the mobile network devices are highly mobile the threat is inherently reduced as the 
location changes. 
a. Service Abuse  
Removing the cost of service limits the potential of service abuse from 
occurring. For example, cellular networks cost the end users money per minute of use. 
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However, assuming a Wi-Fi connection is not charged per megabyte, this approach could 
create an environment where the threat of service abuse does not exist. 
2. Interception, Electronic Tracking, and Obstruction 
The threat of a malicious agent intercepting or obstructing your data is reduced by 
operating in environments without these agents. For example, in Antarctica, the threat of 
an agent intercepting emissions is less likely (low perceived value of information) than 
outside of high-value national assets (high perceived value). As another example, on 
military bases with enforced perimeters, the physical environment is restricted to 
authorized personnel only. Therefore, the level of threat is limited to only internal 
personnel. 
3. Remaining Threat Actions 
Environmental threats, backdoor, spam, inference, intrusion, masquerade, 
falsification, misappropriation, misuse, and corruption are other types of potential threat 
actions that could potentially exploit vulnerabilities. None of the other approaches 
modifies the environment to the extent that they mitigate threats and, therefore, they are 
assessed to have limited to no affect on threat action. For example, spam is a threat action 
that is just as likely to occur regardless of network architecture, since it is low cost and 
low risk for the perpetrator. Since these threats are potentially reduced through 
management policies, the technical architectures presented in this chapter have no affect 
on these remaining threats. 
B. VULNERABILITIES 
Table 22 lists security controls (from Appendix A) that potentially limit 
vulnerabilities in the rows, and the columns list the various architectures being evaluated. 
The average of the scores for each network represents the total vulnerability for the list in 
the table. 



























































































































































































Management Controls 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Operational Controls 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2
Identification & Authentication 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 2
Authorization 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Access Controls Enforcement 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2
Nonrepudiation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protected Communications 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Transaction Privacy 1 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Audit Trail Maintenance 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Protection of Server Resident Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2
Level of Vulnerability 85% 45% 95% 85% 40% 40% 40% 30% 30% 80% 85% 40% 40%  
Table 32.   Vulnerability Metrics 
The most vulnerable network operation approaches in Table 22 are RAN, 
commercial MNO, and Wi-Fi network access points. This is attributed to the use of 
standard commercial communication protocols. The other approaches implement 
additional controls to reduce vulnerability. 
The MVNO concepts provide organizational structure to facilitate additional 
controls. For example, the DoD currently has multiple contracts and agreements spread 
across hundreds of commands, agencies, and departments. The lack of centralized control 
limits the DoD’s ability to implement device and expense management systems. 
According to the characteristics the systems provide, and the authors’ ranking of those 
potential system controls, the resulting score is greatly reduced from the current 
commercial approach.  
The least vulnerable approach is the DoD’s owning and controlling a separate 
core and edge mobile network. Assuming the ownership of the core network increases the 
operational, management, and technical controls, then these approaches should result in a 
lower vulnerability.  
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C. IMPACT AND OVERALL RISK 
Impact and the resulting risk for each architecture would be calculated in the same 
way as in Chapter IV, in accordance with the guidance from NIST (2002). 
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